THE

CONQUEST OF SCINDE

A COMMENTARY

BY

LIEUT-COL OUTRAM C.B.

RESIDENT AT SATTARAH

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PART II

GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMEERS

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THE CONQUEST OF SCINDE

A COMMENTARY.

PART II.

SECTION X.

ADVANCE ON HYDRABAD.

My position, while the events under consideration were in progress, was in the last degree painful and anomalous. I was constrained to take an active and somewhat prominent part in an invasion which I had strongly deprecated, even when it was merely hinted at as a possible contingency. This invasion led to the infliction of still further injustice on the unhappy Princes of Scinde; and, emphatically as I denounced that injustice to Sir Charles Napier, I was bound to vindicate his conduct in my communications with his victims. On the Ameers I had to urge the necessity of a speedy

settlement of affairs, and, at the same time, to demonstrate to the General that, consistently with the course which he pursued, no satisfactory adjustment of them could ever be arrived at. I was called upon to obtain their assent to demands against which I had solemnly protested as a positive robbery; and I had to warn them against resistance to our requisitions as a measure that would bring down upon them utter and *merited* destruction, while I firmly believed that every life lost in consequence of our aggressions, would be chargeable on *us* as a murder. Under the circumstances of the case, I feel confident that the suffrages of all who are competent to pronounce on the subject will be given in favour of the measures which I recommended to be adopted towards the Ameers of Khyrpoor. The Hydrabad Princes were differently situated. Unless implicated in the fate of their cousins, and subjected like them to exactions unauthorized by the treaty, or goaded on to despair, no difficulty was to be apprehended in settling *their* affairs. But menace and command had been employed, and suddenly to have changed our tone, must have appeared to them vacillation —not forbearance. A march upon their capital had been threatened: if, after driving their kinsmen to extremity, and proceeding so far in executing our threat against themselves, we had suddenly halted before the ratification of the treaty, our motives could not have failed to be misconstrued; and the mistake would have proved fatal to them. It *became*, therefore, *merciful* to persist

in that threatening attitude, although its first assumption was alike impolitic and unjust. Accordingly, when Sir Charles Napier rejoined his army, after returning from Emaumghur, I fully concurred in the propriety of his prolonging his march southward, not only as calculated to expedite the final submission of the Ameers of Lower Scinde, but as tending to dispel any faint hopes the Princes of Khyrpoor might still entertain that by standing aloof they possibly might obtain better terms.

When, however, I expressed myself approvingly of such a course, I never imagined that their plenipotentiaries would be sent back, and the unconditional tender of their seals disregarded; nor did I contemplate the continued advance of the General after every thing which we demanded had been yielded, or was in a fair way of being obtained. I was in ignorance, moreover, of much that I now know, and which the reader has already been apprised of, else I most certainly should have endeavoured to dissuade the General from advancing farther with his army than Pir Abu Bukkur.

The reader has seen how unfortunately my previous efforts to save the Ameers of both provinces were frustrated: it now becomes my painful duty to show, that although I eventually failed to avert hostilities, my want of success is wholly attributable to two causes for which I am not responsible: the one, the withholding from me those powers with which I ought to have been invested;

the other, the continuance on the part of Sir Charles Napier, of the same violence and indiscretion which had characterized his every act till his policy attained its final consummation on the field of Meeanee. Before, however, proceeding to narrate the events which occurred subsequent to my arrival at Hydrabad, I must, in justice to the Ameers of Lower Scinde, recall to the reader's recollection certain passages in the history of Sir Charles Napier's negotiations towards them.

The General's first diplomatic act had been to cancel certain privileges guaranteed to the Ameers by the British Government. His subsequent proceedings were well calculated to impress them with the idea that this was but the prelude to fresh invasions of their rights; and it scarcely required even such offensive displays of austerity to convince them that mischief was at hand.

No sooner had our armies been extricated in triumph from Affghanistan,—partly through the assistance rendered by the Ameers,—than the latter beheld us suddenly change our tone and assume a menacing position. Rumour told them that, no longer requiring their friendly aid, and ceasing to dread their hostility, the English contemplated the appropriation of their country; and every circumstance tended to confirm the rumour. I read in the "Intelligence" from Lower Scinde of the 3d November, that—

"The Ameers are wholly at a loss to comprehend the reason of the withdrawal of the (political) agency of Scinde and Beloochistan, as announced to them by Major Outram, and look on it

as preparatory to their country being abandoned to the pleasure of the Affghan tribes."

In the "Intelligence" of the 9th idem, I find the following :—

"During the past week, each day has brought a message from one or other of the Ameers, begging that some one might be allowed to remain at Hydrabad in a political capacity. Their Highnesses do not hesitate to say that their differences will come to open rupture on the removal of British influence from their Court; and Meer Shadad has announced his intention of building a small fort at Meysur as a future residence."

To augment their fears, a large army was collected at Sukkur, at a period of profound peace, and extensive military preparations were going forward, the sole object of which, the Ameers not unnaturally concluded, was the invasion of their country. Captain Mylne reported that the Sukkur army was viewed with alarm, "and any but friendly motives" attributed to its concentration: yet, with all these incentives to make an effort for their independence, they calmly reasoned on their inability to cope with us, and neither collected troops, nor, so far as Captain Mylne could ascertain, meditated their collection. Yet their fears increased apace, and ere long acquired consistency Sir Charles Napier's letter, indeed, to Ali Morad which Ali Morad, doubtless, took care to communicate, gave them good reason to fear that their case was prejudged.

"You know, for I heard it from your own lips, that the

Ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde were in league against us, all except his Highness Meer Sobdar and yourself."

* * * * * *

"WO ATTEND THOSE WHO CONSPIRE AGAINST THE POWERFUL ARMS OF THE COMPANY: BEHOLD THE FATE OF TIPPOO SULTAN, AND THE PAISHWA, AND THE EMPEROR OF CHINA!"

Even the assurance given by the General, that the British Government desired not to appropriate Scinde, but to see it great and flourishing, was calculated still further to alarm them; for it contained the *proviso*, that its Princes must be as faithful to our nation as Ali Morad and Sobdar; *that the other Ameers were not so, Sir Charles Napier had announced.*

The treaty was presented to the Lower Scinde Chiefs, and accepted, as it had been by those of Khyrpoor; yet still, assuming their hostility, and beguiled by the false reports of Ali Morad, Sir Charles Napier declared his intention of continuing, in the direction of Hydrabad, the march ostensibly undertaken with a view to see that the "armed bands" were dispersed at Khyrpoor.

On the 1st of January, the General again added to their fears, by another striking instance of his contempt for treaties. He proclaimed his intention of placing killadars, appointed by Ali Morad, in every fort in Upper Scinde; and, lest the Ameers of the Lower Province should imagine that they enjoyed any exemption from like aggressions, the following very unnecessary notification was added:—

"AND I WILL ACT TOWARDS THE AMEERS OF HYDRABAD AS I SHALL FIND THEIR CONDUCT DESERVES."

To the minds of men who had been pronounced guilty of conspiracy against the British, such an intimation must have vividly recalled "the fate of Tippoo Sultan, the Paishwa, and the Emperor of China," and could scarcely fail to awaken very painful presentiments. Nor were these likely to be effaced by the letter addressed, on the following day, to Meer Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad.

"*I came to Khyrpoor*," wrote the General, "*to see how matters stand, and I mean to go to Hydrabad to do the same.* * * * *I hear of troops collecting in the south. Armed bands shall not cross the Indus, therefore I take troops.*" *

The results of Sir Charles Napier's negotiations with the Ameers of Khyrpoor, and of his march upon their capital, were the deposition of Meer Roostum, and the flight and spoliation of his family. Had not the Ameers of Lower Scinde good grounds to assume that the march to Hydrabad would terminate in like disasters to themselves? Conscious that no troops had collected in the south, could the Princes of Lower Scinde otherwise than conclude that the reason assigned

* The *sequitur* is a strange one. The representative of a nation which is by solemn treaty bound not to introduce its jurisdiction into the territory of an ally, invades that territory under the most ridiculous pretences, and impresses its sovereigns with the conviction that he meditates the seizure of their country. He *hears* that troops are collecting in consequence of the uncontrollable alarm created by his own violent proceedings: he strictly prohibits (contrary to solemn treaty) their collection, and assigns as a reason for prolonging his invasive course, that it appears to have alarmed the invaded! Civilized nations are perfectly entitled to invade; for "barbarians" to take precautions is alike impertinent and treasonable!

was but a pretext for the invasion of their territory?

Even before the General had advanced on Khyrpoor, while yet his march to the southward was but talked of, we read in the "Intelligence" of the 20th of December, that—

> "THEY HAVE ALL TAKEN INTO THEIR HEADS THAT THE GENERAL IS MOVING TOWARDS HYDRABAD, AND THAT NOTHING WILL SATISFY HIM EXCEPT THE POSSESSION OF THE FORT AND GUNS THERE."

The belief certainly appears any thing but extravagant or improbable. The treaty, with all its penal clauses, had been accepted; and it now appeared to them that the General's advance was solely undertaken to provoke that resistance which he had hoped the treaty would, but which it had failed to elicit. We cannot, therefore, wonder that they talked amongst themselves—as the spies represented they did—of making no more concessions to a power whose insolent demands rose in proportion to their submissiveness. It was reported on the 20th December, that—

> "Meer Zungnee Khan has contrived to bring all the Ameers of Hydrabad to agree together, among whom are Meer Sobdar and Meer Hoossein Ali, who have all sworn on the Koran that they will not make any more concessions to the English."

During the subsequent month, as the reader well knows, events occurred which must have driven to resistance any Princes less impressed than were the Ameers with the irresistible power of our arms, and the exhaustless nature of our resources. Emaumghur had been

plundered and destroyed; and apparently for no other reason than that the exactions of the treaty, and the invasion of Upper Scinde, had *failed to provoke opposition*; unheard of demands were made on their brethren of Khyrpoor — demands of which the treaty made no mention — demands which deprived of the means of subsistence a great proportion of the nobles of the land. And they beheld a benign and grey-headed monarch, who had conferred the most substantial benefits on the English—whom Governors-General and British envoys had caressed and honoured—dethroned, despoiled, insulted, and trodden under foot, accused of hostility, and proclaimed a liar. Yet, conscious of their inability successfully to resist us, and fearing to draw on themselves the fate of their cousins, they refused them admission into Lower Scinde, and deputed vakeels empowered to affix their seals to *any terms* the General might dictate.

The Ameers and their feudatories were, however, *men;* and to believe that, while the events above narrated were in progress, they had not contemplated the *possibility of being driven to resistance*, would be to believe them fatuous and blind; to assume that they did not meditate defending themselves, if concession failed to save them from destruction, would be to assign to them a meanness of character which did not belong to them. When, therefore, they sent the vakeels, they might well have provided them with letters of summons to certain of their Chiefs, to be transmitted if an

amicable adjustment could not be effected.* But that the Ameers even then actually had recourse to this precautionary measure, was erroneously assumed by Sir Charles Napier.

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* Let the following extract from the "Conquest of Scinde," (p. 254,) testify to the generosity of the Historian :—"In this crisis, the Ameers played, as usual, a double part. Assenting to the wishes of the war party, *they hastened the arrival of their feudatories, but they also sent deputies to the British camp with the credentials of ambassadors, the instructions of spies, and the powers of military commissaries: they carried secret letters to command the Chiefs of the Northern tribes on the right side of the Indus, allies and feudatories alike, to come with all their fighting men to the general assembly near Hydrabad.*" This tirade is founded on the circumstance, that on the 11th of February Sir Charles Napier arrested some horsemen who were proceeding to Hydrabad, on the leader of whom was found an order to attend to the instructions of Gholam Shah. This summons, and an accompanying note from Meer Mahommed of Khyrpoor, like every other document damnatory of the Ameers, Sir Charles Napier forwarded to Lord Ellenborough, and with it transmitted the following memorandum :—"The Gholam Shah was Mahommed Khan's deputy, with full powers to meet Major Outram ; and there can be no doubt whatever, that this note (which is entirely written with the Ameer's own hand,) relates to the raising of the Murree tribe. This note being to the same person, as the *treasonable* letter, in my opinion, proves this, and shows that Gholam Shah was acting the part of plenipotentiary, spy, and recruiting officer, too, against us. He had truly full power given to him." I have (that my opponents may have no room for cavilling) *assumed* that the Historian is correct in stating that the ambassadors were furnished with these letters of summons. On this assumption, I feel that every right-minded man will exonerate the Ameers from the charge of "*treasonable*" conduct ;—nay, I will go further, and maintain, that *if the assumption be incorrect, the Ameers were culpably forbearing.* The impression likely to be conveyed by Sir Charles Napier's allusion to the Murree tribe, coupled with the Historian's allusions to the "Northern tribes," that the *mountain* Murrees were summoned, is ludicrously absurd. The Chief to whom this letter was addressed, was Hyat Khan Murree, *a Scindian Murree*, a subject of the Ameers, whose village—Goram-ka-Shehur—is situated about thirty miles north-west from Sukkurunda, or about three or four days' journey from Hydrabad ! As I have already said, I have *assumed* that the "*treasonable*" summons was entrusted to the ambassadors, to be forwarded should it be deemed requisite. *By Sir Charles Napier's testimony, however, it would appear that such was not the case !—that the forbearing and suffering Ameers did not even take that precaution which it was culpable to neglect !* The

The vakeels, as we have seen, waited on Sir Charles Napier on the 30th of January; but he, instead of availing himself of the full powers with which they were entrusted, directed them to take to Hydrabad the utterly ruined fugitives of Upper Scinde!* What other conclusion could they draw from this, than that the General was determined to involve the Princes of both provinces in one common fate? They wrote from Sir Charles Napier's camp to apprize their masters of their danger, and let the words employed sink deep into the heart of him who reads:—

"THE GENERAL IS BENT ON WAR; SO GET READY."

I know not that they accurately described the General's feelings—but I do solemnly believe that no other conclusion was open to them. The vakeel who is particularized as having communicated this warning, was Meerza Khoosroo; and I read in the

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ambassadors did not reach the General's camp till the 30th of January; they were still with him on the 31st; and it was probably not till the 2d or 3d of February that they arrived in Hydrabad. *Not till then, when the vakeels told them that war was determined on by Sir Charles Napier, did the Ameers, according to the evidence adduced against them, begin to collect their troops.* And not till the 5th of February, (according to Sir Charles Napier,) when they beheld the army advancing in violation of what they understood to be the General's promise, did the Ameers issue this summons to Hyat Khan Murree. For it is in reference to a letter of the 5th, that Sir Charles Napier thus writes to Lord Ellenborough, when handing up the summons—"*for at the same time that he* (Meer Mahommed) *wrote the letters I send* * * * *he wrote to me the letter marked* 3, *deprecating my march before the 9th*," &c.

* Yet the Ameers of Lower Scinde's compliance with this order, and *that against their will*, is made a charge against them by the Historian. "They received the Khyrpoor Ameers and their armies with open arms, and 60,000 men were assembled."

evidence against the Ameers, with Mr. Brown's signature attached, collected nearly a year after the melancholy events to which it refers, that—

"When the Meerza returned to Hydrabad, the order for collecting troops was given."

And had the time not come? A crisis had arrived when the Ameers were bound by every feeling of which our nature acknowledges the influence, to make a stand. The purity of Sir Charles Napier's motives, and his aversion to bloodshed, are not elements of the question. His heart the Ameers could not search, but his acts they beheld; and those acts could bear but one construction.

The Belooche feudatories, there cannot be a doubt, were nothing loath to obey the summons. To imagine that they had beheld, unmoved, the ruin which had fallen on some of their brethren, and which they feared might overtake all, is to assume that they were more than angels, or less than men.

Yet, though prepared to resist, if submission failed to avert destruction, the Ameers shunned war. Sir Charles Napier and his army might be cut off, and another army and another general might be made to share their fate, but the Princes of Scinde too well knew the illimitable resources of our empire, not to be aware that retribution would follow—retribution swift, terrible, and sure. Their mountain passes, their rigorous climate, and their distant position, had not availed the Affghans;

and the Ameers required not to be told that, hemmed in on every side, with the seaports and river in our possession, with all the resources of the Western Presidency of India within three days' water communication, their open country could not many months be defended against the British. Although, when their vakeels announced that Sir Charles Napier was "*bent on war*," the Hydrabad Princes summoned their feudatories, it is evident (from an intercepted letter) that for some time afterwards they hoped to avert hostilities.

But ere I reached Hydrabad, Sir Charles Napier had again distracted the minds of the subjects of his diplomacy with doubts and fears, which it had been both politic and generous to spare them. The 1st of February, the reader may remember, was the last day of grace allowed to the Chiefs of Khyrpoor in Sir Charles Napier's proclamation of the 27th January. When he sent back the vakeels of Hydrabad on the 31st of that month, desiring them to take with them the Ameers of Upper Scinde, it was necessary to extend the period allowed to the latter for acquiescence. In the memorandum furnished to the vakeels, the General thus expressed himself:—

"I will not commit any act of hostility against those Ameers (Upper Scinde) till I hear from Major Outram; but I shall march more near to Koonhera, in case the Ameers of Khyrpoor do not proceed to Hydrabad, where they must be on the 6th February; and if the Ameers of Khyrpoor do not dismiss their soldiers, I will attack them. This is an extension of the time given by the proclamation, viz. the 1st of February. *If I do not*

receive a letter from the deputies of Hydrabad, on the 5th of February, I will march against Meer Roostum on the 6th."

When Sir Charles Napier thus wrote, he imagined that I should be able to start for Hydrabad on the 30th of January. By the intrigues of Ali Morad, I was unable to leave Sukkur till the 4th of February,—*the day on which Roostum arrived at Hydrabad;* and unforeseen and unavoidable accidents prevented my reaching that city till *the 8th.* On the very day on which I left Sukkur, Sir Charles Napier acknowledged that the miscarriage of his letter was "a strange affair," and expressed his suspicions that Ali Morad had stopped it; under these circumstances it had been generous, and no more than just, to apprise the Ameers, that in consequence of the *contre-temps* that had occurred, he would of course delay his march. This, however, was an act of consideration too marked to be extended to barbarians. On the 5th he wrote to me, assuming that I was then "fairly off," and would be at Hydrabad next day. On the 6th, he again wrote, and expressed himself "*sure*" that I was *then* at Hydrabad; "*barring accidents,*" was the parenthetical proviso,—but the events which *had* occurred might have satisfied him that accidents were by no means easily *barred;* and as he himself intimated that a steamer with treasure was aground, it might have occurred to him that the one bearing his Commissioner was not exempt from a like contingency. These considerations, and the circumstance that the ambassadors had promised that Roostum should accompany them,

night have induced the General to extend to the Ameers the semblance of courtesy; and under the circumstances, the *motives* which influenced him were little likely to be misconstrued. But such a course comported not with the policy of Sir Charles Napier. He continued his march on the 6th.

"The deputies have sent me promises that Roostum will go to Hydrabad." Sir Charles Napier wrote on the 5th of February,—"my conditions were that he or his representatives should go, not promise to go. I know what an Ameer's promises are, and especially his. *I therefore march to-morrow for a village named Mora, sixteen miles on the road to Hydrabad.*" The next day he again wrote —"The vakeels wrote to me that Meer Roostum would go to Hydrabad. *They have not said that he is gone: so to keep my word I have marched thus far.*" My reader will probably agree with me that this sudden eagerness to demonstrate the inviolability of an Englishman's word, was somewhat prudish.

When the intelligence of preparations being made for an advance reached Hydrabad, the terrified Ameers despatched by express the following deprecatory appeal against what they regarded a breach of plighted faith, which was received on the 7th:—

"According to the agreement with your Excellency, Meerza Koosroo Bey, Yoosoof Bey, and Gholam Shah Lugharee, proceeded to our brother Meer Roostum, and proposed with him regarding his movement towards Hydrabad, as a strong friendship, brotherhood, and relationship was existing between us. THE AMEER HAD STARTED FOR HYDRABAD PREVIOUS TO ANY INVITATION ON OUR PART, WHERE HE AND MEER NUSSEER KHAN

AND MEER MAHOMMED KHAN ARRIVED ON THE 4TH OF FEBRUARY. *Your Excellency having promised to our vakeels that, until the arrival of Colonel Outram, and discussion of matters, you would remain at Nowshera till the 9th instant, and not move further on this part, we beg to inform your Excellency that Colonel Outram did not reach this up to the 5th, and Meer Roostum, who is an old venerable man, and the Chief and head of all the family of Meer Choker Khan,* HAS SUFFERED GROSS TREATMENT AND GREAT INJUSTICE, WHICH IT IS OUT OF OUR POWER TO EXPLAIN. When Colonel Outram reaches Hydrabad we will tell him all that has passed, through whom your Excellency will learn every thing about the affair, and also enter into the details of the treaty with Colonel Outram; and it is well known that at Koonhera the Ameers' family and army are remaining, and Colonel Outram, having delayed coming here, we hope that your Excellency on no account will move further on, *because that will be entirely unfriendly, and it is contrary to the laws of the British and that of friends, and it is improper.* The army which is at Koonhera is only meant for protecting the baggage and families of Meer Roostum. We hope your Excellency will not think otherwise."

Sir Charles Napier had said, (according to the Parliamentary version of his "memorandum,") that unless he received "a letter from the deputies of Hydrabad on the 5th of February," he would march against Meer Roostum on the 6th. *He merely required that the aged Ameer should be at Hydrabad on the 6th, and he promised that he would commit no act of hostility against Roostum's kinsmen till he heard from myself.* This memorandum was furnished at a time when he believed I should be at Hydrabad ere the date specified for Roostum's arrival. In the interim, he learned that I had been unnecessarily detained; this detention he himself suspected was caused by Ali Morad, whose

only object in effecting it he well knew must have been to injure his relatives: *on or before the 5th, he received all that he had specified as necessary to arrest his onward march—a letter from the deputies of Hydrabad; that letter stated that Roostum certainly would be at the capital by the day specified; yet, because they had not told him that the Ameer had actually gone, and because, as he elsewhere says, he knew the value of an Ameer's promises—he advances!* To criminate Sir Charles Napier is as far from my wish as it is remote from my province; to vindicate the Ameers, however, is necessary to my own vindication, and I unhesitatingly affirm that the Princes of Hydrabad, knowing as they did that Roostum had arrived among them two days prior to the date specified by Sir Charles Napier, ignorant of the cause of my detention, learning that the force was preparing to advance, and viewing these circumstances in connexion with the General's previous proceedings, had grounds for believing that their DESTRUCTION was determined on,—that they would have been *justified* in using every means at their disposal for the sacrifice of the British army, and would have richly deserved their present fate had they not forthwith summoned Hyat Khan Murree, and every old man and stripling who could be brought to augment the array of warriors at their disposal. Let any Englishman imagine himself in the position of these Chiefs, and honestly say what would have been his conduct—and what his impulses.

Such was the state of matters when I reached Hydrabad.

On my arrival, the usual deputations were sent to meet me, and arrangements were made for a conference with the Ameers in the evening. In reporting my arrival to Sir Charles Napier, I apprized him of what I had from the first foreseen must be the inevitable result of throwing the Khyrpoor Chiefs on the hospitality of their cousins,—that the restoration of Roostum would be demanded by the Ameers of Hydrabad. The possibility of the occurrence of hostilities, I could not but contemplate. But though imminent, they were even yet not unavoidable. The warriors then assembling around the capital of Scinde had been brought together by our own measures. A common sense of injury and danger, and a chivalrous detestation of our ungenerous and unjust conduct alone united them: a simple act of justice would have dissolved their bond of union, but that was peremptorily denied.

I thus wrote to the General:—

"They (about 100 convalescents of H. M. 22d Regiment proceeding up the river, whom it was my intention to detain,) with Captain Wells's detachment of thirty Sepoys, which I received from the *Comet*, will enable me to hold our steamers here, if not the agency also, until you reach Hydrabad, should the Ameers commence hostilities, which, notwithstanding their blustering, I do not believe they intend to do, it being their usual practice to make a show of intending hostilities to get better terms: besides, had they really intended to proceed to extremity, they would certainly have removed their women from Hydrabad, which it

does not appear they have made any preparation for doing. From what Fitzgerald could learn, however, it appeared that Omercote was being stored with grain, and that property was being removed to that place."*

According to promise, I held a conference with the Ameers in the evening. I subjoin the notes of it transmitted to Sir Charles Napier :—

"After receiving and welcoming me with their usual cordiality and customary compliments, the durbar was cleared of all but the parties above mentioned, and I then inquired of their

* In one of the notes appended to this letter, *six months after its receipt*, Sir Charles Napier observes,—"When men bully and bluster at the head of 60,000 men, and have provisioned their fortress, it becomes no joke for 2800 who are within their reach." *Long prior to this note being appended, Sir Charles Napier knew that the intelligence brought to Fitzgerald was incorrect, that no preparations had been made to provide Omercote!* When Sir Charles Napier penned this, he was, I believe, labouring under sickness —but what excuse shall be advanced for the "Historian," who thus writes, (page 265)—"His (Major Outram's) first dispatch announced *a positive opinion that the Ameers had no hostile designs, yet he admitted that they were stowing their desert fortress of Omercote with grain, and were very blustering. On this it was well remarked by the General, 'when men bully and bluster,' &c.*"! Assuming, however, that the desert fortress of Omercote had been provisioned and placed in an efficient state for defence, Sir Charles Napier well knew that it could only have been used as a place of refuge for the Ameers' families and their requisite escorts—that it was not, as he implies, the fortress for the 60,000 men to fall back on ; that for 60,000 or 6000 men to occupy Omercote, with their communications cut off, would have been to devote themselves to starvation. But had the Fort of Hydrabad been put in order for a siege, who will say the time had not come? If it was no joke for 2800 men to be in the vicinity of 60,000 bullies and blusterers, who had brought them there? Whose measures had collected the 60,000? Who had compelled them to bully and bluster? What European power—what power but a native one contiguous to our Indian empire, and aware of its resources,—would have confined itself to bully and bluster under the fearful provocation the Ameers had received! As regards the 60,000 bullies which Sir Charles Napier implies were around Hydrabad, it is unnecessary to say that about two-thirds of them were creations of his own vivid imagination, as harmless as Falstaff's foes. In another note he calls them 50,000! and yet, with a somewhat ridiculous minuteness, details the hosts at Meeanee at 25,862! Strange that the odd 34,138 did not go to battle!

Highnesses whether they were prepared to subscribe the new treaties lately tendered to them?

"The following is the purport of the discussion which followed, which was prolonged upwards of three hours by repetitions of the same arguments :—

"*Ameers of Hydrabad.*—[Producing the former treaties, and Meer Nusseer Khan especially pointing to one dated April 1838, and signed by Lord Auckland, which pledged us never to covet any portion of that Ameer's territory, or "one rea" of his property.] 'Why is it that you now make new demands? Four years have only passed since your Sirkar thus pledged that nothing more should be required of us.'

"*Commissioner.*—'These treaties have been broken by your own acts; the British Government is compelled to require these new stipulations.'

"*Ameers.*—'We deny that we have infringed one iota of the existing treaties. In what have we done so?'

"*Commissioner.*—'The particulars were stated to your Highnesses in the letter from Sir Charles Napier, presented by Lieutenant Stanley, with the draft of the new treaty.'

"*Ameers.*—'It was written, that treasonable letters had been sent to Beebruck Boogtie and Sawun Mull. Why were those letters not produced? Why don't you give us an opportunity of disproving them? We never wrote them.'

"*Commissioner.*—'They are with the Governor-General.'

"*Ameers.*—'You say the seals prove them. How easily seals are forged, you yourself know, having required us to punish one of our own subjects who forged yours when you resided here two years ago.'

"*Commissioner.*—'The handwriting was also ascertained to be that of one of your confidential scribes.'

"*Meer Nusseer Khan.*—'I solemnly deny that it was written by my authority. Why was not the paper shown to me?'

"*Commissioner.*—'These are points which it is not for me to discuss. The question is, whether or not you accept the new treaty? If not, the army under Sir Charles Napier will continue to advance. If you do, I shall endeavour to arrange the consequent details as fairly as possible to each Ameer, which is my only duty.'

"*Ameers.*—'If the army advances, our Beloochees will not be restrained, and we shall be blamed for the consequences.'

"*Commissioner.*—'Do not suppose that the army will be delayed one moment by any assembly of your Beloochees, who, if they appear before it, will certainly be attacked, and the excuse that you could not restrain them will be of no avail: as customary in all nations, the Government will be held responsible for the acts of its people.'

"*Ameers.*—'You know how little under control our Beloochees are. If the army advances, they will plunder the whole country.'

"*Commissioner.*—'It is in your own power to prevent it, by complying with the terms. The moment you do so, I will despatch a British officer to inform Sir Charles Napier.'

"*Ameers.*—'We deny the charges on which the new treaty is imposed, but still we will subscribe it, and the Ameers of Upper Scinde will also subscribe theirs, on one condition, *i.e.*, that Meer Roostum Khan be restored to his rights. Why was he deposed?'

"*Commissioner.*—'He resigned the Turban of his own free will, and wrote to Sir Charles Napier to request that it might be made over to Meer Ali Morad.'

"*Meer Roostum.*—'By the General's own direction I sought refuge with Ali Morad, (here he produced the letter directing Meer Roostum to place himself under Meer Ali Morad's protection, and to be guided by his advice,) who placed me under restraint, and made use of my seal, and compelled me to do as he thought proper. Would I resign my birthright of my own free will? I did not write that letter.* Any thing that I did was by Ali Morad's advice, whose advice I was directed by the General to be guided by.'

"*Commissioner.*—'Why did you not meet me at Khyrpoor as you promised?'

"*Meer Roostum.*—'I was advised not to go, at Ali Morad's instigation, who sent three different persons to deceive me.'

"*Ameers.*—'Do you know the value of the territory taken from Upper Scinde?'

"*Commissioner.*—'About six lacs, I understand.'

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* Captain Brown informs me that the letter alluded to was returned to Meer Ali Morad.

"*Ameers.*—'Does the Governor-General know?'

"*Commissioner.*—'The General has informed the Governor-General.'

"*Meer Mahommed Khan*—(of Khyrpoor.)—'What fault have I committed, and why has my house been destroyed, and my property plundered?' (Emaumghur.)

"*Commissioner.*—'No property was in Emaumghur but some grain, which the General ordered to be paid for.'

"After much conversation of the above tenor, the Ameers again entreated me to obtain the restoration of Meer Roostum to his rights, which they declared was the only obstacle to their signing the treaty, and complying with all that is required of them.

"I replied, that if Meer Roostum could prove the forgery of the paper resigning his Turban to Meer Ali Morad, and the other deceptions which he asserted had been practised against him, he should petition the General to that effect: but that that had nothing to do with the new draft treaties, and it will not rest with me, whether or not any thing would be done for Meer Roostum.

"The Ameers then begged me to write to the General to delay his march, if only for a day or two, while these matters were deliberated—being, they said, of too much importance to be decided in a moment, on the plea that, if the British troops did advance, it would be impossible to restrain the Belooches from outrages, which would commit themselves with the British Government; and that once the Belooches broke from control, the whole country would suffer, whether the territory of friend or foe.

"I replied, that nothing could stop the advance of the army, excepting a full and unconditional acceptance of the new treaty, which I would immediately communicate to the General, who might then, I hoped, be induced to halt.

"The Ameers at last ended by saying, that they protested against the charges on which the new treaty was required, as unfounded, but that they would comply with the terms, provided I advised them to do so, and that they might petition the Governor-General with a view to represent the falsehood of the charges.

"To this I replied, that the charges were considered fully substantiated, but that of course Sir Charles Napier would not object

to the Ameers making any representation they chose, provided they complied with the terms of the treaty; moreover, I advised them, as a friend, to comply at once with what they were prepared to concede, for that delay could only be injurious to them; that resistance must end in their destruction; and all attempts to appear formidable, by calling together their Belooches, would avail them nought towards checking the advance of the British troops, or causing us to relax one iota in our demands. I recommended their Highnesses to come at once to a decision, and to send their vakeels to me in the morning, fully empowered to conclude every thing that was required; that in that expectation I should delay my dispatch to the General until noon to-morrow. They promised to consult, and let me know in the morning. We took leave, and returned to the Agency about eight, P.M., after paying a complimentary visit to Meers Sobdar and Hoossein Ali Khan, with whom I had no discussion, they being quite prepared to execute the treaty should the others do so.

"Lest my memory should have failed me, I read the above to Captain Brown, who accompanied me to the durbar. He says it embraces every thing that was said on my part, but that much that was said by the Ameers in defence of themselves, and especially on behalf of Meer Roostum Khan is omitted; that I did not consider necessary to enter more in detail."

On the morning of the 9th, I received a message from the Ameers, requesting me to visit them again that afternoon, for the purpose of further consultation. I replied that it would now be useless; that the General was advancing by daily marches, and that by nothing short of signing the treaty could they hope to arrest his advance. I reminded them that I had promised to await till noon, when if vakeels fully empowered to agree to the treaty did not arrive, I should despatch Lieutenant Fitzgerald to intimate their hesitation and delay to Sir Charles Napier, and that then the question would be irrevo-

cably taken out of my hands. The riding camel and guides which the Ameers had promised to send for Lieutenant Fitzgerald's use, did not arrive till four, P.M.,* when the deputies of the Ameers of Hydrabad made their appearance, and signed and sealed an acceptance of the treaty on behalf of their masters. Meer Roostum and the Chiefs of Khyrpoor, however, did not come, but intimated their readiness to subscribe Lord Ellenborough's treaty, provided that by so doing they should not be considered as acquiescing in Roostum's supercession. I could only reply, that my functions extended no further than arranging the details of the treaty as it then stood; that the transfer of the Turban had been the spontaneous act of the Ameer himself; that if he could prove the false dealing which he asserted had been practised, the course to be adopted was to petition the General. As the Hydrabad Princes had subscribed the draft of the treaty, I promised to them that I would solicit

* And is it to be wondered at—is it a legitimate ground of denunciation—that these unhappy Princes, operated on by the laws of hospitality and the reproaches of their feudatories on the one hand, and by the terror inspired by the General's advance on the other, should have exceeded the allotted period for consultation—*by four hours?* Yet, because the victims of his brother's "adroit and firm policy" delayed, for that short period, to furnish the camel which was to bear to the General the message on which the fate of themselves and their kingdom depended, the Historian, with wonted generosity, adduces the circumstance as a further illustration of the faithlessness of the Ameers! At page 270 he thus inveighs—"In this credulous state of mind Major Outram continued on the 9th, *though the Ameers failed in their promise to give him camel riders and guides for his dispatches; failed in their promise to send their vakeels in the morning to accept the treaty*; *and had, as he knew, corrupted his moonshee or native secretary, who was secretly corresponding with them.*" I make no comment—my reader will supply his own.

the General to halt the troops for one day ; at the same time informing the Ameers of Upper Scinde, that if on the morrow they did not sign the treaty, the General would instantly advance upon them. The language I used during my conferences with the Ameers, was of course conformable to my orders, which were, to insist on all our demands, and to concede nothing. The Historian truly says, "*Major Outram answered after his instructions, but not after his desire.*"

Next morning I received a message from Meer Roostum, to the effect that he now was, as he ever had been, ready to subscribe the Treaty ; that he would, if I chose, send his son in the course of the day, empowered to sign it on his behalf ; and that his kinsman would do so likewise. He, however, begged to defer business till the 11th, as the 10th was the last and most holy day of the Mohurrum, and was very strictly observed by the Ameers ; but added, that if I insisted on the Treaties being signed on that day, I should be obeyed. My answer was, that I should be sorry to infringe their religious customs, and would wait till next day, provided the Ameer furnished me with a written declaration, for transmission to the General that the sanctity of the day was the sole cause of the delay.* I thus wrote to the General :—

* Sir Charles Napier laboured—and, for aught I know to the contrary, continues to labour—under a strange hallucination regarding this holy season. I observed, that the Ameers kept the last day of the Mohurrum "very strictly." "Very," is the *note* appended to my letter—"very, when it gave them 28,000 *more* men on the field of battle." *En passant*, let me

"I know not how far you may be disposed to halt another day, in the expectation that the Upper Scinde Draft Treaty will be executed; but I have little doubt myself that it will be, and really believe that the objection to business on this particular day

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remark, that as, according to the General's own statement, 25,862 fighting men were the total of his foes at Meeanee, 862 must have been the aggregate collected at Hydrabad prior to the 10th of February. This number forms an anomalous *equation* with 60,000 and 50,000, the numbers elsewhere given by him! But to the point. Sir Charles Napier took it into his head, and the nonsense is reiterated as veritable history by his brother, that the Ameers had arranged to fight the General on the 9th of February. This strange phantasy he professed to justify by the terms of the letter in which Meer Mahommed summoned Hyat Khan Murree, in which the latter is told to be present at Meeanee on the 9th February. "It is now plain," Sir Charles Napier remarks, "that they wanted to delay till the 9th, to get their people together. The Mohurrum prevented this—*because the Chiefs could not get their followers to march while that religious festival lasted.* This ended, they started off for the rendezvous at Meeanee," &c., &c. That the Ameers kept the Mohurrum, and more especially its last day, with great strictness, was true; but had that festival been considered in the light Sir Charles Napier is pleased to assume, instead of specifying the 9th for the *rendezvous*, *i. e.* two days before the Mohurrum, the Ameers would have fixed the 11th as the first practicable day for *leaving their homes*, situated, according to the Historian, in the distant Murree hills! But had they deemed it of paramount importance to assemble their troops, (*though quite as reluctant to profane their holy days as Christians are,*) no fast or festival in the Mahommedan calendar would have prevented their feudatories joining them. Either troops had collected at Hydrabad before I reached, or they had not. If the former, then does the speculation about the Mohurrum stand like an inverted cone; if the latter, what a comment does the supposition offer on the buckram armies of 60,000 and 50,000 men! How completely does the circumstance, that between the 11th (the first secular day after the Mohurrum) and the 17th, so many fierce warriors could be collected, contradict the *disingenuous* nonsense which the Historian so repeatedly urges, that the Ameers of Lower Scinde had been summoning their troops since the preceding November, and yet, that when his brother returned from Emaumghur, they *still required* three *weeks to complete their armament. Three weeks*, the reader will observe, *being the time intervening between the General's return from Emaumghur, and the termination of the Mohurrum!* As the reader well knows, and as Sir Charles Napier's own witnesses prove, the orders to assemble the troops were issued, when the vakeels, returning from Hydrabad, announced that the General was "*bent on war.*" Hyat Khan, and probably others, were summoned to be present by the 9th, for, as we have seen, *that was the day before which the Ameers understood Sir Charles Napier to be*

is the sole cause of the delay. I myself shall be glad if you decide on halting; for the near approach of troops to this capital would cause mistrust, and might make the Khyrpoor Ameers fly."

Sir Charles Napier consented to the delays craved by me, and I felt grateful. He assured me that he did so, "not to hurry" the Ameers; and I believed him. He told me to inform the Ameers that he halted at my request; and I attributed the forbearance to a generous compassion for the unhappy beings with whom I was negotiating. But the reason assigned to me was very different from that given to Lord Ellenborough. To the latter he wrote on the 13th February:—

"I have halted three days here, *ostensibly at the request of the Ameers; but really because the camels, worn out in the Affghan war, are so weak that I was obliged to give them some rest.*"

The Upper Scinde Ameers, according to promise, sent their vakeels to sign the treaty on the 11th. On the 12th, the Ameers hearing that Sir Charles Napier was either advancing, or preparing to do so, were thrown into consternation, and I thus addressed him:—

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pledged not to advance. The Ameers were not so highly favoured as Sir Charles Napier; they were not, like him, permitted to pry into the closed volume of futurity, and they had little idea that, even did matters come to the worst, *Meeanee* would be the field on which sovereignty was to pass from them for ever. They had seen quite enough of Sir Charles Napier to trust no more to his generosity, or even to his justice; but still they and their vakeels had some degree of faith in his promises, and the latter were, doubtless, authorized to fill up the summonses as circumstances might render advisable. If the Khyrpoor Ameers did not comply with Sir Charles Napier's orders, they understood the General to say that he would march on the 9th. That day was, therefore, selected as the date of rendezvous.

"These fools are in the utmost alarm, in consequence of the continued progress of your troops towards Hydrabad, notwithstanding their acceptance of the treaty, which they hoped would have caused you to stop. If you come beyond Halla, if so far—I fear they will be impelled, by their fears, to assemble their rabble, with a view to defend themselves and their families, in the idea that we are determined to destroy them, notwithstanding their submission."

The Ameers had, as I reported to Sir Charles Napier on the 11th, promised that they would repeat the orders that they had before given, for the dispersion of their armed men;* and the General's continued advance, after all our terms had been complied with, would, I feared, cause their reassembling. Another circumstance tended to increase the alarm of the Ameers. On the afternoon of the 11th, the light company of H.M.'s 22d regiment landed at the Residency. As I had never previously required an European escort, they not unnaturally suspected, as I reported to Sir Charles Napier, that this was some artifice to surround them. In communicating the fresh alarm thus caused, I expressed myself as follows:—

"I really wish I was empowered to tell them positively that you do not purpose bringing the troops beyond Halla, if so far;

* My words were—"The Ameers of Hydrabad assure me that they have again sent orders for any armed bodies that may remain united, to disperse to their homes; but that they do not think any could have remained after the orders previously issued." To this Sir Charles Napier adds, on the 11th July, the following note:—"*Only* 50,000." On the 18th of July, he appends another note to a letter written on the 12th February, and unhesitatingly declares that "60,000 *soldiers were assembled.*" The General's assertion is sheer nonsense—perhaps from a typographical blunder; else, wherefore were 25,862, I ask, the whole amount of foes who ultimately assembled at Meeanee?

as it is, I can only express to them my hope that you will not do so, now that they have complied with all our terms; at any rate, I will pledge that you intend them no harm. But then, again, if they do not acquire confidence, (not from any want of faith in me, but from seeing that I cannot pledge myself for you, because I cannot state to a certainty that you will not bring on the troops,) they would render themselves enemies by infringing your orders, by assembling their followers. *It is very unsatisfactory being unable to give a decided pledge to these people, for they cannot understand any motive for hesitation but deception.*"

* * * "I send this, though I have nothing particular to communicate, in the hope that it may reach you before you get to, or at least leave Halla; and that it may induce you to halt there, or further off, wherever you may be, and to send me authority to say that the troops shall not come further, until when, I must continue in a very unsatisfactory position; but I have great hope that you may have halted on receipt of my information that the Upper Scinde Ameers have also subscribed the treaty, (which I sent yesterday,) and also that it will become public through your camp that the troops will not advance further."

On the evening of the 12th, I held a second conference with the Ameers. The memorandum of what took place, which was forwarded at the time to Sir Charles Napier, though, strange to say, not transmitted by him to the Governor-General, until called for, months after the battle of Meeanee, I subjoin:—

"After the usual preliminaries, Major Outram produced the Persian copies of the Draft Treaties, formerly submitted to the Ameers by Sir Charles Napier, through Captain French, at Khyrpoor, and Lieutenant Stanley, at Hydrabad; and requested their Highnesses to apply their seals in his presence, as previously pledged to do by their vakeels.

"A long discussion then ensued between the Ameers and Major Outram, regarding Meer Roostum's affairs, much to the same purport as what passed at the former interview, they insist-

ing that Major Outram had full authority to investigate the case, according to the letter they had received from the General, informing them that he had been deputed to settle *all affairs*, and Major Outram repeating that his instructions only referred to the Draft Treaties formerly submitted from the Governor-General, after accepting which, he had merely to arrange the details between the several Ameers. Major Outram said, however, that he would be happy to receive and forward to the General any representation Meer Roostum wished to make on the subject, and that he was confident Sir Charles Napier would strictly inquire into the truth, or otherwise, of all he (Meer Roostum) had to allege. The Ameers then endeavoured to induce Major Outram to declare, that in the event of Meer Roostum proving every thing he had advanced, his Chiefship, and what had been made over from the Upper Scinde Ameers to Ali Morad, would be restored. Major Outram replied, that it was not in his power to say what would be done, but doubtless every investigation would be made; and if what Meer Roostum had advanced was fully proved, he trusted that the Meer's claims, at least to the property, would be made good; but that he did not see how Meer Roostum could disprove his own letter, making over the 'Rais' to Ali Morad. The Ameers said, Meer Roostum could and would prove all he had asserted with regard to his having been confined by Ali Morad, having, when in confinement, had his seal forcibly taken from him; having been induced to fly by Ali Morad, when the General was coming to Dhejee-ka-Kote, &c. &c. Major Outram said, that this case rested with the General, and he hoped that Sir Charles Napier would soon come here himself, when he (Major Outram) trusted that it would be fully inquired into.

"After long urging this point, the Ameers of Hydrabad applied their seals to the draft of the new treaty, as did Meer Roostum and Meer Mahommed of Khyrpoor; but Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor, after sending repeatedly for his brother, who, he said, had possession of his seal, at last promised to attend on Major Outram (or send a confidential person) with it to-morrow morning.

"It being then very late, and having in his possession the previous agreement to accept the treaty, sealed by Nusseer Khan's accredited vakeel, Major Outram allowed the arrangement, and

then proceeded to Meer Sobdar's durbar, where that Ameer and Meer Hoossein Ali sealed the treaty without demur, after having read it over in public.

"Meer Nusseer Khan, Meer Mahommed, and Shadad Khan, made certain remarks on each article, which are noted opposite to each; also requested the customary preamble and concluding article, to the effect that 'all former treaties between the contracting parties not rescinded by the provisions of this engagement, remain in force.' This Major Outram said would of course be done in the ratified treaties, and would be sent by the Governor-General, of which these were merely the drafts.

"On returning home, after leaving the fort, Major Outram and his companions had to pass through a dense crowd of Belooches, who gave unequivocal evidence of bad feeling in their manner and expressions, but were kept from giving further vent to their feelings by a strong escort of horse the Ameers sent under some of their most influential chiefs.

"Major Outram had been aware that the Belooches had been flocking into the capital since the night before, in consequence of the news having spread that the British army had crossed the frontier, and that the Ameers had been occupied all day in endeavouring to disperse them.

"After getting clear of the crowd, Major Outram was informed that one of the officers in his company had been struck with a stone, but the officer in the darkness did not see by whom the stone was thrown. As it was evident that the Durbar had done its utmost to prevent outrage, by the fact of the unusually strong escort sent with him, (the durbar officers refusing to leave at the usual place when told to do so, and continuing their escort until the party arrived close to the agency;) and, moreover, as the gentleman struck did not mention the circumstance at the time, when the Ameers' officers might have taken steps to apprehend the culprit, Major Outram did not deem it necessary to make any representation on the subject to their Highnesses."

In reporting these events to Sir Charles Napier, I wrote:—

"From what I saw yesterday of the spirit of the people, it appears to me that the Ameers are now execrated for their das-

tardly submission (as they consider it) to what they style robbery. For the first time since I came to Scinde in an official capacity, I was received last night by a dense crowd, on emerging from the fort after leaving the durbar, with shouts expressive of detestation of the British, and a particular cry, in which the whole populace joined as in chorus, the meaning of which I could not make out at the time, but which I have since ascertained was an appeal to their saint against the Feringhees.* Although the durbar and streets of the fort were densely crowded, the Ameers' officers kept such a vigilant look-out, that no evidence of the popular feeling was permitted, but in passing through the city, it could not be restrained; and had we not been guarded by a numerous body of horse, headed by some of the most influential of

* I shall have occasion in a subsequent section to expose the gross ignorance on the part of the Historian, of the Mahommedan *creed and precepts*. At page 281 he thus refers to the "cry to the saint:"—"The cry to the saint might alone have awakened Major Outram's suspicion, seeing that *he had himself in the previous year said the Ameers designed to make a religious war; and this* was confirmed by the British spies in September 1842. Yet neither that coincidence, nor the violence of the Belooches towards himself and his officers, prevented him again, &c. &c." Here are two mis-statements and an absurd inference—such as only could have occurred to one as ignorant of every thing oriental as is the self-complacent Historian. I *never* said that during the previous year the Ameers designed to make a religious war. I said that every effort was made by Affghan Emissaries, seconded, moreover, by the fanatics in Scinde, to excite the religious fervor of the Ameers, and induce them to join our enemies above the Passes. But as I stated to Sir Charles Napier, and as I have reiterated in the course of the present volume, the Ameers were prevented from engaging in the hopeless attempt; and the fact of their not only abstaining from injuring us, but actually rendering us very efficient aid in extricating ourselves from our embarrassments, *at a time when we were at their mercy*, sufficiently proved that only the most extreme measures on our part could have driven them to resistance, when they beheld us in force, disentangled from our connexion with their turbulent neighbours, and able to direct all our energies against themselves. Secondly, so far as I am aware, the British spies never reported that the Ameers had "*designed to make a religious war*," but that they were *urged to do so!* The inference that the Historian draws from the invocation of the saint, is—like many of his speculations on eastern matters—very amusing to those better informed. When a mutinous spirit displays itself among native troops, and warm clothing, marching money, or increased facilities for remitting money to their families, are alone required to allay it, the cry of "Din" is forthwith raised by the Indian Sepoy.

he Belooche chiefs, I daresay the mob would have proceeded to violence. As it was, a stone was thrown, which struck Wells; but it being quite dark in the shade of the gateway, he could not see by whom; this I was not aware of till we got home, and I have taken no notice of it to the Durbar, as it is evident the Government did its utmost to protect us, as was shown by the escort refusing to go back after clearing the gateway—where, heretofore, I had always dismissed it—saying, that they had strict orders to accompany us the whole way. In fact, the Ameers had reason to fear that the Belooches might attempt mischief, having been engaged the whole day in paying off and dismissing those who had flocked into the city since the night before last, on hearing the continued demands of your troops; before I went to the Durbar, they had got the city quite clear, but after dark, great numbers had flocked in again."

As I afterwards found, the Belooches, inflamed by just indignation at the unmerited wrongs inflicted on Meer Roostum, and despairing of their country's independence, had resolved to exterminate the mission, through which, according to their conceptions, the national evils were about to be inflicted. They were prevented, however, from effecting their purpose by the generous interposition of the Ameers. Had we fallen victims, who shall say that our blood would have been justly chargeable on the men who spilt it? In what capital even of Europe could we, visiting it under similar circumstances, and after the occurrence of events like those which had recently unhinged men's minds in Scinde, have expected to pass in safety through the midst of an infuriated populace?

Scarcely had we left the Durbar, when the Belooche Chiefs assembled and swore on the Koran, that as I would not give any pledge that Meer

Roostum and the Upper Scinde Ameers should have justice, they would unite to oppose the British, and not throw away the sword till they were righted.

They agreed to disperse, should I pledge myself that nothing beyond the territory required by the Governor-General's treaty, which had been signed, should be taken from the Ameers; otherwise, they swore that they would oppose us, with or without the Ameers' sanction. When this was reported to me by the messengers of the Durbar, I simply observed, that until the Belooches dispersed I could enter into no arrangement whatever; that under no circumstances could I pledge Sir Charles Napier to any particular concession or line of conduct; but that, as I had already promised, Roostum's representations should be fairly submitted by me to him. The deputies insisted on the inability of their masters to restrain their Belooches unless I would give them the assurance demanded by the latter. I could only say, that the masters must in every case be held responsible for the conduct of their servants, and that the Ameers would inevitably have to answer for any violence practised by the Belooches. Having failed to extract from me any thing which they could convert into the similitude of a promise that the lands which had been made over to Ali Morad should be restored to his victims, they implored me to give some pledge from which the latter might derive hope, as the only means they had of effecting the dispersion of the Belooches.

My instructions were peremptory. I could not even hold out the hope that if Roostum were able to substantiate his allegations, his Turban and lands would be restored to him. Again and again I had to entrench myself behind the maxim that no negotiations could be carried on with armed men, and that so long as the Belooches remained, the General's hostile advance on Hydrabad could not be averted. The deputies took their leave, promising to make one more effort to disperse the armed men; and I told them, that if they promised me that the Belooches would disperse by next morning, I should send an express to the General, requesting him to halt. I subjoin my official report of this conference.

"*Notes of Conference, on the* 13*th February* 1843.

"At three, P.M., Nawab Mahommed Khan and Moonshee Chotram attended from the Ameers, to say, that after my departure from the Durbar last night, all the Belooche Sirdars met; and finding that I had given no pledges whatever that Meer Roostum and the Upper Scinde Ameers should get back their lands, which had been transferred to Ali Morad, or Meer Roostum be reinstated as Rais, notwithstanding that they (the Ameers) had agreed to the treaty required of them by the Governor-General, they had unanimously resolved to assemble to oppose the British troops; had sworn on the Koran to do so, and not to sheathe the sword until Meer Roostum and his brethren had obtained their rights; and that they were determined to march out to-night to fight the British army; that the Ameers had lost all control over them, and could not be answerable for what they did. To this I replied, that whatever the Ameers said as to the Belooches being disobedient, would avail their Highnesses nothing; that they inevitably would be made to answer for whatever their subjects did in the shape of hostility to the British, or plundering the country; that if their Highnesses could not control their people,

it would be considered that they were unfit to rule them; and therefore it will be at the Ameers' own peril if their Belooche followers are not immediately dismissed; for that the General would certainly march on Hydrabad with his army, the moment he learnt that the Beloochee had assembled in arms, which I had written to inform him of, on receipt of the message sent by the Durbar, through Mhadajee Moonshee, this morning.*

"The deputies then talked a long time of the anxiety of the Ameers to dismiss the Beloochee, but that as they (the Belooche Sirdars) had sworn, one and all, to uphold the rights of Meer Roostum and his brethren, that they (their Highnesses) were helpless. To which I only reiterated the same reply. At last they said—'At least give us some pledge that justice shall be done, by which the Ameers may endeavour to allay the excitement of the people, and persuade them to disperse: we fear it will be impossible; but their Highnesses will try once more, if you will authorize them to hold out hopes of the ultimate restoration of their lands, which have been made over to Ali Morad.' I said that I myself was confident that the General would give the most favourable consideration in his power to the representation of their case, and that I hoped good to them would result from the investigation which I was sure would be instituted as to the truth of what they (the Khyrpoor Ameers) had advanced; but that it was not in my power to pledge what would be the result, where I myself had not the power to decide. 'In that case,' rejoined the deputies, 'will the Khyrpoor Ameers not be allowed to settle their own affair with Ali Morad, without your interference?' 'Certainly not,' I replied; 'any attack upon

* Major Outram to the Durbar.—Moonshee Mhadajee has just brought a message from their Highnesses to the following effect:—That it is necessary that Meer Roostum's territory, which had been given over to Meer Ali Morad, should be restored, otherwise the Beloochee will no longer obey our commands, they having sworn to that effect on the Koran, and recommended that I should depart; and my answer is this,—That I do not purpose going away, neither will I even place a sentry over my door. If injury is sustained by any subject of the British Government to the extent of a single cowrie, your Highnesses will have to answer personally for the same, and it will be of no avail to make the excuse that your Beloochee would not obey you.—(Second Scinde Blue Book, No. 70.)

Ali Morad will be a breach of the treaty, and treated as an act of hostility to the British.'

"*Deputies.*—'This is very hard. You will neither promise restoration of what had been taken from them by Ali Morad, nor will you allow them to right themselves. Every thing that the British Government wanted from them, they had given and agreed to; why oppress them any further? Promise to restore the lands Ali Morad had taken. They have given you all you wanted for yourself and Bhawul Khan without a murmur;' and so on, repeating the same demands over and over again. At last the deputies said—'If you will not promise restoration of the lands Ali Morad has taken, the Khyrpoor Ameers must fight for their bread. Why should we be answerable?' 'You will not be answerable,' I observed, 'for what they do, provided you do not allow them to commit hostilities within the Hydrabad bounds, and afford no aid. If the Khyrpoor Ameers are determined to court destruction, let them go out of the Hydrabad territory, and let no assistance be given to them by the Hydrabad Ameers and subjects; in which case I will pledge myself that the army will not come to Hydrabad, and that no harm shall befall the Hydrabad Ameers.'

"The deputies said they would report what had passed, but that they had no hope of allaying the excitement of the Belooches, unless I would authorize some more positive assurance to the Upper Scinde Ameers; that, if any reply was to be given, they would bring it that night; otherwise, that I was to consider that their masters could do nothing further.

"They took leave about six, P.M., and did not return."

In writing to the General, I thus expressed myself regarding the tone of the deputies, and the threats of hostilities being about to commence:—

"I believe it is merely a last attempt to get their brethren of Upper Scinde restored to their lands, given, or about to be so, to Ali Morad. They have never murmured at what has been taken by the treaty, poor devils! but I heartily hope your endeavour to get some portion of that back, as you have recommended to his

Lordship, may succeed. Being not expected, it will be so much the more appreciated."

At ten, P.M., I added the following postscript:—

"No reply from the Durbar; but the Moonshee whom I sent there (in the Ameers' interests he doubtless is) represents that the Belooches have determined on marching to meet you to-morrow morning, and that some will probably attack us to-night. So confident am I that this is dictated, that I take no extra steps, and have not even a night sentry on the Agency. Still the 22d company has its own sentries, of course, and is sufficiently near to meet any attempt, the very idea of which has never entered the head of any but those who wish to funk us. I have little doubt but that all their vaunting will end in smoke, though it is said that a commander-in-chief of the army of warriors has been elected within the last hour."

Next day, however, I saw good grounds for alarm. Before I received Sir Charles Napier's letter intimating that he had seized Hyat Khan Murree, and twenty-five other Belooches, who were proceeding to Hydrabad, their capture had been complained of to me, as a grievance, by Meer Mahommed Khan, whose subjects they were. I subjoin a few extracts from the letter which I addressed to the General in consequence:—

"The seizure of the Murrees will, I am afraid, bring matters to a crisis, and cause the Belooches to commence plundering, which we were so anxious to prevent; in that case, all will be implicated more or less, and consequently their Chiefs also. *Hostilities I consider so likely to occur in consequence, that I have deemed it prudent to write to Colonels Booth and Boileau to halt the 41st at Tatta or Kurrachee, until your orders are received. I believe that the Ameers had not the least intention actually to commence hostilities, and merely hoped to get Roostum's party benefited, by making an appearance of ferment among their Be-*

looches, BUT THE APPEARANCE WILL NOW MOST PROBABLY CHANGE TO REALITY, SINCE THE CAPTURE OF THESE MEN."

I deemed it my duty to make a last attempt to save the unoffending Ameers of Lower Scinde. By directing the Khyrpoor Ameers to proceed to Hydrabad, we had embroiled the Lower Scinde Ameers in Meer Roostum's wrongs, and had brought them to the edge of the precipice, when their own footsteps tended in an opposite direction;—and it was but fair to do our best to lead them back again. I accordingly addressed the subjoined memorandum to their cousins:—

"From the messages I have received from your Highnesses, it would appear that the Upper Scinde Ameers are determined to rush on destruction. If they are so foolish, tell them to go to their own territory, that injury may not come upon you. If no hostility is shown to the British troops within the Hydrabad confines, I pledge myself that no injury shall befall the Ameers of Hydrabad; otherwise if any hostile acts are committed within the Hydrabad territory, or if the Upper Scinde Ameers are aided in such acts by subjects of your Highnesses, although beyond the Hydrabad frontiers, I am sure the army will advance to the capital."

In a postscript to a second letter, written to Sir Charles Napier the same day, I added:—

"The moonshee who took my letter to the Durbar has returned, and says the Ameers gave no reply; he saw every preparation for moving; and it was the opinion in the fort that they would advance against you to-night or fly; it is supposed that Sobdar, Hoossein Ali, and Shahdad, will remain quiet."

Sir Charles Napier replied as follows from Halla:—

* * * "Do not pledge yourself to any thing whatever. I am in full march on Hydrabad, and will make no peace with the

Ameers. I will attack them instantly whenever I come up to their troops. They need send no proposals. The time has passed, and I will not receive their messengers. There must be no pledges made on any account. Come, if possible, away, and bring Mr. Carlisle away, unless you have no boats to embark the men; in which case prepare your house for defence. * * * Have no intercourse with the Ameers."

This letter was written at 9 A.M. on the 15th: at 6 P.M., on the same day, I was fifteen miles from Hydrabad *en route* to join the General. My despatch, written on board the "*Planet*" steamer, is sufficiently minute for the purpose of my narrative; and as it has the advantage of conveying my statement as made at the time, I subjoin it:—

"My despatches of the last few days will have led you to expect that my earnest endeavours to effect an amicable arrangement with the Ameers of Scinde would fail: and it is with much regret that I have now to report that their Highnesses have commenced hostilities by attacking my residence this morning, which, after four hours' most gallant defence by my honorary escort, the Light Company of Her Majesty's 22d Regiment, commanded by Captain Conway, I was compelled to evacuate, in consequence of our ammunition running short.

"At 9 A.M., this morning, a dense body of cavalry and infantry* took post on three sides of the Agency compound, (the fourth being defended by the "*Planet*" steamer, about 500 yards distant,) in the gardens and houses which immediately command the inclosure, and which it was impossible to hold with our limited numbers; a hot fire was opened by the enemy, and continued incessantly for four hours, but all their attempts to enter the

* "Ascertained after the action, on the 17th, to have amounted to 8000 men, under the command of Meer Shahdad Khan, (one of the principal Ameers,) his cousin Meer Mahommed Khan, Nawab Ahmed Khan Lugharee, and many principal chiefs. It was also ascertained that the enemy lost upwards of 60 killed, and more wounded in the affair; among the latter Meer Mahommed Khan."

Agency inclosure, although merely surrounded by a wall varying from four to five feet high, were frustrated by Captain Conway's able distribution of his small band, and the admirable conduct of every individual soldier composing it, under the gallant example of their commanding officer and his subalterns, Lieutenant Harding and Ensign Pennefather, Her Majesty's 22d Regiment, also Captains Green, of the 21st Regiment Native Infantry, and Wells, of the 15th Regiment, who volunteered their services, to each of whom was assigned the charge of a separate quarter, also to your aide-de-camp, Captain Brown, Bengal Engineers, who carried my orders to the steamer, and assisted in working her guns and directing her flanking fire. Our ammunition being limited to forty rounds per man, the officers directed their whole attention to reserving their fire and keeping their men close under cover, never shewing themselves or returning a shot, except when the enemy attempted to rush, or shewed themselves in great numbers, consequently great execution was done with trifling expenditure of ammunition, and with little loss. Our hope of receiving a reinforcement and a supply of ammunition by the "*Satellite*" steamer (hourly expected) being disappointed on the arrival of that vessel without either, shortly after the commencement of the attack, it was decided at 12 A.M., after being three hours under fire, to retire to the steamer while still we had sufficient ammunition to fight the vessel up the river; accordingly, I requested Captain Conway to keep the enemy at bay for one hour, while the property was removed, for which that time was ample, could the camp-followers be induced to exert themselves; after delivering their first loads on board, however, they were so terrified at the enemy's cross fire on the clear space between the compound and the vessel, that none could be persuaded to return, except a few of the officers' servants, with whose assistance but little could be removed during the limited time we could afford, consequently much had to be abandoned, and I am sorry to find that the loss chiefly fell upon the officers and men, who were too much occupied in keeping off the enemy to be able to attend to their own interests; accordingly, after the expiration of another hour, (during which the enemy, despairing of otherwise effecting their object, had brought up six guns to bear upon us,) we took measures to evacuate the Agency. Captain Con-

way called in his posts, and all being united, retired in a body, covered by a few skirmishers, as deliberately as on parade, (carrying off our slain and wounded,) which, and the fire from the steam-boats, deterred the enemy from pressing on us as they might have done. All being embarked, I then directed Mr. Acting Commander Miller, commanding the "*Satellite*" steamer, to proceed with his vessel to the wood station, three miles up the river, on the opposite bank, to secure a sufficiency of fuel for our purposes ere it should be destroyed by the enemy, while I remained with the "*Planet*" to take off the barge that was moored to the shore. This being a work of some time, during which a hot fire was opened on the vessel from three guns which the enemy brought to bear on her, besides small arms; and requiring much personal exposure of the crew, (especially of Mr. Cole, the commander of the vessel,) I deem it my duty to bring to your favourable notice their zealous exertions on the occasion, and also to express my obligations to Messrs. Miller and Cole for the flanking fire they maintained on the enemy during their attack on the Agency, and for their support during the retirement and embarkation of the troops. The "*Satellite*" was also exposed to three guns in her progress up to the wood station, one of which she dismounted by her fire; the vessels were followed by large bodies for about three miles, occasionally opening their guns upon us to no purpose; since then we have pursued our voyage up the Indus, about fifteen miles, without molestation, and purpose to-morrow morning anchoring off Muttaree, where I expect to find your camp. Our casualties amount to two men of Her Majesty's 22d Regiment, and one camp-follower killed; and Mr. Conductor Kiely, Mr. Carlisle, agency clerk, two of the steamer's crew, four of Her Majesty's 22d Regiment, two camp-followers wounded, and four camp-followers missing: total three killed, ten wounded, and four missing.—I have, &c."

With the attack on the Residency all further negotiation necessarily ceased. The sword had been unsheathed, the scabbard thrown away, and the day of reconciliation had passed. War had commenced; and such being the case, I sought not

for one moment to retard the measures requisite for its successful conduct and termination. To the next Section I defer a consideration of the events which occurred, subsequent to my junction with the army; in the meantime, I beg the reader's attention to certain circumstances connected with the history of the period we have just discussed.

During my sojourn at Hydrabad, I am represented by the Majors-General Napier as having recommended measures the adoption of which would have caused the destruction of the British army; and to have evinced an incapacity for military duties, and an obtuseness of intellect in my diplomatic character, which rendered me intrinsically contemptible, but from my position dangerous. The reader has seen that the charges brought against me in connexion with the occurrences antecedent to those now being discussed, were unfounded calumnies. They have been, not merely malevolent imputations of unworthy motives and ungenerous sarcasms, but misrepresentations founded on perversion of facts, falsifications of dates, and contradiction of despatches, unparalleled, I believe, in the literary history of the army.

Equally false, and equally malevolent, are the accusations brought against me in connexion with my conduct at Hydrabad. The reason of their being urged is obvious. If my counsels were judicious, then were Sir Charles Napier's measures alike foolish and wicked; if there was aught of truth or wisdom in the solemn warning I

recorded on the 26th of January, then were the men who perished beneath our bayonets unlawfully slain; unless I penned the most drivelling nonsense, Sir Charles Napier proceeded to enforce measures with the sword, which were unauthorized by the Government he served, and in themselves iniquitous; unless I were a simpleton, like whom (to quote the words of the Historian) "never was a civilized man since the day of Crassus so beguiled and mocked by barbarians," then did Sir Charles Napier unrelentingly drive to their own destruction submissive men, who only required the assurance *that if, on investigation their allegations proved true, justice should be rendered to them!* Urged by those feelings, which in common with every right-minded Englishman I own, and ignorant of the concealment which had been practised by Sir Charles Napier, I pleaded in England, as forcibly as my humble abilities and my position enabled me, in behalf of cruelly persecuted and unoffending men. In doing so, I referred to documents which I naturally concluded were in the possession of Government—for I had the written assurance of Sir Charles Napier that they should be submitted to it—to my grief and surprise, I found that I had been deceived, and the authorities kept in ignorance of what they ought to have known. The revelations which I unconsciously made, led to the suspicion that all was not right; the Imperial Government and the Governor-General called for the production of the papers which Sir Charles Napier had withheld, and after the lapse of months

these were forwarded to the individuals who ought to have received them, in course of post, soon after the dates of their composition. But, as the reader has seen, they were not even transmitted in their chronological order; documents the most important were forwarded to the Governor-General prior to the despatch of those which, written before them, were required to make them intelligible; and they were accompanied by notes containing fallacies in inference and mis-statements in fact, the refutation of which had appeared in letters of an earlier date; and these, from the circumstances attending their transmission, were little likely to be read with care, if at all.

To remove the suspicion that bad faith had been manifested by himself, it became necessary for Sir Charles Napier to represent my documents as so utterly worthless, that to have transmitted them at the time would have been an unnecessary infliction on Lord Ellenborough's patience. To give probability to this representation, it was necessary to establish an *a priori* case against me; this Sir Charles Napier had the generosity to do, knowing that I had it not in my power to meet his *official* calumnies; and as even the fervour of his enmity failed to carry conviction to the public, the "Conquest of Scinde" has since been given to the world.

Before proceeding to expose the utter falsity of the charges brought against me by Sir Charles Napier and his brother, I crave the reader's attention while I proceed to exonerate the unhappy

Ameers from the accusation of treachery to which they have been subjected by their conqueror, and the historian of their dethronement.

The fallacious statements reiterated from page to page in the "Conquest of Scinde," as to the Ameers of Lower Scinde designing a war, and having long been engaged in the collection of troops, I have amply exposed. The exposure is supplied by the topography of the province, and the evidence adduced by Sir Charles Napier for the condemnation of his victims. Lest my own impressions should have been erroneous, or my memory have proved treacherous, I have applied for correction to those who, from long continued residence in the country, and a very intimate connexion with its people, are well qualified to correct me, and I again state it as an incontrovertible proposition, that the most remote of the Hydrabad feudatories could leisurely have been assembled in a fortnight; and, in an emergency, little more than half that time would have sufficed for their collection. Men who are represented to be so avaricious as the Ameers are by the historian, were likely to summon their troops ere they were required. But, as I have said, the very evidence adduced by the General, satisfactorily shows that it was not till he himself had refused to avail himself of the plenipotentiary functions with which their Vakeels were invested, ordering the latter to entangle their masters' affairs with those of the Khyrpoor fugitives, and when the only conclusion open to them was that he was "*bent on war*"

—that the orders for assembling troops were issued. I appeal to every Englishman who peruses the "Notes of Conference," and the other contemporaneous records of the Ameers' proceedings, if they do not establish, beyond the possibility of a doubt, their intense anxiety to maintain peace? I ask if their messages did not indicate a strong hope on their part that war would be averted? Nay, I require not to make any such appeal,—I point to the letter sent by Meer Nusseer Khan to his Governor of Kurrachee, which was intercepted by Captain Preedy, and which shows that only on the 14th of February that Prince gave up the hope that an amicable settlement might be effected:—

"The friendship of the Ameers to the English Government is broken, because the English are determined on seizing our country; therefore it is resolved on taking the field against the English, and would immediately march," &c.

The reader has seen that to Lord Ellenborough's treaty no objections were made; it was against the unauthorized exactions of Sir Charles Napier alone that the Hydrabad Ameers protested in behalf of those relatives whose cause they had been compelled to identify with their own. Nor did the deputies absolutely demand that these exactions should be remitted; they merely required to be authorized to assure the Belooches that Roostum should have an opportunity of proving his allegations, *and should, on these allegations being proved, have justice rendered to him*. Without any definite promise from me that so unreasonable a request should be acceded to, the Ameers of Up-

per and Lower Scinde signed and sealed the treaty in open Durbar on the 12th of February.

But the feudatories were not so pliant as their masters; they had, as the reader has seen, sworn that if justice were not rendered to Roostum, they would oppose the English. By cajolery, and the distribution of money, I have little doubt that the Ameers would have succeeded in appeasing their troops, denied though I was the authority to accede to their just demands, had it not been for the advance of the General and the seizure of Hyat Khan. When apprized of its occurrence, I ceased to think it practicable to avert hostilities. Only three methods existed by which the unoffending Ameers of Hydrabad could be extricated from their difficulties. The first was, that Sir Charles Napier would halt; and this I have every reason to believe would have enabled the Ameers to pacify their Belooches. The next was, that Roostum should, by *acquiescing* in his own degradation, make an effort to secure the means of subsistence for his feudatories. And the third and only remaining prospect of safety to the Hydrabad Ameers was, that their cousins should flee from their territory.

The first was frustrated by the General; the second, Roostum did his best to carry out, agreeing to submit to his brother's usurpation of his Turban, provided the property of his feudatories were suffered to remain intact—but it was in vain; and the unanimity of the Belooches prevented Roostum and his kinsmen doing (as they unhe-

sitatingly would have done) what then only remained to save their cousins, viz. flying with their followers from the Hydrabad territories. Early on the 14th of February, my rejection of Roostum's overture to sacrifice himself, for the sake of his people, was announced to the Belooches. During that day an assembly was held; Nusseer Khan and others were *compelled* to agree to take the field, and to proclaim to their subjects the necessity of a war, "*because the English are determined on seizing the country.*"* And it became necessary, as a *mere ordinary military precaution*, ere they advanced to meet the General, to drive my escort from their rear.

That this was the sole object of the attack on the Residency, is satisfactorily established by the evidence of Peer Budroodeen, so eagerly adduced by Sir Charles Napier. In communicating it to Lord Ellenborough on the 24th October 1843, the General wrote,—"*I lose no time* in sending such information as I could *at once* get relative to the conduct of Shahdad Khan;" we may, therefore, I presume, rely on its correctness. Yet of this very Ameer Shahdad, who is said to have commanded at the attack made on me, I read as follows:—

"*Question.*—'When this party reached the agency, who commanded it, and what orders were given by him?'

"*Answer.*—'Meer Shahdad commanded, and he gave orders that *if the* (British) *troops fight, kill them,* BUT IF THEY RUN AWAY, NEVER MIND.'"

The following quotation from the petition of

* Nusseer Khan's letter of the 14th February, addressed to the Governor of Kurrachee, and intercepted by Captain Preedy.

Meer Nusseer Khan, corroborated as the account is by information received at the time by his Highness the Rao of Cutch, is important as bearing on this subject :—

"When the Belooches threatened to rise in arms in consequence of the ejection of Meer Roostum Khan, intelligence arrived that Sir Charles Napier had imprisoned a Muree chief named Hyat Khan, without any apparent cause, on which some of the Belooches who were at Hydrabad assembled, and took a solemn oath, resolving to attack Major Outram on his return from the fort to the Residency. I was informed of their intention : it was then twilight. As the Major was a friend who was dear to me as my own life, I sent, in consequence of the ferment among the Belooches, Meer Jahan Khan, Hajee Golam Mahommed, and ten or twelve other nobles of my Court, to accompany him to the Residency ; and they, after escorting him to the Residency, returned and told me they had seen parties of Belooches ready for mischief, at two or three places on the road, and had sent them away. On hearing this, I sent to Major Outram a verbal message by Moonshee Mahadajee, and also wrote to him of it ; as Major Outram had promised to write to the General to request him not to advance, and to send the letter by one of my camel-riders. He did so that night (12th.) On the 13th, I endeavoured to restrain, by counsel, by force, and by reproaches, the Belooches, and urged them not to excite disturbances, *as I had signed the treaty, and the Major had written to the General to beg he would not advance, and that this request would be attended to.* * * On the morning of the 14th, the camel-rider who conveyed the Major's letter to the General returned, and brought intelligence that the General, *on receiving the Major's letter, prepared to advance.*"

A simple assurance on my part, similar to that which Sir H. Pottinger was authorized to give in 1839, and by giving which he averted hostilities, would have sufficed to pacify the Belooches. But I was neither permitted to hold out to them the

hopes of justice being rendered, nor to promise that, having agreed to our terms, they should be spared the advance of the army. On the 13th and 14th I was urged to leave, but I persisted in remaining, and in doing so, I believe that, according to the recognised principles of international ethics, I relieved the Ameers of all responsibility on my account. The generosity of Sir Charles Napier is strikingly illustrated in the following passages: his marvellous inaptitude for narrating dry matters of fact is scarcely less conspicuous.

On the 12th of June he thus wrote:—

"The Ameer says he fixed his seal to the new treaty: yes; he did so on the evening of the 14th, and on the morning of the 15th he tore it with contumely in open Durbar. The Ameer says he sent a guard of favourite nobles to protect Major Outram. *It is very evident there was no occasion to murder Major Outram in the evening, when they intended to destroy him and all who were with him next morning. He knew that by murdering him in the evening, his party would immediately retreat to the steamer, and they would have lost the pleasure of murdering upwards of* 100 *Englishmen by the premature assassination of one.*"

This document is as completely at variance with truth in its narrative, as it is ungenerous in its inferential portions. Not satisfied with driving the Princes of Scinde to opposition, dethroning them, and insulting them in their captivity, Sir Charles Napier follows them with an unscrupulous vindictiveness. Sir Charles Napier well knew that the Ameers signed the treaty on the evening of the 12th, and between that and the 15th, kept urging me to leave; yet hesitated not to repre-

sent them as signing it on the 14th, merely to tear it up next morning. Their friendly warnings he overlooks, and represents the saving his commissioner's life for one night merely as a ruse, that they might sacrifice a hecatomb on the morrow. That Sir Charles Napier's memory, so very treacherous, may have failed him, when in June he discussed matters which occurred in February, one can readily imagine; but what is to be thought of a general officer, who, in receipt of all the communications above referred to, thus delivered himself on the 18th of February, three days after the attack on the Residency—less than a week after the treaty had been signed?—

"*On the night of the 14th*, the whole body of Ameers formally affixed their seals to the Draft Treaty; *the next day the residence of Major Outram was attacked;* the report of this nefarious transaction, &c. * * * * The tyrannical and *deceitful* Ameers,"* &c., &c.

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* Ungenerous as are Sir Charles Napier's insinuations, they are surpassed by those of his brother. The Historian first assumes that my recommendation to the General to come to Hydrabad had been dictated by the Ameers, who sought to sacrifice him; and next, that it was solely from the hope of securing him that I was saved. He cannot evade the fact of my having been warned to leave, but thus magnanimously attributes the foulest treachery to a piece of advice resulting from feelings of friendship: "*For they now perceived their hope to get the General into their hands was illusive, and they desired to push the troops at the Residency into confusion of embarkation, that they might attack them to advantage.* MOREOVER, *they feared, and with reason, that the Commissioner might entrench himself, and await the arrival of reinforcements.*" When Sir Charles Napier asserted in his despatch, dated 18th February, and reiterated the mis-statement on the 12th June, that the Ameers signed the treaty only on the night before they attacked me, there was no proof to the contrary forthcoming; but, before the "Conquest of Scinde" appeared, the correspondence which disproved that assertion had been demanded from Sir Charles Napier, and was published in the Supplementary Scinde Blue Book;—consequently, to maintain the charge of

Is it to be wondered at that Lord Ellenborough,* thus misinformed, should have pronounced it "*a treacherous attack on a representative of the British Government?*" Sir Charles Napier's communication to the Governor-General is the more surprising, as, when he wrote the draft of that despatch, I protested to him, in the presence of several of his staff, against the injustice of charging the Ameers with treachery.

Both Sir Charles Napier and his brother represent me as having been grossly deceived in reference to the armaments at Hydrabad. Sir Charles, I regret to say, does not hesitate, when expediency demands, to pervert my meaning and misapply my words, as egregiously as does the Historian. On the 3d of July, he thus wrote to the Governor-General:—

"I certainly did reject Major Outram's advice, because I soon saw that he was grossly deceived by the Ameers. I had several proofs of this, one or two of which I now feel it right to state to your Lordship.

"treachery," it became necessary to vary the story. Accordingly, the "Historian" thus renders it:—"THE AMEERS DELIBERATED UPON THE QUESTION OF MURDERING THOSE WHO WERE IN THEIR POWER AT ONCE, OR SPARING THEM FOR A DAY TO ENTRAP THE GENERAL. . . . DECIDING ON THE LAST, THEY SUFFERED ALL TO DEPART UNHURT, AND COUNTERMANDED THE EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK ON THE RESIDENCY." And this is the work of an Englishman and a soldier!

* As my correspondence with Sir Charles Napier had not been laid before the Governor-General, his Lordship had no reason to doubt the truth of this statement, on which is founded the charge of "treachery" for which the Ameers were dethroned; but Sir Charles Napier, when he penned his despatch, was in possession of *five* letters from me *proving the contrary*, written during the *two days* and *three nights* which intervened between the signing of the treaty and the attack on my residence.—(Nos. 65, 68, 69, 72, and 78, Second Scinde Blue Book.)

"1st, Major Outram, being at Hydrabad, sent me two (or three my journal says, but I can find but two) despatches by express on the 12th, *to assure me that the Ameers had not any armed men, except their usual personal attendants, and that these were not more numerous than Indian princes of their rank would move with in time of profound peace. At that moment, the army of the Ameers was assembled at Meeanee, only six miles from Hydrabad, and were preparing their position! At the moment he was writing these despatches to me, his house was surrounded by* 8000 *Beloochees, (who had eight pieces of cannon,) preparing for their attack on him on the 15th of February.*"

There is not an approximation to sober reality in this damnatory paragraph. Sir Charles Napier addressed to me a letter on the 6th of February, in which I was directed to inform the *Khyrpoor* Ameers that they must disperse the troops at Koonhera. "*To secure their obedience to this order,*" proceeded the General, "*I shall move on Koonhera immediately, or upon any part where a body of troops may be assembled, and disperse them by force of arms.*" On the 10th, I thus replied in a postscript:—

"Since writing the inclosed, I have received your private and official letters of the 6th, and I shall send immediately to the Ameers the messages you direct me to communicate. *I had before told them much to the same effect regarding the troops at Koonhera,*" &c.

I next day observed:—

"He (Meer Roostum) declares to me, that the guns and property at Koonhera are what his son saved from the general wreck on his hurried flight, when, of course, he also took off as many guns as he could collect; *but that when he and the other Chiefs came off to Hydrabad by your orders, they left* merely the usual armed followers who accompany their families for protection always when outside their forts, also such of the Belooche chiefs

and retainers as always live with, and are supported by, the Ameers. Altogether, there may be about 1000 or 1200 followers and servants of every description, armed and unarmed, which is no great attendance for the families of some twenty or thirty Oriental Chiefs and Princes, small and great. Meer Roostum declares that there is not a man beyond the customary attendants, without whose protection they could not have left their zenanas and effects, when they themselves came here," &c.

My meaning the reader will, I think, allow was intelligible enough. Was it, then, either honourable or generous to represent me as having thus expressed myself of the Ameers of Hydrabad, of whom I reported, only a few lines further on, that they assured me they had "*again sent orders for any armed bodies that may remain united, to disperse to their homes?*" The grossness of the misrepresentation is more conspicuous when it is placed in contrast with my reports of the excitement occasioned by the General's advance, and of the threats made by the Belooches. But even assuming that I had been deceived, when Sir Charles Napier wrote to the Governor-General that his detection of the deceptions practised on me taught him to disregard my advice, he wrote that which was in complete opposition to the real circumstances of the case; *for, whether right or wrong, he perfectly coincided with my views.* On the 12th of February, even when reporting the capture of Hyat Khan Murree, and that the whole country was "traversed by armed bodies," the General wrote:—

"The Ameers must put this right. The 2000 men at Koonhera are, I dare say, their attendants. To these alone I have no

objection; but I have to the six guns, which, under existing circumstances, I insist upon their giving up to me."

Another heinous offence charged upon me by General William Napier is, that I believed that the Belooches instead of meeting us in battle, would, if driven to hostilities, commence a predatory warfare. That they preferred the former, only proves how impressed they were with the conviction that *we* had resolved, in spite of all their submissiveness, to seize their fort. I am certain that every officer, *without exception*, who ever commanded troops in, or has had much intercourse with the people of Scinde, will bear me out when I say that a predatory warfare was that *which alone was to be looked for*.

But, to return to the "one or two" proofs of my incompetence, which Sir Charles Napier tendered to the Governor-General on the 3d of July. The *second* is as follows:—

"Major Outram wrote, to ask me to go to Hydrabad alone to meet the Ameers."

"3d, He proposed my sending troops to Meerpoor. Had I allowed myself to be guided by Major Outram, my own throat would have been cut, and the army left without a leader at Meerpoor."

The only inference which the reader can legitimately draw from this is, that I recommended the General to separate himself from his army, and to isolate that army in the presence of an enemy. Never was a misrepresentation more complete and more unjust. I thus expressed myself on the 10th February:—

"*If you do not intend the troops to come any further* IN THE EVENT OF THE DRAFT TREATIES BEING EXECUTED BY BOTH THE AMEERS OF UPPER AND LOWER SCINDE, *I hope you purpose coming here yourself, when your presence would facilitate every thing that remains to be settled. Of course, I do not mean in reference to myself, for I could join your camp as readily as stay here, but to avoid delays in referring to the Ameers, who happening to be all together now, should be kept so till our affairs are arranged.*"

Two days later—on the 12th—I implored Sir Charles Napier not to continue his advance, after all our demands had been complied with.*

"I have (I wrote) great hopes that you will have halted on receipt of my information that the Upper Scinde Ameers have also subscribed the treaty (which I sent yesterday,) and that it will have become public throughout your camp that the troops will not advance further. *I am also* in hopes that you will put yourself into the steamer, and come down, which would at once," &c.

If the acceptance of a treaty of our dictation, and a compliance with all our demands, are not to put an end to hostilities, and if contemptible fears of assassination are to prevent our treating submissive Princes with confidence, farewell to negotiation. As I have before observed, had Sir Henry Pottinger been an equal alarmist, an amicable settlement could not have been effected in 1839; were all our residents at the Courts of native Princes similarly nervous as to their personal security, it would speedily be necessary to reduce

* The acceptance of the draft treaties had been signed by the vakeels of the Lower Scinde Ameers; while their Khyrpoor cousins had given written pledges to ratify the treaty, which they did that very evening.

the latter to the present condition of the Ameers. In alluding to my urgent request to be permitted to assure the Ameers that we were not resolutely bent on their destruction, and that the army would not advance after they had complied with our demands,—a permission which none but a politician of Sir Charles Napier's "adroit and firm" character, would have withheld,—the Historian proceeds :—

"He intimated his intention also to pledge himself that no harm was intended; and he complained that he was not free to pledge himself positively to what he saw fitting; in other words, that he had not the direction of this great affair, when every hour of every day proved his incapacity to conduct any part of it with judgment. He was not content with repeating continually his desire that the army should not advance, he once more urged the strange counsel, that Sir Charles Napier should quit his troops, and come down alone to Hydrabad. 'It would remove all doubt.' 'Unquestionably,' exclaimed the General, with his caustic humour, 'it would remove all doubts, and my head from my shoulders.'"

One circumstance both the General and his brother have strangely contrived to overlook. On the 13th I informed Sir Charles Napier that the treaty had been accepted, and urged him to come down to inspire confidence in the Ameers' minds, and in the hope that on a personal interview he might relent, and concede as an act of grace what was denied as one of justice. Before despatching the letter, I heard of the plot on the part of the Belooches to murder us on our return from the Durbar, which was frustrated by the Ameers : this, and another warlike rumour, communicated to

the General, adding—"*I mention the report now, lest you should be coming away in the steamer, which, under these circumstances, you would not wish to do.*"

The General's caustic humour did not indulge in that silly exclamation until the 11th of July—five months after my recommendation. When he did thus express himself, he did what was alike ungenerous and unjustifiable. Not a single act of the Ameers, from the commencement of his adroit and firm policy, gave him the slightest grounds for suspecting that the Ameers could have been guilty of such foul treachery. Men who had, from an overwhelming sense of their utter helplessness submitted to all our aggressions, were little likely to invoke destruction on themselves by the assassination of the English General. The death of Sir Charles Napier could not be more desirable to them than that of any other British officer, for in their estimation, all commanders are equally competent; they knew not that their coercer was one of the "greatest of England's Captains."

Coupled with this charge of having recommended a course of proceeding which would have removed Sir Charles Napier's head from his shoulders, is that of striving to isolate the army. The proposition was thus made on the 10th of February:—

"The Meerpoor Chief has not yet sent his vakeel, but I expect him to-morrow. *Should he not come, perhaps you may deem it advisable to march the troops to Meerpoor*, which would be all in the way of such portion of your force as you may intend sending to India, going by Bhooj, or to Guzerat, should you wish to send them that way as quicker than via Kurrachee, where, more-

over, there is greater difficulty in providing boats than at Mandavie in Cutch."

At the time I opposed this suggestion, *and for two days after*, Sir Charles had the intention of breaking up his force, and embarking part of the troops for Kurrachee in boats, as soon as the treaty was signed, as is proved by his letter to me, dated Sukkurunda, Feb. 12, 1843:—*

"If I hear to-morrow that the Ameers have all signed the treaty, (it was signed on the 12th) and acknowledged their obedience to the Turban, I will not approach nearer to Hydrabad than Sallara, *as there* I mean to embark the troops for Kurrachee in boats."

Both Sir Charles Napier and I contemplated the return of part of the troops to India, *after the treaty was signed, and their presence was no longer required in Scinde*. And yet, five months after, in various despatches of the 3d and 11th July, *accompanied with delineations of the country*, he has endeavoured to blast my character with the Governor-General, and through him to impress "the House of Commons" with the belief of my imbecility, in having recommended as a *warlike* movement that which was contemplated only for a *time of peace*. Had *I* been the author of the General's letter of the 12th February, (above quoted,) and had I suggested the embarkation of the troops in boats at Sallara, to return to India by water, as he did, would not the same generous spirit have influenced Sir Charles to similar re-

* No. 61, Supplementary Blue Book.

marks on my imbecility for having recommended the detachment of part of the troops, when he was surrounded by 60,000 "fierce Belooches?" Yes; and with more justice too, for it was two days later: and, let it be remembered, that each day was pregnant with events which rapidly drew to a close that important period.

Again, Sir Charles states in his despatch of the 3d:—

> "I have it in proof, that about the time Major Outram kept assuring me of their pacific feelings and dispositions towards us, they (the Ameers) had sent orders along both banks of the Indus to their people, to 'kill every English man, woman, and child, they could lay their hands upon.'"

This, like many of the other statements of Sir Charles, is perfectly opposed to the truth. It may be asked, how was Lieutenant Godfrey, who fell into the enemy's hands at the same time as Captain Ennis, allowed to escape? How were all the British subjects who were taken prisoners, and brought before the Ameers at Hydrabad, instead of being murdered, *kept alive, and afterwards allowed to return uninjured to camp after the battle?* Among whom, I recollect the following instances:—*i.e.*, a European belonging to the Indus flotilla, in charge of one of the wood stations, who instead of being ill-treated when taken before the Ameer, (before the battle,) reported that he had been kindly treated, clothed, fed, and presented with money by Meer Nusseer Khan; a European conductor, and, I think, wife and child, besides

Lascars, taken in the ammunition boat; the hospital-assistant, Rame, belonging to the Agency; the Dhobies of the detachment 22d Regiment, &c. &c., none of whom complained of ill-treatment even, and many more could be added to the list, were it as much an object to give the Ameers credit for their good actions, as it is to discredit them by displaying all the bad which can be found against them. I am aware of no instance of the murder of any British subject among the many who fell into the hands of the Belooches throughout the whole course of the Indus, from the sea to Sukkur, (300 miles) even after war was declared, except that of Captain Ennis, which there is every reason to believe, was caused by some resistance on his part, on finding himself under restraint; otherwise, why was not his comrade, Lieutenant Godfrey, also murdered, who was seized with him? A Parsa also fell into the enemy's hands, and who appears similarly to have brought on his own death, for his Parsa companion, who attempted no resistance, was not injured.

Not satisfied with misrepresenting my intentions and misquoting my words, General William Napier finds fault with me for doing my utmost to strengthen his brother's hands when his violent conduct had rendered war inevitable. When the capture of Hyat Khan forbade me to hope longer for peace, I wrote to the officer commanding H. M. 41st Regiment, then proceeding to Kurrachee for embarkation to England, apprising him of the state of matters, and requesting him to halt till he

received further instructions. In allusion to this act of my own discretion, the historian continues :—

" Thus taking upon himself to interfere with a positive order of the Governor-General, which directed that regiment to embark immediately."

Sir Charles Napier at first disapproved of what I had done; in a few days he deeply regretted having disallowed it. He sent to recall the *corps*, but it was too late—they had embarked. And this is adduced as an illustration of my mischievous interference!

Similar in their unfounded character, and equally malicious, are the other insinuations and sneering remarks with which this portion of the " Conquest of Scinde" teems. To answer, or even to notice, them all, would swell my volume to a needless and wearisome length. I shall therefore confine myself to one point more, viz., to the " notes of conference" which have been already submitted to the reader: and in now placing before him the two following letters from Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General, he will be amused, for glaring contradictions can no longer surprise him.

On the 11th February 1843 (*vide* No. 57, Second Scinde Blue Book) he writes :—

" I will state to Lord Ellenborough all the Ameers say, *because it is fair to them.* * * * I will *at once* send Lord Ellenborough a copy of what passed; for though I do not think he will alter one iota, he may incline to show them favour in the Roree district affair."

And on the 11th July 1843, (No. 145, Second Scinde Blue Book):—

"These (the notes of conference with the Ameers above alluded to, received by Sir Charles Napier on the 11th February) I could not forward to your Lordship, because *after the 13th* our communications were intercepted;* but the inclosed copy of a letter to Major Outram shows that I intended to do so, *although I did not think it necessary,* as we were on the *eve of a battle,* which I knew could not take place if the Ameers were honest, and spoke the truth."

On the 11th February Sir Charles Napier promised *at once* to send the Ameers' representations to the Governor-General, "*because it is fair to them;*" and yet it is shown that he omitted to forward them for months afterwards, and not before they were *demanded* from him! The *omission* is accounted for in a letter dated 13th July:—

"As a battle would take place, or peace be made,† in a few days, (if Major Outram's assertions were correct,) the face of affairs would change, *I therefore* DELAYED *sending this paper.*"

* It is evident that the 13th could not have been inserted in the original, for Sir Charles Napier is excusing himself for the non-despatch of a document which he *had received on the 11th,* the date on, or before which, he must have intended to express that his communications were closed. It looks as if the 11th had been changed to the 13th, after Sir Charles Napier had referred to the 1st Scinde Blue Book, where he found recorded a letter addressed by him to the Governor-General on the *13th February,* which proved, at any rate, that his communications *were open till that date,* and which discovery called forth the explanation contained in his letter under date the 13th July, No. 146, Second Scinde Blue Book. This discrepancy he tries to account for thus:—"I was much vexed with myself for not having sent Major Outram's notes of his interview with the Ameers, because I received them on the 11th February, and the post was open to the 13th, *as I find* by a long letter written to your Lordship on that day."

† It was still in the General's power to have prevented a battle, by sending me on that day (the 11th February) the requisite authority to give the assurances the Ameers asked for.

We find, notwithstanding, that Sir Charles Napier did not fail at once to dispatch certain intercepted documents,* obtained on the 13th idem, tending, he hoped, to criminate the Ameers.

"I will send this letter of Meer Mahommed to Lord Ellenborough. * * * I to-day sent off the letter of Meer Mahommed to Lord Ellenborough."†

Sir Charles Napier next represents that he had FORGOTTEN to forward the "notes of conference," and in his letter No. 146, before alluded to, he states,—

"I had, however, made preparations for sending the notes of Outram's meeting to your Lordship, for I have just found among my papers a copy of this paper prepared for transmission to your Lordship, and with it I find my private notes made on reading it."

* * * "The march upon an enemy of such force was alone so engrossing, that really *if I had thought these papers important (which I neither did nor do now)* I could not have attended to them.‡ If they produce annoyance, or throw difficulties in your Lordship's way, very deeply shall I regret that *I* FORGOT *to send them after the battle!*"

In the former letter (that of the 11th July) Sir Charles Napier had remarked—

"That this (delay until their forces should assemble) was the

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* Which form enclosures 1, 2, and 3, to letter No. 471 in First Scinde Blue Book.

† No. 67, Second Scinde Blue Book, dated 13th February.

‡ Yet as the paper for transmission was *prepared*, what further attention was requisite beyond forwarding it, as he had done by the criminatory letters two days later!

real motive of the anxiety exhibited by the Ameers to suspend my march, if only for a day, is made more apparent by the fact that there was no advantage to be gained by delaying the signature of the draft treaty. On the contrary, to sign this draft would enable the Ameers at once to discuss and formally to protest against any, and every part of it, while it would relieve them at once from the presence of our troops; but they were confident of victory, and wanted to fight."

The Ameers *did not delay* to sign the draft treaty; they signed it—as I had previously reported to Sir Charles Napier that they *would do*—on the 12th, and subsequently I made known to him that *they had done so:* still it availed them nought,—it did not relieve them at once, or at all, from the presence of the troops: but they were "confident of victory," and "wanted to fight!" The refusal of aid or refuge to the fugitives of Khyrpoor, until compelled by Sir Charles Napier to admit them: their Vakeels deputed to accept the treaty long before the British army entered their territory, thereby obviating the necessity for its coming in contact with the stiff Belooches, and depriving the British General of any plea for *war:* their repeated protestations against the advance of the British troops when they were ready to comply with all our demands: their repeated warnings that the approach of the British army to the capital would force the Belooches to hostilities: their formal acceptance of the treaty by deputy, when first tendered to them on the 8th February, and their solemn ratification of the same in person on the day promised (12th February), while it was still in the power of Sir Charles

Napier to avoid collision,—all prove how *eager* the Ameers were for *battle!*—how confident of victory!! The *forbearance* of the British General —his *aversion to war*—are rendered equally apparent by his steady prosecution of the very measures he had been assured would cause all the Belooches of the nation to assemble in opposition —his continued advance against the capital, to protect which they had congregated—his disregard of the Ameers' compliance with the treaty —of the warnings of the consequence of advancing further when they had done so—and of the Ameers' solemn protestations! The reader will judge whether the *acts* and *words* of Sir Charles Napier, or those of the Ameers of Scinde, were most consistent.

Now to their lamentable results.

SECTION XI.

THE EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE ATTACK ON THE RESIDENCY.

WITH the attack on the Residency ceased my functions as negotiator, if he can be called a negotiator who is sent to demand every thing and yield nothing. The appeal now lay to arms; by arms alone it was to be decided. My duty to my country demanded that every effort should be made to render the issue of the struggle favourable to her, and in my heart I believe that the interests of humanity and the success of our army were identified. Let the public notice some malicious misrepresentations of the Historian:—

P. 299.—"Scarcely had the sound of musketry ceased when Major Outram fell into his former course of errors, which the attack of the Belooches temporarily suspended. Even on board the steamer he wrote a despatch, which he commenced with the startling observation, that his letters for several days past must have led Sir Charles Napier to expect the negotiations would fail. Yet passing over his repeated and confident assurances that the Ameers had no hostile designs, he had on the 13th reported the formal signing and sealing of the treaties in full Durbar—a proceeding which, as the Governor-General and the Council of Calcutta well remarked, might have been supposed a very promising step in a negotiation for peace.

"At Muttaree, a place on the Indus one march north of Meeanee, Major Outram found the army, which was advancing to fight. He joined it, not as might be expected, proud of his military exploit, and somewhat ashamed of his political failure, but

with the same inflated opinion of his own sagacity and judgment in diplomacy; and more forward than ever to thurst his dangerous counsels upon his chief in matters beyond his capacity. Thus, despite of the attack which drove him from the Residency, he persisted in declaring that the innocent Ameers desired peace; and he actually pressed the General to halt another day, which would have at once added twenty-five thousand men to the enemy's army at Meeanee. Finding Sir Charles Napier inflexible on this point, and fixed in his resolution to march forward and give battle, he changed his object, and immediately meddled with the military dispositions.

"First, he suggested the sending a detachment down to Tattah, as if there was not already a sufficient disparity of numbers; then he spoke of his own notions and conclusions as to the Beloches' mode of warfare, and the places where they were likely to be found, as if war depended on conjectures and not on matters of fact. And always supposing, contrary to what really happened, that the enemy would only harass the British line of march and never deliver battle, he proposed to drop down the river again, to burn the Shikargahs on the bank, and so deprive them of cover. This he pressed so strongly that the General yielded to free himself from importunity rather than any conviction of its use. Major Outram then actually demanded the best of the European troops, besides Sepoys, to effect this petty enterprise, and would thus have caused the destruction of the army in the next day's fight, if his desire had been granted. He was, however, forced to content himself with two hundred Sepoys.

"It was a great fault to give him any men, and the less excusable that his manifold errors, during his three weeks of diplomacy, had proved the unsoundness of his judgment both in military and political affairs. But the General had early taken a personal liking for him, being swayed thereto by his manners and reputation; and it has ever been his character to hold tenaciously to friendly impressions. Hence, he attributed all the errors he saw and endured the effects of, to an ardent, zealous temperament; and now, having expected his death from the treachery of Ameers, and secretly reproaching himself for letting him run into such danger, he in joy at seeing him safe when almost past hope, was too willing to please a friend. Outram came also, not

as an escaped victim, but a triumphant soldier; and the General, forgetting his many errors, and overlooking his present preposterous demand for European troops, suffered him to carry off for this wild enterprise two hundred brave soldiers, and with them three European officers, Green, Wells, and Brown, men of singular zeal and courage, and unassuming withal, which greatly enhanced their value as executive officers; their absence was severely felt in the day's battle. It was a great error."

The dispatch referred to by the historian, was submitted to the reader in the last Section. The dispatches written from Hydrabad have also been quoted; and I appeal to every honest man, conversant with the English language, if what I wrote on board the steamer was not in strict harmony with what I had written from the Residency, and if my dispatches prior to the attack were not such as an English officer would *a priori* be expected to have written, when the circumstances under which he was placed became known. That the Ameers had no hostile designs, I then averred, as I still maintain and believe. "The formal signing and sealing of the treaties in full durbar" undoubtedly were, as the Governor-General and the Council of Calcutta very sensibly remarked, "a very promising step in a negotiation for peace;" and but for Sir Charles Napier's persisting in advancing against Hydrabad after the treaties *had been* sealed, the Ameers would most probably have succeeded in pacifying their Belooches. When I expressed my fears that my negotiations would fail, I but intimated the possible immediate development of those evils which three weeks previously I had shown must, sooner or later, result from the un-

just and unauthorized exactions of Sir Charles Napier. When the Governor-General and the Council of Calcutta thus disparagingly alluded to me, they believed, as they probably still imagine, that the gathering of the Belooches, and the disinclination of the Ameers to accept our terms, had reference to, and were caused by Lord Ellenborough's treaty. They were then ignorant of Sir Charles Napier's oppressive demands, and even now are probably not aware of their nature and extent; for the notes and comments with which the Governor of Scinde thought fit to accompany my letters ere he submitted them to the Government of India, are well calculated to convey an impression the reverse of truth. When, moreover, I *did* say that I despaired of an amicable adjustment of affairs, I clearly and explicitly intimated that the Belooches, whom Sir Charles Napier's violence had brought together, and not their helpless masters, were the recusants. I indicated the extent of their recusancy, and sought permission to appease them. *All that they required was a simple assurance that* JUSTICE *would be rendered; and* THAT *was refused!* Even this refusal might have been overcome, and I believe it would, had not Sir Charles Napier's continued advance, confirming their worst fears, rendered it imperative on them to march out in defence of the capital, and, as a necessary military precaution, to expel my party from their rear.

When General Napier wrote that I joined his brother, little "proud of my military exploit," for once

he wrote the truth. Far from being proud of having kept at bay a horde of exasperated Belooches whom our own measures had driven to resistance, I would willingly have sacrificed whatever credit might attach to the exploit, and joyfully have abjured all claims to political sagacity, could I thereby have saved our unfortunate antagonists from the consequences of their assaults on us.

When General Napier says that I urged his brother to "halt another day," he says that which is totally opposed to the truth. He, however, but repeats, in more sonorous periods, the statement of his brother, who, at No. 143 of the Second Scinde Blue Book, thus observes:—

"One would have imagined that the attack on the Residency would have at least opened Outram's eyes to the treachery of the characters he had to deal with. Not a bit; he joined me on the 16th at Muttaree, and still wanted me to delay my attack for a day; yet six hours' delay would have added 24,000 men to the forces of the Ameers at Meeanee."

Of the imperfect memory of Sir Charles Napier, as shown in his numerous mis-statements of facts and misquotation of dates, the reader has already had many illustrations. Here is a notable example: I am bound to believe it is unintentional, but it must nevertheless be exposed. When I joined the General, I found that it was his intention *to leave his baggage at Muttaree and advance on the 17th, with all his disposable force, to clear the shikargahs along the road to Meeanee, which were supposed to be occupied by the enemy, and then to return to Muttaree!* This operation would not only have

involved one, if not two days' hard fighting, but have compelled us to meet the enemy at great disadvantage. If in the open field the Belooches contended so well as to render the issue of the battle more than once doubtful, what might not have been the result had we indulged them in their favourite mode of jungle skirmishing? Even had we succeeded, our final advance on the capital would have been retarded; *and so far from wishing a single day's delay, now that the scabbard had been thrown away, I openly and unreservedly expressed my anxiety that our measures should be conducted with celerity, and matters brought to a speedy issue!* But the delay which it must have occasioned was not my only, nor was it the greatest, objection which presented itself to the General's proposition. It was the moral effect of a *retrograde* movement to the baggage, and the disasters which were likely to follow it, that I most deprecated. Though our troops might, and probably would, have succeeded in driving the Belooches before them through the woods, there cannot be a doubt that, as soon as the former had begun to retrace their steps, the latter would have renewed the contest with redoubled fury, encouraged by what they would assuredly have construed into a *retreat.* They would have pressed on our retiring force on every side, bringing the whole body of their warriors into play instead of only a small portion as at Meeanee. The nature of the ground would have enabled them to do so, and their hordes of horse—ineffective, it is true, at Meeanee and Dubba, but under

the circumstances contemplated, free and available —would have turned our rear and fallen on the baggage, while the main body of the army was maintaining a retrograde fight. Impressed with these views, I did suggest that, rather than adopt his original plan, the General should take steps to clear the shikargahs beforehand, so as to enable the baggage to accompany the army, and thereby prevent the necessity of any retrograde movement. And this I offered to do by firing the woods from the opposite quarter. The misrepresentation of my advice, made by Sir Charles Napier, is the more remarkable, as he ought to have remembered that, previous to my joining him, and prior, therefore, to the conversation whose purport he professed to communicate to the Governor-General, I had informed him that the shikargahs were likely to be occupied, and volunteered to clear them on the evening of the 15th, so as to enable him to advance on the morning of the 16th, a day earlier than he originally intended! I subjoin an extract from a letter written on board the steamer:—

"The accounts I received this morning lead me to conclude that the Ameers are moving up to the Gableanee and Meeanee shikargahs, which by night will, doubtless, be filled with Belooches, whom it will be difficult to dislodge from such dense jungles, and certainly could not be effected without serious loss. I would, therefore, beg to propose that you allow me to drop down in the steamers to-morrow morning to fire* both shikar-

* The simplest mode of clearing jungles, frequently had recourse to in India, when practicable; but Sir Charles Napier, ever desirous of improving on Indian practice, consulted his artillery officers as to the practicability of *firing the shikargahs* BY SHELLING!

gahs, which can be done easily from the river, under the steamers' guns should opposition be offered, or we could do it this evening if you prefer it; only by the morning all the enemy may be collected in the shikargahs, which, perhaps, they may not be this evening."

This proposition I repeated to Sir Charles Napier, when I rejoined him on the morning of the 16th, and learned the extraordinary project which was then under consideration. He considered the subject till the afternoon, when he sent me back to the steamers with 200 sepoys,—*convalescents selected from the whole army as least capable of exertion;* it being supposed that we should not require to proceed to any distance from the vessels.

I am represented by General Napier to have "*actually demanded the best of the European troops, besides sepoys, to effect this petty enterprise*"—*a demand which would, if complied with,* "*have caused the destruction of the army in the next day's fight.*" As my correspondence in the Scinde Blue Books proves, I was not in the habit of making any *demands;* and however energetically I might *recommend,* from first to last I never presumed to dictate to Sir Charles Napier what troops to employ, or how they were to be employed. The Historian's assertions are, simply, *untrue.* Sir Charles Napier cannot have forgotten, that when he asked me what strength of a detachment I thought would suffice, my reply was, that only a *few* were required to burn the shikargahs, but that had I a stronger party, including the light company of H. M. 22d Regiment, *not then removed from the steamers which had brought them from Hydrabad,* I

might make an effectual diversion in favour of his advance. My idea was, after firing, to turn the shikargahs, and thus take the enemy in the rear should they fight us in the open field, after having been driven from their cover. The General determined on limiting my operations to the firing of the woods, and ordered 200 sepoys to accompany me ; not able-bodied men, as the Historian alleges, but, as I have said, convalescents—men so weak, that our comparatively easy duty distressed them greatly. When the firing of the shikargahs was concluded, my desire to carry into effect the further object alluded to, with the reduced party, was frustrated in consequence of the officers reporting the incapability of the sepoys to undergo further fatigue.*

With reference to the " wild enterprise" itself, the Historian informs us that it " *turned greatly to the disadvantage of the British.*" And wherefore, does the reader suppose ? *Because in the night the enemy* " *moved eight miles to the right,*"† and the 200

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* It is not to be supposed that any great risk to my small party would thus have been incurred ; the enemy's attention being occupied with the British army in their front, would have enabled us to approach unobserved through the thick cover by their rear, when the sudden appearance of British troops from so unexpected a direction must have caused a panic. But allowing that they did turn upon us, a compact square of 200 bayonets could have kept them at bay, having no artillery to turn upon us, which of course could not have been spared from their front for that purpose. When I afterwards mentioned my purpose to Sir Charles Napier, he said that it would have been a good move, and an effectual operation ; for that the appearance of even a serjeant's party from that direction, when he was hardest pressed, would have decided the action.

† " Conquest," page 301. The historian, inconsistent as usual, here states that the enemy moved out of the shikargahs *the night before the battle.*

sickly men, who were sent with me, with Captains Green, Wells, and Brown, were not engaged in the general action! What, may I ask, induced the enemy to move? I think I can throw some light on the subject. Rather, I should say, I have it in my power to substantiate the supposition made at the time, and one which I never heard controverted till the publication of the Scinde fables,—that information regarding our intended operations, conveyed to the enemy by their spies from the General's camp, induced them to evacuate the shikargahs. I subjoin an extract from my private journal of the 19th February :—

"I rode with the captive Ameers on the march this day (interpreting between them and the General.) * * Meer Nusseer Khan asked me where I was during the late action, for that when his army fled, he looked everywhere for me with his spy-glass, with a view of surrendering to me, but not seeing me he went off with the rest.* I told the Ameer how I had been employed; that we expected his army to oppose us in the shikargahs, not in the open plain. To this he replied, that they had some idea of the sort, but changed their minds. Ramah, the native doctor of the agency, who happened to be in the city when

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Previously, at page 275, he had recorded, with reference to the 11th February—*six days before the battle*—"Thirty thousand of them were actually collected and occupying a position of battle at Meeanee, which they were entrenching, in the expectation of at least 25,000 more in eight days"—which, again, is opposed to the evidence handed up by Sir Charles Napier *eight months afterwards*, (p. 136, 2d S. B. B.) to the effect that ALL the Belooche troops were encamped in a bauble jungle, half way to Meeanee, when Nusseer Khan joined them *on the evening of the* 14th February, and that *on the evening of the* 16th they moved from thence to Meeanee.

* This was confirmed by Lieutenant Fitzgerald, of the Scinde Horse, who reported that one of the principal Ameers, mounted on a camel, the description of the trappings of which answered to that of Meer Nusseer's, and surrounded by some chiefs, hovered long in the rear of the retreating army.

the Residency was attacked, was imprisoned, but released after the action of the 17th to bring the Ameers' overtures to the General. He states that the plan of holding the shikargahs *was only abandoned the night before*, and that the change was much discussed in the Durbar, and generally disapproved of by the Belooche sirdars. He (Ramah) was not aware *why* this alteration had been made, but it is evident that our plan of firing the shikargahs from the river had been made known to the Ameers, and on inquiry I found the intention was notorious through our camp the previous day, so no wonder it transpired. Fortunate, indeed, was it that they *did* change their plan, and thus gave us an opportunity of deciding in a single day, *and, in an open field, the whole campaign*,* instead of commencing by contesting the shikargahs before falling back upon the fort and city, in which jungle warfare we could have gained no decided advantage, should have lost many men, and then should have arrived before the place with an inadequate force to attack it. Of this, Sir Charles tells me he is now convinced, and that had they done so, he must have confined himself to entrenching his camp until reinforced. The advantage of a fair field day outside the shikargahs, neither he nor any one else had ever hoped the Belooches would give us; nor did our information from the natives of the country lead us to expect it. It was evidently the result of information received from the British camp."

That the enemy did occupy the shikargahs which flanked the General's intended line of march, the Historian pretends not to deny; that their evacuation of these woods was of the utmost importance to the British army, no one acquainted with jungle warfare can doubt; that had the Belooches remained in the shikargahs, to burn the latter was the most feasible operation, the veriest

* Had Sir Charles Napier acted according to my advice, and as I thought he would when this was penned, the battle of Meeanee would have terminated hostilities, and our injustice have stopped short of its final melancholy consummation.

tyro in Indian warfare knows; and therefore, *per se*, my "wild enterprise" was sound military practice. Without pretending to place myself on a level with Sir Charles Napier, I am desirous that my proposition be contrasted with his own, and their respective merits tested by any method the Historian can suggest more satisfactory than his own interested dictum. That the evacuation of the shikargahs was effected in consequence of the information obtained by the enemy of our intentions, few but the Historian, and those who, ignorant of his untrustworthiness, have given implicit faith to his unsupported assertions, can, I think, doubt.

The remaining charge against me, and the first in number in the Historian's indictment, is, that I "suggested the sending a detachment (of the General's army) to Tatta, as if there was not already a sufficient disparity of numbers." The reader has seen, that when hostilities could no longer be averted, I requested the officer commanding H.M.'s 41st Regiment to stand fast, and be able to reinforce the army. That reinforcement the General countermanded—a measure which indicated full confidence in his own numbers. In replying to the letter in which he declined the proffered aid, I observed:—

"We have two hundred tons of coal at Tatta, which must be our chief stand by now; but I fear the guard there, thirty sepoys I understand, is too weak to prevent its destruction if tried. *Would you wish* one of the steamers to run down to assist in protecting it? We have now the detachment of native infantry which brought down the ammunition, (fifty men,) in addition t

the 22d light company, should you wish to detach a portion to Tatta."

I need scarcely explain that it was a portion of the fifty sepoys I indicated—a party sufficient to fight the steamer. On the same day, immediately afterwards, I again wrote :—"*Might not a reinforcement* (for the coal depot) *be brought up from Kurrachee?*"*

My suggestions were unheeded: no measures were adopted till the 19th, when a steamer *was* sent. *But it arrived too late—the small guard had been driven off*, and—THE COAL WAS IN A BLAZE.

The decisive nature of the battle of Meeanee prevented any serious consequences from arising; but who could predict the issue of the fight? What General is justified in not preparing for the worst? Had Sir Charles Napier's first notion been attempted to be carried into effect, who shall say what might have been the result? or rather, when the campaign would have been concluded? for its final result, of course, was never doubtful. And all our wood stations rifled, our coal on fire, and the steamers consequently useless, how would our communications have been maintained?

I implore my reader not to misunderstand me. Far be it from me to insinuate aught against the skill and generalship of Sir Charles Napier. Nor would I have offered even a passing comment on the acts of one whom all acknowledge to be a master in war, had it not been that attempts are

* No. 81, Second Scinde Blue Book.

made to misrepresent my own character and conduct; but if, in vindicating these, I found it necessary to say aught which reflects on the Generalship of Sir Charles Napier, the fault is not mine: it is chargeable on those who have placed me on my defence.

It is greatly to be regretted that General William Napier, while giving a loose to his imagination, by describing as facts events which neither *were* nor *could have been* performed, and caricaturing those actually achieved, has failed to render justice to two of the most brilliant events which have signalized British arms in Scinde. I allude to the dashing affair at Peer Acres, near Shewan, on the 8th of June 1843, and that of Thadadpoor, on the 15th. On the former occasion, the gallant Roberts, with not more than 700 men, attacked, routed, and dispersed the Belooche forces on the western bank of the Indus, and captured their leader, Shah Mahommed, who was collecting and organizing a large army, with which to join his brother, Shere Mahommed, on the other side of the river, in the hope, doubtless, of obtaining terms denied to justice. On the latter, Captain Jacob—another officer of whom the Bombay army is justly proud—with the Scinde horse, 400 infantry, and two guns, surprised and attacked Shere Mahommed's army, which, by the most accurate reports, amounted at least to 10,000 men. But for Roberts' affair, the Shere would speedily have been reinforced by his brother's troops; and but for that of Jacob, the united armies might have retired eastward to the

desert, and waited till the pestilence, the heat, and the inundation placed Sir Charles Napier's army at their mercy. Between them, these skilful officers dealt a death-blow to the Ameer's hopes. Sir Charles Napier, it is true, was advancing against him—but with what prospect of success? Scinde, the reader is aware, is intersected with canals, and these, though empty and dry on the descent of the army in February, were in June full. The thermometer, by day, stood at 120 in the coolest tents, and hardly ever fell so low as 100 by night. The troops were compelled to march *at night;* by day they could not sleep, by reason of the heat and plague of flies. On the second march, the Europeans were so knocked up, that all H. M. 28th, save 120 men, were compelled to be sent back; and of the 170 English soldiers still remaining in camp, *nine died*—all struck down by apoplexy. It was resolved, then, to send back all the Europeans, when intelligence of Jacob's victory enabled the entire force to return. Had that victory not been gained, who shall set limit to the disasters that would have accrued—disasters of our own seeking, induced by the infatuation of Sir Charles Napier.

I proceed with the Historian's narrative of his brother's policy.

P. 321.—"At break of day he sent this message to the Ameers, that he would immediately storm Hydrabad if they did not surrender. Their vakeels then came to ask what terms he would give. 'Life, and nothing more. And I want your decision before twelve o'clock, as I shall by that time have buried my dead,

and given my soldiers their breakfasts.' Soon afterwards, six sovereign princes, namely, Nusseer, Roostum, and Mahommed, of Upper Scinde, Nusseer Khan, Shahdad, and the young Hoossein, of Lower Scinde, entered his camp on horseback, and offered themselves as prisoners."

Incorrect.—The vakeels came *first* to ask for terms, and they were sent back with the General's message, which promised honourable treatment, (izzut-se.) Shortly after, Nusseer Khan, Shahdad, and young Hoossein of Hydrabad, entered our camp and surrendered. The General returned their swords, and spoke kindly to them, intimating that their ultimate disposal rested with the Governor-General; that in about twenty-five days his instructions would be received; and that, in the meantime, they would be treated with the consideration due to their fallen state, and receive every indulgence consistent with security. One of these Ameers, the youthful Hoossein, had been confided to me by his father on his death-bed, and the guardianship of the boy, imposed on me under these melancholy circumstances, I was authorized by Lord Auckland to undertake. This circumstance, and his youth,* I represented to Sir Charles Napier, and interceded on his behalf. He was accordingly released, with the understanding that he was pardoned, so far as then rested with the General.† So, at least I, who solicited his par-

* He was sixteen years of age.

† It does not appear that this act of mercy was departed from in consequence of the disapproval of higher authority. On the contrary, the release of Meer Hoossein Ali, and his arrest afterwards, appear never to have been reported to the Governor-General.

don, understood; and such, I am certain, was the impression of all present. He was desired to return to his relations in the fort, and to give confidence to the people, by assuring them that, now that the Ameers had submitted, no harm should befall them, if they returned peaceably to their houses. Next day, (the second after the battle,) Meer Roostum, and Meer Nusseer of Khyrpoor, with one of the sons of the former, surrendered themselves. Roostum, in his petitions, makes no mention of having been induced to give himself up by any message from me;—probably for the same reasons which influenced the other Ameers in suppressing that circumstance. But I did tell the captive, Meer Nusseer of Hydrabad, to send him a message in my name, advising their submission; and this message was, I know, conveyed. Sir Charles Napier was also aware of it. Conscious of having given that advice, and believing that it had had its influence in effecting their ready submission,* I felt myself in some measure responsible for the treatment the Ameers received. This consideration, and the annulling of the pardon granted to the poor boy, whom I swore to his dying parent to protect, impels me, from a sense not

* But whether or not the Ameers may have been at all influenced by me to surrender, the fact of their giving up a stronghold like the fortress of Hydrabad, while yet they had 10,000 or 12.000 fresh troops to garrison it, and Shere Mahommed's unbeaten warriors in the field, within a few miles of so small an army, which they had just before so nearly defeated in the open field, is an unanswerable proof that the Ameers never had indulged the hope of overcoming, or even withstanding our power, and that they had not prepared for the war which had just burst upon them!

only of honour, but of duty, not to close my own defence without endeavouring to obtain justice for our captives. It impelled me, when I was in England, to plead for them with the authorities there: that advocacy led to explanations; those explanations were little relished by Sir Charles Napier, and led to the compilation of the Scinde fables, with their endless tissue of calumny and misrepresentation.

The punishment which had been inflicted on the Ameers in the battle of Meeanee, and the lesson it read to them of the hopelessness of any attempt of resistance, was quite adequate for the emergency, *even* had any guilt attached to them; and they, at least the majority of the Ameers, were guiltless of aught save culpable forbearance.

Had we remained satisfied with our success, and restored the Ameers to their thrones, we should now be holding Scinde in as peaceable subjection as any other province in India; and with little, if any expense. Nay, more—our forbearing to enhance, by spoliation, the guilt of our repeated acts of injustice, might have been accepted by the world as magnanimity! Such a course I recommended Sir Charles Napier to adopt; and I had little doubt that, by his representations, such was the course which the Governor-General would have been inclined to adopt. Had not I hoped so, and been sanguine in my hope, should I have been justified in advising the Ameers to surrender, knowing as I did, and as the General acknowledged, that had they held out the city and for-

tress, owing to his deficient means, Sir Charles Napier must have retired on the river, and there entrenched himself till reinforced,—a measure which, even after the late battle, would have had almost as injurious an effect as the one previously proposed, of leaving the baggage at Muttaree. *Had the Ameers not been induced, by Sir. Charles Napier's assurances, to expect a far different fate from that which has overtaken them, they would not have surrendered.* THEY WOULD, LIKE ALL ASIATICS OF THEIR CREED, RANK, AND CHARACTER, RATHER HAVE BURIED THEMSELVES AND THEIR WIVES BENEATH THE RUINS OF THEIR FORTRESS.*

* General William Napier talks of the surrender of the Fortress of Hydrabad as an act of "miserable cowardice." It was not so. It was surrendered *because the Ameers trusted to the honour of his brother!* They required not to be told that his field pieces would be useless against their fort,* and that till reinforced he was impotent to molest them. But they knew also, that even could his army be destroyed, other armies, and as able a commander in their estimation, would invade their country and destroy them. To resist him they knew would be—*not courage, but—madness.* But for this conviction strong on their minds, would they have allowed the Emaumghur party to return scatheless—would they not have fought Sir Charles Napier long ere he approached their capital—and daily harassed his line of march! But they never contemplated resistance. Whatever mild men could do to deprecate our hostility, the Ameers did. WE forced them to the encounter, and THEY were foiled. Instead of seeking to retrieve their fortunes, they surrendered, reasonably hoping that as they were guiltless of any hostile views till driven to defend themselves, their fate would be a gentle one. They believed Sir Charles Napier, and they now rue their credulity.

* Thus described by the Historian, page 376:—"Apparently built of soft bricks, into which the heaviest shot would sink without fracture or destructive vibration of the wall, and consequently without damaging it for defence, the lofty ramparts possessed a strength which could not be perceived from the outside; the brick was a casing over the solid rock, —breaching was impossible, * * * it could not be battered; it was too lofty for escalade; it could only be taken by mines and storm, for which its want of good flanks gave facility. The Belooche warriors, though fugitives, were fierce as before the battle, for 10,000 fresh men had joined them during their retreat from Meeanee, all were earnest to defend both the fortress and the city, house by house, the thick walls of the buildings being well adapted for such a warfare."

Up to my departure from Hydrabad—on the morning of the 21st February—I continued to advise Sir Charles Napier to proclaim an amnesty, and restore the Ameers. Though I had sanguine hopes that such would be the course pursued, Sir Charles Napier had not arrived at a decision on the subject when I parted from him, but in a private letter which I soon after received from him, he thus communicated his resolution :—

"My own mind is now made up decidedly, but till he (the Governor-General) asks me I shall say nothing. Now as you propose yours to the Bombay Government, it becomes essential to prevent his Lordship considering them the same (as mine); he will probably hear of yours, and ask mine. I say these are different, because, besides those we took before the battle, you since told me you thought the Governor-General should restore the Ameers. At that time I had too much on my hands to think on the subject; now I see my way perfectly, and am satisfied that we should not restore the Ameers and their Government."*

When the resolution thus communicated to me on the 5th March, was *first* formed, I know not; but to carry it into effect, required the arrest of Meer Sobdar and Meer Mahommed—the Ameers who, not having been personally in the battle, were told to remain quietly in their houses, and who had given up the fortress† when requested to do so, in the expectation that they were not to be

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* In reply, I observed :—"The arrangements which the Governor-General has ordered for Scinde are known in part; and as far as your position (as the newly appointed Governor) is improved, I rejoice; *but regarding our assumption of the country, I will say nothing, further than that for your own sake I would wish to see you clear of it.*"

† In which their houses were situated.

molested. The alleged reason for their captivity was thus communicated to me in a letter dated the 24th February:

"Meer Mahommed was yesterday invited to join his brethren in affliction in the Garden.* Though not present himself in the fight, his whole army was; as was also, beyond doubt, that of Meer Sobdar Khan, but who, with Hoossein Ali, and the younger branches, are now alone in the Fort."

And in the same letter there occurs this allusion to Meer Sobdar:—

"Since the above, Meer Sobdar Khan has also been invited to join his brethren."

In the Blue Books, no reference whatever is made to the *arrest* of these chiefs, though a *passing allusion* is made to the latter in a letter written seven days after his arrest. Accusations are, for the first time, so far as we can judge from the Parliamentary Papers, brought against them on the 12th of June 1843. Regarding Sobdar, Sir Charles Napier writes:—

"I always thought that Meer Sobdar was a faithful ally. He was greatly favoured by the new treaty; * * * But the cloven foot of duplicity and cowardice was soon displayed. His Highness's vakeel, named Outrai, met me on the march to the south; he assured me of his master's good wishes, that he would send 5000 men into the battle with the Ameers, and, on a signal turn, would traitorously fall on those troops, while I was to arrange it that my soldiers were not to attack those of his Highness. The wretched duplicity of such conduct was disgusting. Had the force that I commanded been worsted in battle, Sobdar's 5000 men would have been fresh, unattacked, and untouched

* Where the captive Ameers were confined.

during the combat, and they would have mercilessly cut up the British, to clear themselves from the charge of treason to their friends. * * * If, on the other hand, we were victorious, no doubt the troops of Meer Sobdar would have fulfilled his engagement by the merciless slaughter of his flying countrymen. * * * My answer to this insidious and abominable proposition was:—'Tell your master that my army has no fear of the Belooches, and does not need the aid of traitors,' &c. * * His Highness sent 4800 men into the field at Meeanee, where they fought us manfully."*

Sir Charles Napier thus communicated to me, on the day of the occurrence, what then took place:—

"Report says that Sobdar has joined the others, and his vakeel told me it is true, but said (p. 25, 2d B. B.) 'he means only to join them in appearance, and if there is a fight, all Sobdar's men will join your side.'"

Sir Charles Napier neither told me, *nor does he for a moment appear to have entertained the idea*, that Sobdar sent this message. However friendly Sobdar might be, it necessarily followed that he *dared not* to separate himself from his kinsmen at such a crisis. It is violently improbable that Sobdar himself, who well knew that in the event of a battle he could not compel his Belooches even to remain neutral, still less to turn against their countrymen, would have made a promise which he knew he could not fulfil, and thereby have gratuitously forfeited British protection. The de-

* The Historian, unable to resist the temptation of vilifying the Ameer, here states:—"Where hundreds of them perished, while he, *coward and traitor*, remained in his palace to profit from whatever might happen."—Meer Sobdar had been for some years unable to leave his palace (except when carried in a litter) from the effects of repeated epileptic attacks, and could not, therefore, have gone to the war had he been so inclined.

throned Ameer has it not in his power to controvert the statements thus made in justification of his dethronement, even if aware that such an attempt at justification has been entered on. But I appeal to the reader, if it be in the least degree probable that one who had sent such a message to Sir Charles Napier as Sobdar is represented to have done, would have thus written to me, the Commissioner of that General, and in almost hourly communication with him, as he did on the 13th of February, four days prior to the battle :—

"I have undergone great expense, and have taken great precautions (to keep his Belooches faithful to him ;) but, led away by instigation and promises, they have deserted me. If we do not now go out (with the Belooches) we shall remain as prisoners (in the fort.) In the country (outside the fort) there is a great danger of being killed. If I do not go I shall remain a prisoner. Having no remedy left to me, I now go out (to keep up appearances,) and after speaking to some Belooches, as well as the other Meers, I shall soon return. I am endeavouring to get another man (a substitute) that I may not go out of the fort. If not, I shall do all in my power, (*i.e.* to allay the excitement of the Belooches.) *If I be killed or imprisoned, the risk* (responsibility) is to be borne by the Sirkar (English Government.)"

That matters had reached a crisis when the Ameers were impotent to control their Belooches should the latter finally *resolve* to fight, I informed Sir Charles Napier on the same day that this letter was received from Sobdar. I wrote :—

"The Belooche Sirdars all met together, *and swore on the Koran that they would unite to oppose the British:** THAT WITH

* The purport of this message I communicated to Sir Charles on the 13th February, although at the time I did not place much faith in Meer Sobdar's

OR WITHOUT THE AMEERS' WILL THEY WOULD OPPOSE THE BRITISH: THAT IF THE AMEERS WOULD NOT HEAD THEM, THEY WOULD GO WITHOUT THEM."

Again, I thus wrote:—

"'The deputies said they would report what had passed, but that they had no hope of allaying the excitement of the Belooches generally, unless I would authorize some more positive assurance to the Upper Scinde Ameers; that if any reply was to be given they would bring it that night, *otherwise*, that I was to consider *that their masters could do nothing farther*,'—*i.e.*, that the Ameers could not control the Belooches—of course, including all the Ameers."

The *alleged* treacherous message was received by the General on the 4th of February,—thirteen days prior to the action: this Sir Charles Napier calls "*just before the battle.*" My intimation that neither Sobdar nor any of the Ameers could control their Belooches, should hostilities break out, was communicated on the 13th of February, four days before the battle. Sir Charles Napier well knew that not one of the many thousand Belooches whom his violence had collected, dreamed of absenting themselves on that day; yet, after the action, he intimated to Sobdar that, since not personally present, he might remain in his house and

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representations. I thus reported—"Sobdar affects to be in a fright that the Belooches purpose seizing him." And by a letter received by my moonshee from Meer Sobdar's minister next day, the 14th February, the purport of which is embraced in the reply, No. 76—"Your note I have received, and informed Major Outram of the contents, *i.e.*, * * that they (the Belooche Sirdars) have accordingly turned against your master (Sobdar) and will no longer obey him; and that the Meer himself, if he does not move out will be murdered; but that he will not go out, and will do his utmost to serve the British, &c. &c."

fear nothing. This intimation produced the surrender of the fort, and led Sobdar to write a letter to the Governor of Kurrachee, strictly prohibiting him from molesting the English. When the convenient hour arrived, this confiding Ameer was "*invited to join*" *his brethren, and forthwith imprisoned!*

But another charge is preferred against this unhappy and ill-used Prince:—

"Meer Sobdar, in dark council with the other Ameers, had resolved to massacre Major Outram, and above a hundred British officers and soldiers that were with him. The Ameers made an ostentatious pretence of protecting him in the evening, knowing that he was to be slain the next morning. * * *"

I have, I trust, already satisfied the reader that no intention of massacring myself or my escort ever entered the minds of the Ameers. The General's advance *compelled* the Beloochees to march out in defence of the capital; *a necessary military preliminary* was to expel me from their rear; and, *as the evidence adduced by Sir Charles Napier* AGAINST *the Ameers proves, my expulsion was* ALL *that they desired.* "*If they fight, kill them: but if they run away, never mind,*" were the bloodthirsty instructions issued by those who "*in dark council*" had resolved to "*massacre*" my escort and myself! Farther, not the most frivolous evidence is sought to be adduced to prove that Meer Sobdar sanctioned the measure, or was even privy to its adoption.

Sir Charles Napier further adds, that whether Sobdar was or was not privy to the attack on the Residency, whether able or impotent to defend the

British detachment, his dethronement, and, *a fortiori*, his arrest, was justifiable. For, proceeds the Governor of Scinde :—

> "Princes who cannot protect accredited agents (invited by themselves to their capital) from being massacred by their troops, are mere chiefs of brigand bands, and must be put down by any civilized Government that has the power."

It is enough to observe, that I had *not* been invited to the Court of Hydrabad, and that the troops there collected were not the ordinary soldiery of the capital, but the entire warriors of a nation exasperated to the last degree by the perfidy of the English ; and finally, that long ere I was attacked, my danger had been indicated to me, and I had been *implored* to depart. One consideration more I must urge on my reader, and I have done with Meer Sobdar. The inability of that Ameer, in common with the rest, to control his warriors, was well known to Sir Charles Napier before the action : *that the united armies of all the Ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde had opposed him, Sir Charles Napier most clearly* IMPLIED *in his report of the battle of Meeanee;* when Sobdar was arrested, no evidence, even the most scanty, existed that he was connected with the attack on the Residency, *else assuredly would it have been given ;* in other words, the guarantee of safety and honourable treatment granted to this Prince was violated, without a reason which would not have been equally cogent against its being originally granted.

And now as regards Meer Mahommed Khan.

No report of the arrest and imprisonment of this Ameer appears to have been furnished to the Governor-General: nor does any allusion to him occur in the Scinde Blue Books, except in the document above alluded to, written by Sir Charles Napier on the 12th of June, three months *after his arrest*, when that officer could no longer avoid to notice this Ameer's petition, and seek a justification for his treatment. The tone of argument is a strange one. The first point of defence is, that—

"The Ameers formed one Government, and must be responsible collectively."

To this it were sufficient to reply, that the treaty of 1839, *the treaty then in force*, expressly broke up this confederated responsibility. By it, each Chief was treated with individually, and made independent of, and irresponsible for, his brethren. But it is further to be observed, that Lord Ellenborough had most unequivocally declined to comply with Sir Charles Napier's suggestion to create a single responsible head at Hydrabad, in reply to a request that he might be permitted to do so.

The second plea in justification of this Ameer's treatment is, that he joined in the attack on the Residency, and actually received a wound in the attack. He had, so far at least as any evidence is forthcoming, no connexion with that attack, and I will venture to say, there was not a native of Scinde, or one of the General's moonshees, who

would not have told him that this was *not the Meer Mahommed who attacked me*, and was wounded on that occasion; but had Sir Charles Napier ever any doubts on the subject, they must have been removed when the old man was brought to his camp ten days afterwards, four *miles* in the sun on the *bare back of an elephant*, WITHOUT A SCRATCH UPON HIS BODY. The Meer Mahommed mentioned in my despatch was the *cousin* of the prince whose case is now under consideration. That the latter was unimplicated, I can prove by the clearest evidence, but it is unnecessary to do more than quote that adduced by Sir Charles Napier against the Ameer, in No. 182 of the Second Blue Book:—

"Meer Bijur loquitur—'Meer Golam Shah spoke to *Meer Mahommed*, and he *sent a confidential servant*, who came to Meer Shahdad and *told him that the business he was engaged in* (alluding to the preparations to attack the residency) *was a bad one, and prayed him over and over again to desist.*'"

In the third place, we are told that he—

"Tore the treaty to atoms,—the treaty to which the traitor had affixed his name and seal for the purpose of blinding the diplomatist and securing his destruction."

I will merely observe, that not an atom of evidence is attempted to be adduced in proof of this assertion. The simple assertion of Sir Charles Napier, that Meer Mahommed did so, is perfectly valueless on such grounds, first advanced nearly four months after Meer Mahommed's arrest, is this aged prince deprived of his throne and pos-

sessions, imprisoned, and banished from his country, who, from his peaceable nature, had been repeatedly employed by me as peace-maker on occasions of feuds among the chiefs,* and thanked by Government for his friendly exertions. An officer who can so far *forget* facts, as to reiterate the assertion that the treaty was signed one night to blind, and an attack made to destroy me next day, knowing, as he did, that *two days and three nights* had intervened, *and that in the interval I had been implored to leave*, cannot complain if something more than his own *ipse dixit*, and more even than the testimony of pliant Budrodeens and "*faithful and trustworthy*" Moydeens, be required to insure credence to his statements. The treaty probably *was* torn in durbar, but that Meer Ma-

* I observe that this Ameer, in his petition, dated September 24, (No. 172,) lays claim to my testimony to this fact, which I had not before remarked. He says—"Major Outram, Lieutenants Leckie and Mylne, are well acquainted with my disposition and qualities, and know that when the other Ameers used occasionally to quarrel among themselves about their territory, I always mediated between them, and never disputed with them myself. * * * Major Outram was resident in Scinde for three years, during the whole of which time I faithfully obeyed him in every thing, supplied fuel for the steamers, and camels and every other necessary for travellers. Major Outram is now in England, and will bear witness that all I have herein stated is true." Most certainly am I bound to confirm ALL the Ameer has here advanced, as *perfectly true*—and I doubt not that the other gentlemen to whom he refers would do so likewise. This Ameer elsewhere states,—"The third day after the plunder of the fort, Colonel Pattle came to me and said, 'The General wished to see me'—and having made me mount on an elephant *without a houdah*, but with *merely a pack saddle*, took me to the spot where the other Ameers were imprisoned (four miles distant:) *my solicitations to be conveyed to the General were not attended to*, and I was forcibly imprisoned."—(Ameer's petition.) No wonder the British General shunned to face the man who *only six days before* had been assured that *no harm should befall* HIM!

hommed tore it, is an unsupported assertion of Sir Charles Napier. Even were it true, what criminality attaches to the deed? The treaty *had been* signed, every submission had been made, and yet the army advanced, to verify the suspicion attributed two months before to the Ameers of Hydrabad, that "nothing would satisfy the General but possession of their fort and guns." The acceptance of the treaty WE had rendered nugatory; its fragmentary distribution to the winds of heaven was but an invocation of the God of Battles to witness their innocence of wilful bloodshed.

The last charge advanced is, that the Ameer's *followers* were in the battle. Nothing requires to be added to what I have already said on this score in reference to Meer Sobdar. That *all* the Belooches near Hydrabad stood before him at Meeanee, Sir Charles Napier was well aware when he gave his assurance of indemnity to the Ameers not personally engaged.

I must now refer to the case of my ward. It is a sacred duty, and I dare not evade it.

Beyond being present in the battle, no charge is in the most indirect manner made against this poor boy. He was but sixteen, and his youth alone ought to have averted a heavy punishment. I pleaded for him as my son by adoption, I procured his release, and, as I had every reason to believe, his pardon. That the one was supposed to imply the other, is very evident from the following literal translation of a letter which I received at the time from the princess, his mother,

who had recognized me as a brother on the solemn occasion of her husband's death, and who was, and still continues, entitled to all the protection which it is in my power to afford her.* The letter was in the unfortunate lady's own handwriting:—

"When the Meer (Noor Mahommed Khan) was alive, he was faithful to the Governor-General so long as he lived, and he always besought your favour on behalf of his sons, and he regarded you as his brother, and he assured me that in the hour of distress you will not withdraw your protection from me. I have no one to look to but yourself. Whatever crime has been committed by my son, I beseech your forgiveness for the sake of God and pity. I have nothing to hope for but through your mercy. You gratified me much by releasing my son, Meer Hoossein Ali, and I beg you will also Meer Shahdad. I have written to you this petition because I have great reliance on you. Our reputation and welfare is in your hands. Never in future shall any offence be committed by my sons; you will arrange my affairs with the General, that I may not have recourse to the mediation of other people. *I hope you will look to the tomb of Meer Noor Mahommed and show mercy to his sons.*"

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* I thus reported my interview with the dying Meer Noor Mahommed Khan, on the 22d November 1840, to the Government of India, (No. 269, First Scinde Blue Book).—"His Highness, hailing me as his brother, put his arms round me and held me in his embrace a few minutes, until I laid him quietly down. So feeble and emaciated had the Ameer become, that this exertion quite exhausted him, and it was some minutes afterwards before he could speak, when, beckoning his brother, Meer Nusseer Khan, and youngest son, Meer Hoossein Ali, to the bed-side, he then took a hand of each and placed them in mine, saying, '*you are their father and brother, you will* protect them.' * * In the course of the interview, Meer Hoossein Ali, the Ameer's youngest son, came from the inner apartments, and whispered in his father's ear, who smiled and informed me that the Khamun (the mother of his sons) sent to say she hailed me as a brother." On the 28th December 1840, (No. 275,) Mr. Secretary Maddock communicated to me "the instructions of his Lordship the Governor-General in Council, to express to you the full approval of your proceedings on this melancholy occasion"—*i. e.*, my assuming the guardianship of the young Ameer.

No mention is made of the arrest of the young Hoossein. The deed was too dark to be recorded —it must have originated in Sir Charles Napier's fixed resolution to make no exception—but to involve in one common ruin, the aged Roostum, the youthful Hoossein Ali, the peace-loving Meer Mahommed, the urbane though intriguing Meer Nusseer, and the old and faithful ally of the British Government, the bed-ridden Sobdar, and his youthful sons, for whom marriage preparations were actually in progress in the hall of their fathers, when Sir Charles Napier advanced towards the capital in hostile array. The Talpoor dynasty of Scinde was to be exterminated, root and branch —never was a vow more religiously fulfilled—nor does any allusion to Hoossein appear in the Parliamentary papers, beyond the insertion of his petition, which forms No. 131 of the Second Blue Book.* To that petition no reply is given. In it, he claims the fulfilment of the pledge given by me to his father:—

"When my father was on his death-bed he took my hand and placed it in that of Major Outram's, consigning me to his care and protection, after which he breathed his last."

He thus concludes it:—

"Your petitioner is separated from his country and relations, particularly from his mother, who, worn out with years, cannot have long to live, and the few remaining years of her life will be shortened by separation from me. My betrothed, too, and her parents, will grieve for me."

* And an intimation by the Prize Agent that *he* had given up money and property to a value considerably above £260,000.

Is it to be wondered at, that I feel deeply for this poor boy; and am I to be blamed for giving utterance to those feelings? When it was resolved by the Government of India to act on the views of Sir Charles Napier, announced to me on the 5th of March, when that officer "saw his way clearly," and would "not restore the Ameers and their Government," it might have been inconvenient to allow so many living monuments of our injustice to move at large in Scinde. If another reason less dishonouring to my country can be assigned for the wholesale banishment of every one of the Princes of Scinde, including the two sons of Meer Sobdar and two of Meer Nusseer, with their cousins and relatives, I shall rejoice to learn it. In the meantime, none other occurs to me.

One undeniable fact is, that though the expectations of the prize agents were disappointed, enormous treasure and costly property belonging to the Ameers were taken possession of. The sole obstacle that could have existed to the appropriation of this on behalf of the captors, would have been the restoration of the Ameers. To secure the whole, the removal of all the Ameers was a necessary step. Another melancholy fact is, that ALL the Ameers, without reference to their alleged guilt, or their evident innocence, *were* arrested and transported like felons to India, while their property was appropriated. These, I repeat, *are* facts; and from these facts each person is competent to draw his own conclusions. Be his *conclusions* what they may, I would have the reader bear

the *facts* in mind, as he reads the petitions of the Ameers, and the comments made on them by Sir Charles Napier. To analyze all the appeals made by the fallen Princes of Scinde, were a tedious task, though one not without profit: one, moreover, which justice requires should be done. On our legislators that duty devolves, and I trust they will not shrink from its performance. I attempt not to discharge it, but there are some points which demand attention, and to these I crave the reader's attention. In the petitions of the Ameers there are certain complaints which the Governor-General pronounced "monstrous in themselves under any circumstances, as directed against soldiers of honour, and certainly not deriving any peculiar and unusual value from the character of the persons from whom they were made to proceed." That Lord Ellenborough should have thus expressed himself, is not to be wondered at; no one who had received the reports furnished to him, and who had been compelled to form so bad an opinion of the Ameers as he had been, could well have expressed himself otherwise. Yet the reader (while entertaining the same high ideas of the character of British soldiers of honour as his Lordship) knows, that the characters of the Ameers, which had been transmitted to his Lordship, were grossly inaccurate. The question at issue is one between the Commander of the British forces in Scinde and his prize-agents on the one hand, and the despoiled Princes of Scinde on the other. Both parties are deeply interested in the matter. Sir

Charles Napier is interested to the extent, I believe, of one-eighth of the enormous wealth appropriated, and his prize-agents, besides their individual shares of the booty are, by the usages of war, entitled to five per cent. on it. The Ameers have been deprived of all their possessions. Knowing how far our personal interests influence our judgment, it is the duty of those whose province it is to pass a final judgment on the matter, *to listen to both parties, and where insurmountable difficulties occur in reconciling their conflicting statements, to seek the evidence of those who have no interest in the matter.*

Meer Nusseer Khan, Meer Sobdar, and Meer Mahommed complain of the plunder of their treasures. Sir Charles Napier summarily disposes of these Ameers' petitions as "*a tissue of falsehoods,*" assertions worthy only to be met "*by assertion;*" and in reference to this item of complaint observes, "it (the fortress) was not plundered;—it was completely protected from plunder." The Ameers may not have been able to draw the nice distinction between "plunder" and "appropriation;" but what they doubtless meant was, that all they possessed was taken from them, no distinction being made between their private valuables and the State treasure. The replies of Major M'Pherson and Captain Bazett, the prize-agents, as transmitted to Lord Ellenborough, I submit:—

Major M'Pherson.

"During that day, as prize-agent, I collected treasure in considerable amount, principally in gold. No zenana was ever entered by me, or any other British officer, during the time they

were inhabited by the ladies, but *I have taken treasure from those vacated.* * * * That we, the prize-agents, took money, jewels, swords, &c. &c., from the empty houses, is certainly the case."

Captain Bazett.

"The treasure (with one exception, when Meer Sobdar sent Colonel Pattle to me, then waiting outside his zenana gate, to go to him and see that he sent out all his treasure, when he produced only about a lakh of rupees) was received by me outside the zenana gates, generally in presence of one or more of the junior Meers; and I refer to Meer Hoossein Ali, from whom I received by far the greater sum—I think nearly twenty-six lakhs of rupees; but that the jewels found with other State property in the Toska Khana, these being entirely detached from the zenanas, were considered as State jewels, and as such retained by me, as also the jewelled swords and matchlocks found in them."

How far the assertions of the Ameers are falsehoods, or rather, how far their falsity is proved by the statements of the prize-agents,—my reader must determine. The Ameers did not say that Sir Charles Napier, or his prize-agents, themselves pocketed their jewels; they complained that *they had been deprived of all that they possessed.* But we shall be told, that the property which changed masters on the surrender of the fort of Hydrabad, was lawful prize. This is precisely the question at issue. Passing over the injustice of those acts which *drove* the Ameers to resistance, and the circumstance that war had *not* been declared when the General's continued advance, after our terms had been complied with, compelled the Ameers to expel me from their rear, I would observe, that it is the custom, in appropriating an enemy's wealth, to draw a distinction between public and private

property; and, again, that the fortress of Hydrabad was surrendered, not stormed.

To this Meer Sobdar Khan refers in his petition:—

"The General sent a message to the effect, that all the Belooche sepoys, both in the fort of Hydrabad and suburbs, were to be sent away. I sent them away accordingly, for in my sincerity I feared nothing, and always used to obey the orders of Government, and act in conformity with them. Next morning, Colonel Pattle, &c., with two regiments of cavalry and infantry, and some guns, came into the fort."

And still more strong, and to the point, is the protest of Meer Nusseer Khan:—

"Had a single shot been fired from the fort of Hydrabad, there would have been reason for sacking it; but on what principles of justice or equity was the fort plundered, when it was neither besieged nor taken by storm?"

Sir Charles Napier thus replies:—

"The Ameer is right, when he says the fort was neither besieged nor taken by storm; but it would have been, had not the terrors of the battle frightened its owners."

What would have taken place, or what would not, is, I conceive, extraneous to the matter. In war it is, I believe, the custom to make a distinction between a place *capitulated* and one *stormed;* the question is, was that distinction observed? *Had the Ameers, however, not surrendered, Sir Charles Napier well knows, and before they did so, he admitted the fact to me, that he had not the means of storming their fort; that he must have retired to the river, and there intrenched himself till reinforced; and that this*

measure would have so inspirited the Belooches, and straitened him in his means of provisioning the army, as to have insured the Ameers pretty favourable terms.

Another complaint made by the Ameers is, that the privacy of their ladies' apartments was violated. Thus Meer Nusseer Khan complains :—

"They also rushed into my seraglios."

And Meer Mahommed :—

"They also went into the seraglios, and plundered every thing that was found there."

This charge is distinctly denied by all the prize-agents, and so far as their own personal intrusion on the ladies is concerned, the denial had been sufficient, even had not their characters been sufficient guarantee. But I would ask, is it not possible, that while these gentlemen were engaged in searching for treasure, some of the sepoys, with which the fortress appears to have been filled, may not have entered these buildings, which were separate and detached, and which could only have been thoroughly protected from intrusion by preventing the soldiery from entering *at all* within the gate of the fortress itself? Before the assertions of the Ameers are denounced as *falsehoods*, questions like these should be propounded. I had myself particularly recommended, that though the gate should be kept in strong possession, not a soldier should be admitted into the fort, except those under the personal inspection and care of the officers engaged. But it requires no hypothesis to reconcile the statements of the Ameers with

truth. That the zenanas were actually vacated *having property in them*, is admitted by Major M'Pherson, who says:—

"No zenana was ever entered by me or by any British officer, *during the time they were inhabited by the ladies, but I have taken treasure from those vacated.*"

Would the ladies have abandoned their apartments and their treasure without a cause? Captain Bazett throws some light on the nature of these causes. He declares:—

"I never entered any zenana in which the women were living, except in the presence of one or more of the Ameers, with their full consent, or rather at their request—*the women having been previously removed to another part of the zenana.*"

Another of the complaints of the Ameers, stigmatized by Sir Charles Napier as a *falsehood*, is that the females were treated with discourtesy if not with positive indignity. Thus Meer Nusseer Khan says:—

"The sepoys who guarded the gate of Hydrabad deprived every female they met of ornaments. My ladies, who had never left the house, *went out of the Fort*, throwing away their ear and their nose-rings, in fear of their lives, and dreading to be seen by strangers."

Meer Sobdar:—

"The sepoys stationed at the gate of the Fort plundered every female they found with ornaments; the ladies threw away their ear and nose-rings, and went barefooted out of the Fort, for fear of their lives and being seen by strangers."

And Meer Mahommed Khan:—

"The ladies, who had never gone out of the house, (*i. e.* the

privacy of the harem had never been broken,) throwing away their ear-rings and nose-rings, went out of the Fort, and for fear of being seen by strangers."

These complaints are thus met. Major Blenkins observes :—

"They (the Ameers) were repeatedly told that we did not wish the ornaments of their women to be given, or any other property which belonged to them; and in several instances, when so proffered, I have myself sent them back to their owners; so did the other prize agents. We had no idea of intruding on the ladies, nor did we ever intrude on their zenanas, and we had strict orders from the Major-General to keep perfectly aloof from the dwellings of the women."

Captain Bazett adds :—

"I further state, that I have not to this hour seen any of the females of the zenanas (excepting the slaves, &c., who went about the Fort at all times,) nor have I ever heard of violence being offered to any female *save on one occasion, when I was told a sepoy* had forced *a nose-ring off a woman passing through the Fort;* but on inquiring, the man could not be pointed out," &c.

And Mr. Brown thus further expatiates :—

"With reference to the very strong charges adduced by the Ameer, (Sobdar,) which I now hear for the first time, of our soldiery rushing into the seraglios, and the ladies of his family being driven, by ill-treatment, barefooted out of the Fort, I can only say that, as I visited the Ameer twice on the afternoon we took possession of Hydrabad, upon which day the outrage would appear to have been committed, and frequently visited him afterwards, it appears strange that when mentioning his different grievances to me, many of which were most trivial, it should have escaped his memory to have brought to my notice those such very grave ones."

With reference to Meer Sobdar's complaint, and Mr. Brown's attempt to set it aside, I will observe.

that *the Ameer evidently does not complain of what occurred during his intercourse with that officer in the Fort, but to what took place after his removal from the Fort to the place of confinement which he was made to share with the other Ameers, on and after the 24th February.* After this event, he could have received but scanty encouragement from the other captives to impart his grievances to Mr. Brown,* who, from all I can hear, seems to have paid but little attention to the last request I preferred to him; a request which, conscious of having done my utmost to show kindness to that officer, I thought I had a right to proffer. It was, that he would strive to mitigate the sorrows of the unhappy Ameers.†

In reference to the statements of the prize agents, it will be observed that they only refer to the treatment of the ladies *while they remained in, not after they left, the fortress.* As regards the allegations of the Ameers, the statements of the prize

* It appears that letters of remonstrance were written by the captives to Sir Charles Napier, which elicited his angry reply, No. 87, 2nd Scinde Blue Book. These letters, which are not given in the Blue Books, are not unlikely to have contained Meer Sobdar's remonstrances.

† On the 23d of February I thus wrote to Mr. Brown from Tatta :—" As you are the custodier of the captive princes, let me intreat of you, as a kindness to myself, to pay every regard to their comfort and dignity. I do assure you my heart bleeds for them, and it was in the fear that I might betray my feelings that I declined the last interview they yesterday sought of me. Pray, say how sorry I was I could not call upon them before leaving; that could I have done them any good, I would not have grudged to go miles for the interview, or grudged any expenditure of my time, or amount of labour, on their behalf; but alas! they have placed it out of my power to do aught, by acting contrary to my advice, by having had recourse to the fatal step of appeal to arms against British power."

agents are in no way pertinent. The Ameers do not say that their wives were *deprived* of their ornaments, but that the ladies abandoned these ornaments before leaving the fortress, *in dread of the scrutiny which was going on at the gate, and of which they were apprised.* This complaint stands unrefuted.

It addition to the spoliation and indignities to which they were personally compelled to submit, the Meers complain of violence practised on their servants. Thus Meer Nusseer Khan writes :—

"Afterwards, the houses of Akhoond Brikal Moonshee, Bale Ram, and Moonshee Moolram, who are my subjects, were plundered; they themselves were seized, and still continue prisoners. Meerza Khoosroo, whom former Ameers treated as their child, was beaten and disgraced; his house, and that of Bushee, was plundered."

Meer Sobdar :—

"The house of my servant Gora was plundered of all the property in it. I would say nothing to the plunder of my property, but why should my servants be plundered?"

And Meer Mahommed similarly complains :—

"The house of my servant Meerza Dadoo, who is one of my subjects, was plundered of every thing in it."

None of the prize agents reply to these complaints, and Major M'Pherson makes no mention of the assault on him by Meerza Khoosroo, a venerable old man, most highly respected by all the Ameers, as having been the confidential friend of their grandfather the late Meer Kurreem Ali; an assault thus alluded to by Sir Charles Napier :—

"Meerza Khoosroo was not beaten, nor was any body else, but, being in a passion,* he seized Major M'Pherson by the throat, and was, of course, instantly made a prisoner."

Mr. Brown thus disposes of the complaints above quoted:—

"Akhoond Buchal was placed in confinement for having arms found in his house after all had been ordered to be given up. Moonshee Meeteram and Moolram were similarly treated for being found in correspondence with the enemy,† but were released immediately after the fight with Meer Shere Mahommed. Meer Khoosroo attempted to seize Major M'Pherson, without provocation, by the throat."

Yet no answer is given to the Ameers' allegations, that the houses of these persons were plundered, as well as those of the servants of Meers Sobdar and Mahommed.

My examination of the petitions of the fallen Ameers has been very cursory, but it will suffice to satisfy my reader that Sir Charles Napier was scarcely justified in designating them a tissue of

* No wonder. Would not the Duke of Wellington feel, and perhaps give vent to, indignation, were similar occurrences to be transacted before his eyes in Windsor Castle! The Ameers' faithful followers have feelings as well as the most faithful of her Majesty's servants.

† This is a strange accusation on which to justify appropriating these persons' property. If, as would appear, this occurrence took place on the day the Fortress was occupied, i. e. 21st February, I can only say that on that morning I left Hydrabad, and up to that time certainly no enemy had been heard of; the only Ameer then in a position to show hostility—Shere Mahommed—had tendered his submission on the 18th February, and had been informed by the General's letter of that date (No. 82) that he was forgiven. The first mention we afterwards find of him in the light of an enemy, is on the 3d March (No. 83)—after all those deeds had been performed which it is natural to suppose were the causes of that chief's relapsing into enmity!

falsehoods,* or authorizing his Secretary thus to address the Governor-General :—

"His Excellency further begs that his Lordship's attention, and of the Governor in Council, may be drawn to the insulting expressions used in the ex-Ameers' petitions, and which expressions his Excellency has underlined, as he cannot submit to have officers under his command insulted by the unprincipled ex-Ameers."

The following is the insulting expression thus underlined, to which the British General could not submit :—

"*The treaties and certificates have been plundered, along with my other property, by the English officers.*"—Second Scinde Blue Book, No. 144.

Sir Charles Napier may choose to have the operations carried on by his prize agents characterized by some milder term,—*conveyancing*, perhaps, but the result to the unhappy sufferers is the same. *Before that humble petitioner, thus dethroned and stigmatized, the representative of the British Sovereign had appeared only six years previous, without his shoes, to solicit permission for foreigners to navigate his river, under a solemn pledge never to injure him or*

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* I may here remark, that from the manner in which the papers are inserted in the Second Blue Book, it would appear that all the Ameers' petitions which are placed before No. 134 and its inclosures, are answered thereby, whereas only those of Meer Nusseer Khan, (28th April,) Meer Sobdar Khan, (28th April,) and Meer Mahommed Khan (29th April,) Nos. 102, 103, 104, are so; not the remaining petitions which intervene, numbered 104, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, and 132; and the petitions of my ward, Meer Hoossein Ali, (Nos. 131 and 180,) are taken no notice of whatever—no explanation being offered why the pardon granted at my intercession was revoked.

his. He was now deprived of his treaties and his certificates: was it strange that he believed them to have been removed by the officers who were appropriating his wealth? Was it unpardonable in him to style that appropriation plunder?

Even were the language strong, might not powerful feelings have been accepted in extenuation? He had lost all he possessed or held dear —his wealth, his throne, his liberty, his family, and kindred. These were no ordinary bereavements; it was hard that a strong representation, though erroneous, should be so severely characterized. The party denounced was a royal captive who had lost all; the denouncer a British General, who had gained a government, advancement, honours, and in expectancy enormous wealth: he was more; he was an *English Gentleman*, who boasted of noble blood, and would doubtless resent it as an insult were a doubt expressed as to his nobility of soul. Yet in the very letter in which this indignant appeal is made to the Governor-General, I find the victims of his "adroit and firm policy" thus characterized and referred to:—

1. "The complaints of the Ameers form a *tissue of falsehoods.*"
2. "I utterly *disbelieve the fact*" (advanced by the Ameers.)
3. "The *falsehoods* stated against Lieut. Brown, &c."
4. "Their *traitorous Highnesses.*"
5. "*Insidious and abominable proposition.*"
6. "Hypocritical quibbling."
7. "Which was a falsehood."
8. "*Hypocrisy*" (twice applied to Meer Sobdar in one sentence.)

9. " *Dark counsel to massacre Major Outram.*"

10. " (The Ameers) *bribed* * *to steal.*"

11. " The *Chiefs of brigand bands.*"

12. " Cut British soldiers' throats."

13. " The Ameers endeavouring to *cut that officer's* throat."

14. " They (the Ameers) *would have lost the pleasure of murdering upwards of* 100 *Englishmen, by the premature assassination of one*—the term '*murder*' twice besides applied in this sentence."

15. " The following *falsehoods* are again stated by the Ameers."

16. " What remains of the complaint is an *accumulation of falsehoods !* "

Yet notwithstanding these emphatic terms, I do not believe that any impartial person will condemn the Ameers as wholesale venders of falsehood, till satisfactory answers be obtained to the following queries :—

1st. If the Ameers were not plundered, what was left to them and their families ?

2d. What ladies remained in the zenanas, and how long, after the Ameers' sons were removed from the Fort ? And what property was left them in the zenanas ?

3d. Will the prize agents deny that a woman, then the concubine of an officer of one of the regiments in Scinde, and who has since, for some offence, been imprisoned with hard labour at Hydrabad, was employed to search women belonging to the zenana, and stationed at the gate of the Fortress, to prevent the possibility of their passing out unsearched ; and that in this way jewels and other property were seized from their persons ?

4th. Will they deny that the process of searching was conducted by that woman in such an indecent manner as naturally to cause the Ameers' ladies, even if they had permission to take jewels away with them, rather to sacrifice all—as stated in the petitions—in the fear of being subjected to such outrage ?

5th. Will they deny that everything in the shape of clothing, furniture, &c., belonging to the female apartments, was

seized and sold by public auction—even to the cots on which they slept? If they deny this, I challenge them to produce the sale lists.

6th. Will they deny that one lady, who, being on the point of delivery, sent to beg for her cot, which had been seized with the others by the prize agents; or that her request was refused by one of those agents? And will Captain Brown, Sir Charles Napier's Secretary, deny that the man who had been sent by the lady to make the request afterwards complained to him?

7th. Will it be denied that, in the first instance, no provision whatever was made for these queens and princesses, but that they were left entirely to shift for themselves—from the time they departed, fled, or were expelled from the Fortress, in March or April, until the arrangements announced by Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General on the 27th June 1843, (No. 141 Second Blue Book)?

Let it be stated whether the houses of the servants mentioned by the Ameers as having been plundered, were so or not?*

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* How different was the treatment experienced by the family of our *hereditary and implacable foe*, Tippoo Sultan, after the *capture* of Seringapatam.

From Lord Mornington (Wellesley) to General Harris, dated 12th May, 1799, on receiving the report of the fall of Seringapatam:—"It has afforded me peculiar satisfaction on this important occasion, to learn that every possible attention has been paid to the families of Tippoo Sultan, and those of his chieftains."

Extract from Instructions from ditto, for removing Tippoo Sultan's family: —"The details of this painful, but most necessary, measure, cannot be entrusted to any person more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by the occasion, than Colonel Wellesley; and I therefore commit to his discretion, activity, and humanity, the whole arrangement, subject always to such suggestions as may be offered by the other members of the commission. Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton is appointed to prepare for their accommodation at the Fort of Vellore after their arrival: no reasonable expense will be spared to render their habitations suitable to their former rank and expectations, and it is my intention to give them a liberal allowance. I authorize you to make the allotment of the stipends to each of them, as well as for the establishment of the zenana, provided that the total sum does not exceed to the utmost a lack of pagodas. The sons of the late Sultan may be accompanied by such attendants as they

In reference to the petitions of the Ameers, Sir Charles Napier wrote his impression to the Governor-General that they were the concoctions of a hostile party at Bombay. That there were, and are, many in Bombay who disapproved of Sir Charles Napier's policy, is very likely; for the great majority of those conversant with Eastern affairs regard it as most flagitious. That any party existed, or among high-minded gentlemen could exist, capable of underhand opposition or dishonest practices, is too monstrous to be believed. The Historian insinuates that "a vile faction"—impliedly composed of the civil servants of the company—the "jackals whom Lord Ellenborough drove from their prey,"—opposed his brother "through thick and thin." This, I need scarcely observe, is as ridiculously and as maliciously the reverse of fact as the assertion put forth at page 412, that "THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE" of

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may select. I have learned, with the utmost degree of surprise and concern, that the zenana palace of the Sultan was searched for treasure some time after the capture of the place. I could have wished, for the honour of the British name, that the apartments of the women had not been disturbed: in the heat and confusion of an assault, such excesses are frequently unavoidable, but I shall for ever lament that this scene should have been acted long after contest had subsided, and when the whole place had submitted to the superiority of our victorious arms. If any personal ornaments or articles of value were taken from the women in that unfortunate moment, I trust that the Commander-in-Chief will make it his business to vindicate the humanity of the British character by using the most zealous exertions to obtain a full restitution of the property in question. After these observations, it is superfluous to add my most anxious expectation that the utmost degree of care will be taken to secure the personal property of the princes, and of the women, when the period of removal shall arrive."

the sickness in the Scinde army "WAS THEIR OWN INTEMPERANCE." Until the publication of the 2d Scinde Blue Book, the Governor-General most unjustly bore the odium of the Scinde measures. It was not till that volume was laid before Parliament that it became known that those measures were taken not only without his sanction, but even *without his knowledge.* Had the Ameers received any assistance in the composition of their petitions, *it was no more than they had a right to demand.* But no such assistance was rendered to them. Dr. Peart tells us that no one had communication with the Khyrpoor Chiefs when those petitions were drawn out; and Captain Gordon declares that it was all but an impossibility that any extraneous aid could have been obtained by the dethroned Princes of Hydrabad. That the Ameers are, with one or two exceptions, highly educated men, capable of communicating their sorrows in even still more elegant language than that employed, is likewise testified.

But, says General Napier, the petitions bore internal evidence of having been concocted by the "vile faction" above referred to.

And here is the proof. Sobdar, "a Mussulman, appealed in the name of Jesus Christ for redress! thus betraying the real authors of his shameful memorial." I have had frequent occasion to exhibit the gross ignorance of General William Napier on Eastern matters; here is a further illustration of his incompetence. I will be bound to say that there are few schoolboys of

fourteen years of age who could not have informed the Governor of Guernsey, that next to the Prophet's name, that of our blessed Lord is most reverenced among Mussulmans. Mahommed is, in their opinion, the last and greatest of the prophets, and the Koran they believe contains the last and final dispensation of God to man. More perfect in their opinion, than the gospel of Christ, it has superseded it; but the latter is not the less regarded by them as the word of the Highest, nor does the fuller glory of Mecca derogate aught from the sanctity of Bethlehem, and the messenger of God who was there made Man.

But even were it not so:—Were that name which to us is above all names, unrecognised as holy and authoritative among Moslems, wherefore should not those who venerate it be invoked by it? When we appeal to men's feelings, we appeal to all most dear—*not to ourselves but—to them.* The Ameers well knew what were the dictates of Christianity, and they knew also that our deeds were at variance with those dictates; was it therefore not a legitimate device in men seeking justice and complaining of persecution, reproachfully to point to the genius of our religion as they detailed to us their wrongs; to implore us by the name of Him whose disciples we profess to be, to shape our course by the rule which he has left for our guidance.

But our consideration of the Ameers' petitions, and their maligners' absurdities, has compelled me

to part from the Historian. Let us return to him :—

"When the reception of the fallen Ameers was terminated, the General prepared to take possession of Hydrabad. He had previously been intent to march with the main body of his army against Shere Mohammed of Meerpoor. That chief, bringing ten thousand men to the other Ameers, and intending to join them on the morning of the 18th, was only six miles from Meeanee when the battle was fought. To be able to attack him, and, at the same time, gain Hydrabad, the General had sent the stern message to the Ameers, related before, calculating with reason upon their fears under such a defeat; in a few hours, therefore, after the surrender of the princes, Shere Mohammed would have been surprised, and probably taken or killed, if Major Outram—who, during this campaign, was the evil principle, the Arimanes of the army—had not been in the British camp. He had burned the Shikargahs, there was nobody to oppose him; the smoke might have been seen from the field of battle, yet not until the fight was over, for none were then in a mood to look out for distant objects. He assured Sir Charles Napier that this expedition, which, from the absence of enemies, presented neither difficulty nor danger, had essentially contributed to the success of the day; and the General gave some slight countenance to the notion in his despatch; but what effect could the burning of a jungle ten miles off have had on such a fight?

Major Outram's natural activity, directed to matters which he understood, might have been valuable; but always intent on meddling with questions beyond his grasp of mind, his pertinacity sometimes overbore the superior judgment of his chief. He implored him now not to march against Shere Mohammed. He knew the man, he said, personally and perfectly. He understood his character, his present views, his temper, his general policy, his disposition. He would never fight. His march was a mere menace; he would be too glad to submit and obtain peace; he would hurry to that conclusion if his present aggression was unnoticed. Write to him and he will be as pliant as can be desired; march against him, and all will be mischief and bloodshed. Such were the arguments with which the General was plied,

until in an evil hour he assented, saying, 'Write then what you like, and I will sign it.'

"Unhappy was the moment when that presumptuous counsel was acceded to. Had the army marched as designed, Shere Mohammed would have been surprised, defeated, and his capital taken in three days. Well he knew this, and in his first fear, on learning the result of the battle, wrote to say he had no part in the late fight; he had not crossed his own frontier. This was untrue, yet the excuse was accepted, and the plan of reducing him to submission adopted in all its extent. The Ameer having thus obtained time to reconsider his position, placed himself in safety by a retrograde march,* laughed at the confident simplicity of Major Outram, and commenced rallying the Belooche warriors who had escaped from the battle. In a few days he was at the head of twenty-five or thirty thousand fighting men. Fierce as ever and undismayed they were; and soon he recommenced the war with them; having Meerpoor,† his large and strongly fortified capital, on the edge of the desert, as the base of operations; Omercote, his other fortress, so well provided in the heart of the desert, as a place of refuge in case of defeat. This was the greatest error committed by Sir Charles Napier. It produced another terrible battle, and went nigh to cause the destruction of the army: it would have done so if there had been less genius and energy to repair the mistake."

I had no occasion to implore Sir Charles Napier not to march against Shere Mahommed when the

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* Shere Mahommed was only six miles off—within sound of the fray—when the battle of Meeanee was fought, on the 17th February, and must have been aware of the result within an hour after it had terminated— *i. e.*, early in the afternoon. Sir Charles Napier, *under any circumstances*, could not have moved against him before noon next day. What, then, prevented Shere Mahommed placing himself in security during the intervening twenty-four hours? Why, having so much of the 17th, *and the whole of the night before him*, should he have awaited till next day, within six miles of the British army, and reply to a letter addressed to the General? only because *he was as well aware as Sir Charles Napier himself was, that his retreat was secure whenever he pleased to retire!*

† An open town of the third class.

letter was written in which amnesty was offered if he discharged his troops; *for he would as soon have thought of then marching against him, as of celebrating his recent victory by a conflagration of the Indus!* When the conciliatory letter was, by my advice, despatched to Shere Mahommed, the Ameers of Hydrabad had not surrendered; till noon of that day their surrender was optional, and could not be reckoned on by the General. Let us assume that no friendly overtures had been made to Shere Mahommed, and that the Ameers had continued to hold out the fort, (as but for the adoption of my suggestions they most probably would have done,) what would have been the relative position of the Scindian and British armies? Sir Charles Napier openly acknowledged, that should the garrison of Hydrabad refuse to surrender, he had no alternative but retire on the river bank, and there intrench himself till reinforced with heavy artillery. His coal depot was destroyed, our wood stations had been rifled, and effectual measures would most assuredly have been taken, by the enemy, to prevent our obtaining a further supply of fuel. Our communications, therefore, were effectually closed. "Braver barbarians" than the Belooches, we have the Historian's testimony, "never gave themselves to slaughter;" and their desperate valour in the late engagement, with their subsequent anxiety to retrieve, under Shere Mahommed, the disasters they then experienced, sufficiently show that though vanquished they were not disheartened, and leave no

doubt on the minds of reasonable men, that had the Ameers again availed themselves of their services, they would rather have buried themselves beneath its ruins, than surrender the fortress, capital of the country. In addition, moreover, to those who remained, the Ameers were joined after the battle by 10,000 fresh warriors burning for revenge; the fugitives of Meeanee would have rallied, and additional levies would have rapidly poured into Lower Scinde. Shere Mahommed's army was, by the Historian's own account, 10,000 strong; his men were fresh, and eager to be at us; only six miles distant from the British camp, he was apprized of our every movement, and acquainted with all our arrangements. Our occupying an intrenched position after so signal a victory, must to him and the Hydrabad Ameers have appeared an admission of our inability to cope with them; the consciousness of our weakness which it implied, would have inspired them with that which is the best earnest of success—unbounded confidence; and instead of waiting to be assaulted, they would most probably have been the assailants. Who shall venture to say what would have been the result of a combined attack on the handful of British troops thus isolated and without support? Had it been adverse to us, who shall set limits to the mischief that would have accrued; the storm raised, would have desolated fairer provinces than Scinde. And yet the Historian gravely talks of his brother's determination to attack Shere Mahommed.

Let us even assume that, when I recommended Sir Charles Napier to make friendly advances to the Meerpoor chief, the Hydrabad Ameers had actually surrendered, would the General's ability to march on and surprise Shere Mahommed have been materially enhanced? How stood matters? That Prince's army was 10,000 strong. Round rallied the warriors of Meeanee, and the 10,000 new troops who had arrived at Hydrabad too late for the battle, the Historian tells us, proceeded to join him, *disgusted with the Ameers because they would not again fight;* elate with the hope of retrieving, under the Shere, the disasters which had on the previous day overtaken their compatriots! And what was our own position? Twenty-four hours had not elapsed since we were engaged in a battle, *the result of which was more than once doubtful.* No reinforcements had reached us; none were on their way. Of our gallant soldiers, nearly sixty were no more, and about two hundred were incapacitated by their wounds. Even on the previous day, the paucity of *officers* on more than one occasion perilled the victory, and of the inadequate number who went into action, "twenty European gentlemen, including four field-officers, went down, six of whom were killed."* Our hospitals were full and filling; our stores and baggage were in naught diminished; the fort of Hydrabad had to be garrisoned; its captive Princes to be guarded, and its long-coveted wealth required protection! Shere

* Conquest of Scinde, p. 320.

Mahommed sought not to molest us; but assuredly he would have fought, if attacked by us, as gallantly as he did fight when subsequently assailed. His strength my reader has just seen; his own valour, and the devotion of his warriors, are imperishably recorded in the bloody records of Dubba. Now for the force that could have been brought against him. The entire British army amounted to about 2500 men. Deduct from this the killed, the wounded, the sick, and the convalescents; deduct further, the hospital and treasure guards, those required for the captive Ameers, and those entrusted with the public stores, the ordnance, and commissariat; and still further reduce the remainder by the number of men required to garrison the fort, and in the paltry remnant behold the army with which we are gravely informed Sir Charles Napier proposed to defeat Shere Mahommed in three days! But not only did he purpose defeating,—he contemplated *surprising him!* Surprise him! Why, the Ameer was but ten miles off; recent events had taught him the necessity of vigilance; his scouts were alike numerous and active, and there was, notwithstanding the Historian's ridiculous tales to the contrary, not a peasant entering our camp who was not ready and willing to give him the most ample information regarding all our changes, arrangements, movements, &c.!*

* "Shere Mahommed,"—writes one who is, perhaps, better acquainted with Scinde generally, the feelings of its people, and the state of matters in

But even assuming that the slaughter of Shere Mahommed and his army was practicable, was it necessary, desirable, or justifiable? Surely enough of blood had already been shed! The Meerpoor chief had done nothing in violation either of treaty or international law. The sense of self-preservation had compelled him to collect troops; and had a right appeal to him been made, the same powerful feeling would have caused him to disband them. But it was otherwise ordered.

The letter which was sent to Shere Mahommed ran thus:—"If you disperse your troops, and keep no one with you, I shall reckon you just the same as before." It was delivered, early in the morning after the battle, to Syud Imambree, the Ameer's deputy, in whose presence the message to "remain perfectly at his ease, and to take care of the fort and town of Hydrabad," was sent to Meer Sobdar, Shere Mahommed's intimate friend. In this man's presence, also, the young Hoossein Ali was released. Is it to be wondered that the Ameer, on learning that Meer Sobdar, who, trusting to the

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regard to Shere Mahommed, than *any one* in Young Egypt—" was assuredly beloved and respected by his subjects; so long as he kept the field, all assisted him. When Captain Jacob was at Meerpoor, some 300 Belooches left the place to join him before the affair of Shahdadpoor, (when his fortunes were desperate;) *the people all over the country supplied him with money and grain of their own free will, and without allowing the British authorities to know any thing about it.* About 5000 men and four guns proceeded early in June to join the Meer at Sukkurrund; he had no immediate means of paying them. On the 14th of June, Shere Mahommed marched to surprise Captain Jacob's detachment with more than 10,000 men!" And this is the Prince whom the Historian tells us his brother made *more odious* to his subjects!

General's assurances, had dismissed the Belooche garrison of Hydrabad on the 20th, and surrendered the fortress on the 21st, was made a prisoner on the 24th, should have hesitated to trust to the General's assurances? Those Ameers who, not personally in the battle, were told to fear nothing, were captives and despoiled;—what reason had Shere Mahommed to imagine that Sir Charles Napier's promises made to himself would be more scrupulously regarded?

Had Sir Charles Napier respected the promises made to the fallen Ameers, Shere Mahommed would most certainly have disbanded his troops. What inducement could he have had to do otherwise? *The new treaty did not affect him in the slightest degree, and he had been assured that he would now be permitted to retain his possessions and dignity as before.* To improve his lot, to extend his territory, and to extort concessions from the English, could have been the sole object in view, had he, *believing the General's assurances trustworthy*, continued to hold out. Could he, who had seen his kinsmen, with all their power combined, "broken as potsherds," and the "bravest warriors in Asia" beaten by the small army of Meeanee, hope, single-handed, long to prevail against a nation regarded in the East as indomitable? The supposition is so extravagantly absurd, that it were an insult to my reader to attempt its refutation. But when the fate of Sobdar and Meer Mahommed became known to him, to have trusted to Sir Charles Napier's assurances, would have been *insanely to court*

destruction. That Shere Mahommed continued in arms purely in self-defence, after he became apprized of the events which occurred at Hydrabad on the 24th February, is impliedly confessed in the first notice of the circumstance; for the earliest reference to the subject is contained in a letter addressed by Sir Charles Napier to the Ameer on the 3d of March—seven days afterwards. He thus wrote:—

"You are *rallying* the defeated Belooches; you have increased the number of your troops; and unless you come to my camp at Hydrabad, and prove your innocence, I will march against you, and inflict a signal punishment against you."

Such a message may, under the circumstances, have been proper; but let my reader place himself for a moment in Shere Mahommed's position, and say whether, after what had occurred, he would have done as desired;—whether he would not have continued to strengthen the defensive means at his disposal? He did so. Twelve days afterwards—on the 15th March—Sir Charles Napier thus addressed the Governor-General:—

"I had scarcely sent my letter of the 13th,* when intelligence reached me that 30,000 men had assembled under Shere Mahommed."†

* In which he wrote:—"*I believe that the country is gradually becoming quiet.*"

† General William Napier, as usual, improves on his brother. At page 354, he writes:—"He was soon at the head of thirty thousand fighting men; *the spies said forty thousand.*" Whence the intelligence of the smaller number was obtained, we are not told! Not from the spies it is implied. "In fine," proceeds the General, at page 356, in reference to Shere Mahom-

The Ameer being thus, as he imagined, in a position to secure terms better to be relied on than those offered to him on the 18th of February, which he must have regarded as a disingenuous trap laid for his destruction, now offered to treat. His overtures were rejected.

That Shere Mahommed had no inducement to hold out, save the natural distrust of the General's word, which recent events had created, I have shown. That *distrust alone* prevented his coming

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med's reinforcements, "he now again experienced the dangers of listening to Major Outram's counsel." In fine, I would observe, his difficulties arose *from neglecting my counsel.* That counsel was, the reader knows, to pardon the Ameers, and offer friendship to Shere Mahommed. The latter he did: but he accompanied the offer with a treatment of those in his power which precluded that Ameer's accepting the terms. I am indebted to General William Napier for a further and a conclusive proof that Meer Shere Mahommed was acting on the *defensive.* That officer, in a letter addressed to the *Sun* newspaper, on the 5th August 1843, says, in allusion to his brother Sir Charles Napier:—"He explained his views and grounds of his determination beforehand, and in every instance the actions which followed were in strict conformity with what he had forewarned me would happen. Thus, on the 18th March he wrote:—'*In six days I shall fight another battle,*' and on the 24th, the battle of Dubba (Hydrabad) was fought." To this I replied:—"I am the last person in the world to doubt Sir Charles Napier's ability to execute the task imposed upon him, or to deny that he carried into complete effect the plan which he originally laid down, *and fought his battles at the time he thought most* conducive to his military objects." General William Napier, in bearing the above testimony to the *vaticinatory* powers of his brother, might have quoted his letter of the 13th March, alluded to above; also his prediction of the 20th December 1842:—"The result is a fair prospect of a permanent and *peaceable* settlement," &c. &c. —(No. 439, First Blue Book.)

23d December 1842.—"I consider, therefore, that Upper Scinde is *perfectly settled.*"—(No. 442, First Blue Book.)

7th January 1843.—"*Upon* which (arrangement with Ali Morad) *I consider the tranquillity of Scinde to depend.*"—(No. 453, First Blue Book.)

And 24th March 1843.—"I have *reason* to *believe* that *not another shot will be fired in Scinde.*"—(No. 90, Second Blue Book.) Predictions which in every case were *negatively* fulfilled.

is evident from all his acts. Though, doubtless, execrating a nation which he could only regard as *perfidious, cruel, and avaricious*, and though all his aspirations, most probably, were for our destruction, conscious of his inability to cope with us for any length of time, he cautiously abstained from any act of hostility which might afford the British General an excuse for attacking him.* The Historian, however, tells a different tale; let us briefly glance at his fictions. In detailing the difficulties which rendered Sir Charles Napier's position most critical during the month that intervened between the battles of Meeanee and Dubba, General William Napier tells us, at p. 340, that—

"He had only 400 men in the fortress; his field force was now reduced by the battle and sickness to less than 2000; had to guard not only the intrenched camp, with the hospitals and magazines, and the station of steamers, but the garden in which the Ameers were confined, the enclosing wall of which was more than a mile in circuit. *Here were* 2000 *men separated, not willingly, but of necessity, into three bodies, the Fortress being four miles, and the garden half a mile from the intrenched camp which contained the magazines and hospital. An army of brave men, said to be* 40,000 *strong, was only ten miles off on the outside, and in communication with more than* 1200 *inside the frontiers, who were all ready to aid.*"

Again, we are told that while Shere Mahommed *menaced* Sir Charles Napier,—

* Beyond a blustering message, which, *if it was ever really sent by the Prince*, probably was dictated, as the Historian suggests, by "latent fear." The General was not then in a condition to march against him, and he perhaps hoped that *bravado* might obtain for him *terms* which were denied to justice.

"The captive Ameers being well acquainted with the real state of affairs, and taking advantage of their conqueror's generosity, sought to increase his difficulties by intrigues and conspiracies of a very dangerous nature. They continually despatched emissaries to excite all their feudatory chiefs and allies to assemble in arms again and renew the war; they kept up a constant correspondence with Shere Mahommed, informing him of the weak state of the troops, and all other points of importance; they organized the Belooches in the garden near the camp, and in the fortress, to fall on the garrison of the one and the hospitals of the other, when the Lion should be in march to attack according to the plan concerted between them."

Furthermore, p. 338,—

"They arranged a plan also for a concerted attack by his (Shere Mahommed's) army in the fortress and camp from without, while the Belooches should fall upon the garrison from within. Their intercourse with his army was incessant, almost every hour, and so confidently did they anticipate success that they scarcely tried to conceal their treacherous proceedings."

The details are thus given at page 354 :—

"Having constant intercourse with the captive Ameers, as shewn in the preceding chapter, he designed the following plan of attack. The fortress to be assailed with part of his army, the Belooches inside acting in concert. When the British troops should move from the intrenched camp in aid of the garrison, the Ameer, in person, was to meet them with his main body on the march, while a strong detachment, placed in a convenient position, should, aided by the Belooches in the Ameers' garden, assail and storm the camp behind."

That these are, for the most part, unmitigated fictions, my reader scarce requires to be told. The weakness and divided state of Sir Charles Napier's army is not exaggerated, and had any of the other items in the catalogue of

dangers been true, both he and his army would assuredly have been "*cabooled*." The Beloochees within the fort and in the intrenched camp, are—like the armies which, in the earlier part of his work, General Napier distributed through Upper Scinde—creatures of his own imagination! The plan of attack is, like that previously invented by the Historian, and modestly assigned to the Ameers' African slaves, merely a statement of what *might* have taken place, *if* all the alleged circumstances *had* existed. The unhappy captives, neither had nor could have had, communications with Shere Mahommed. Conscious of its utter hopelessness, they harboured not a thought of resistance; for they well knew, and I believe were told, that any attempt to rescue them would seal their doom. A company of Europeans kept guard over them, and had they wished it, they were denied the power of corresponding with the enemy. By the Historian's account, Sir Charles Napier evinced a total inaptitude for command, by allowing an armed enemy to remain within his posts, and not taking effectual means to prevent any communications between his captives and the enemy. But he was not oblivious of his duty or his safety. Ridiculously alive to reports of *treachery* and contemplated *massacres*, he was made the tool of Ali Morad's artful agents, who, trembling for the stability of their master's power while a chance of the Ameers' restoration existed, sought to exasperate the General against them to the last degree. They knew that the readiest avenue to

his favour was by abusing the Ameers; and they judged that no detraction would be so efficient, as that which comported with his previous ideas of their perfidy, and afforded a colouring for his harsh conduct.

Since, however, the Historian assumes the fictions above given, as the premises from which he deduces my incompetency to advise Sir Charles Napier, and the righteousness of the attack on Shere Mahommed, let us for a moment suppose them true.

The alleged arrangements were certainly "*a well combined plan*," and, had they been carried out, must have effected the destruction of the British force. *Wherefore then was not that plan executed?* The Historian gives us some vague generalities about the want of "celerity and precision," which mars barbarian plans; and he undertakes to show how this sad defect vitiated Shere Mahommed's schemes. His explanation, however, is simply a recital of facts and fictions, from which we only gather what we before knew, that Shere Mahommed made no attempt to molest us!

He tells us that the Shere did not perceive that "the General's drift was to waste his treasure, and thus make the battle he designed to fight, when the time should come, a decisive one for Scinde." But he refuses to give us any insight into the motives which induced Shere Mahommed to wait idly contemplating his victims, while his own resources were being wasted, and those of his opponents augmenting; nor are we told wherefore he allowed

reinforcements and supplies, whose progress he could have stopped, to reach the British camp! Shere Mahommed was a barbarian, if by that be meant a Belooche, but he was not a fool; on the contrary, he was a clever and a shrewd man. He was not ignorant of the supplies and reinforcements proceeding to Sir Charles Napier, for he was apprised of every event which occurred from Sukkur to Kurrachee. He reposed not on a bed of roses, for his all was at stake; and no effeminacy kept him in quarters when he should have taken the field, for the Historian tells us, "his life had been of less luxury than that of his cousins, and *he now showed his training.*" He was, we are further told, at the head of a large and brave army, and eager to wreak his vengeance on us. Wherefore, then, did he remain on the defensive, and hesitate to execute his plans? Wherefore had he not, at the head of his own army, reinforced by the rallied fugitives of Meeanee, and the 10,000 fresh troops who joined him after the battle, disgusted with the pacific disposition of the Hydrabad Ameers, taken steps to attack, or at the least, molest the British force, encumbered with its sick and wounded, and its enormous baggage, as it marched from the field of Meeanee on the 19th of February? Wherefore did he not attack it, or harass it by false attacks, while encamped in the open plain, before the intrenchments were made?* Wherefore did he allow February and the

* The intrenched camp was not completed for some months after the

better half of March to pass unimproved, knowing, as he did, that in the Fort of Hydrabad he might replenish his coffers, which were fast being exhausted —aware as he was of the numerical inferiority of the enemy, and of their divided and crippled state, and conscious, as he is represented to have been, that he had within their possessions allies nearly as numerous as they, ready to aid him? Did he dread the result, and quail at the name of the British General? Far from it. His name was *Shere*, which, being interpreted, means a Lion; and the Historian tells us, that he "did not disgrace his cognomen, being bold, resolute, and enterprising." "Deceived by the General's apparent timidity and real difficulties," we are further told, that "*he felt confident of success*" in the "*well combined plan*," above given, and "*openly boasted that he would cabool the British!*" Did his officers and men shrink from joining him in his enterprise? The reverse was the case. His troops, we know, rallied round his standard, for the express purpose of being led against the English, and "the Belooche sirdars," the Historian tells us, "*despised*" his brother! Wherefore, then, I repeat the query, did not Shere Mahommed, who is represented to have burned with anxiety to destroy the English, "*elated*," as we are told he was, "*with*

battle with Shere Mahommed, which occurred on the 24th March. Captain Thomas, who commanded the intrenched camp during that action, had to work night and day to make some very weak parts defensible, filling up openings with *abattis* and Babool trees.

insolence and pride," and looking "*upon the ruin of the British army as certain,*" *not attack it?*

The reply is simply this. It was as little his interest as it was his wish, to enter on a war which he knew *must* terminate in his utter destruction. Like the other Ameers, he had been *compelled* by Sir Charles Napier's invasion, and unjust measures, to assemble a force to defend his capital if assailed. He was not in the battle of Meeanee, and conscious that he had done nothing which could justly render him obnoxious to the English, he sent his ambassador to the British camp. Had not Sir Charles Napier's conduct compelled him to distrust his assurances, the Ameer would have disbanded his troops, and continued to rule his territory, which, as I have before said, the treaty left intact. After he became acquainted with the worthlessness of the General's pledges, he *dared not* trust them, and therefore remained out. He *would not* invoke destruction on his own head by waging war against a mighty nation, and therefore he abstained from attacking the British camp, though aware of its helpless weakness. Actuated by a like sense of his own interests, he declined to do, what he easily might have done, viz., prevent supplies reaching the army.* Influenced by the same

* "Before the 16th (of March) the British army received, by water, six months' provisions, some recruits from Kurrachee, money, and ammunition." (Conquest of Scinde, p. 359.) These had to creep up to the Indus in river boats, at the mercy of Shere Mahommed at any point along the banks where he might have chosen to pounce upon them! The ordinary supplies of the country he could have anticipated; and had he known the persecutions he was destined to undergo, and foreseen our persistence in injustice, he doubt-

feelings, he suffered the 21st Regiment of N. I. to descend the Indus from Sukkur to Hydrabad, unmolested, and made no attempts to oppose or harass Major Stack's brigade, though he knew not how soon they might be brought to bear against himself. He resolved, and adhered to his resolution, to watch the course of events—to guard his own hearth, and to defend himself if attacked. He, doubtless, hoped that if successful, favourable terms, *which could be relied on*, would be tendered; and this feeling probably influenced him, when conscious of his power, to write his bravadoing communication to Sir Charles Napier; if unsuccessful, he was prepared for the worst. He remained on the defensive, and the General determined to attack him.

The battle of Dubba followed, and I defy any impartial man to deny that it was the result of our conduct to the other Ameers after our first victory, —not of any insincerity on the part of Meer Shere Mahommed. It issued in further slaughter, and in the seizure of Shere Mahommed's town and territory. I subjoin extracts from two letters which I addressed from Bombay to Sir Charles

less would (as according to the usages of war in the East he ought) have laid waste the country around the British posts. That he did ravage it, is a fiction of General William Napier's; if any camels were carried away, it is evident it was not done by his orders, or according to his wish; for he who feared to exasperate the English by falling on their weak and divided forces, and who allowed supplies and reinforcements to reach them, would scarcely frustrate the objects of his forbearance, *by stealing a few paltry camels!* The idea is too preposterous to be for a moment entertained. Thus it is that General Napier refutes himself, and by the absurdity or incompatibility of his charges, vitiates his own accusations!

Napier's secretary, on the 16th and 20th of March respectively. They will satisfy my reader as to the consistency of my views, conduct, and recommendations, and as to the candour with which I was in the habit of communicating my sentiments on the subjects under consideration:—

"When I left you, we had the game so entirely in our own hands, that I thought there was no fear of further open opposition, and I hope so still, notwithstanding the apprehensions which seizing all the treasure and property of the Ameers, invading the privacy of their harems, and arresting those of the Ameers who had been assured no harm should befall them if they remained quietly in their houses, must have caused. If the case is as represented, it is not to be wondered at that Shere Mahommed should have hesitated to submit, expecting as he naturally would do to be treated in the same manner when once in our power." Again,—"I cannot but think that, had we made a generous, or even moderate, use of our victory, as I advised—declared an amnesty immediately, and assured Meer Shere Mahommed and the other Belooche chieftains that their possessions and property would not be violated—all would have been settled. I certainly did not anticipate any further open hostilities when I left, for I did not anticipate such harsh proceedings on our part, or wholesale appropriation, which it appears has ensued."

Ere I conclude this Section, I am, much against my inclination, compelled to notice Sir Charles Napier's treatment of his royal captives. I do so, not to enlist public sympathy in their behalf, for if the revelations I have already made fail to do so, I shall acknowledge myself sadly mistaken as to the character of my countrymen. But, as an attempt has been made to palliate the harsh treatment of the Ameers, by accusing them of further intrigues, it is due to them that the subject be

looked into. I give the Historian the full benefit to be derived from telling his own tale; his florid inaccuracies I shall quote at considerable length :—

P. 334.—"It was perplexing at first to decide how the Ameers were to be treated, and this perplexity impeded the measures necessary for the security of the army. Were they prisoners of war, or deposed Princes? The battle had altered the political relations between them, as Sovereign Princes, and the Anglo-Indian Government. It was no longer a question of enforcing a new treaty. They had appealed to the sword, and were by defeat placed at the mercy of their conquerors. How would the Governor-General treat them? This question was decided on the 12th of March, twenty-four days after the action of Meeanee. Lord Ellenborough, by proclamation, annexed Scinde to the British possessions in the East, and the Ameers were to be sent captives to Bombay."

P. 336.—"To reconcile politeness towards the Ameers with what was due to the army, became impossible. To understand this, it is necessary to show in detail the exact state of affairs, and the power which these bad men still had to produce mischief. The six who had surrendered on the field of battle were at once placed in a large and pleasant garden of their own on the bank of the Indus, close to the intrenched camp. Within this enclosure were pavilions, containing all the luxuries that they had been used to; and they were permitted to have an unlimited number of attendants, and free intercourse, by means of those attendants, with the city and the country. Sobdar, Mohammed Khan, and the two Hoosseins, who were at first supposed to be friends, were left in the quiet enjoyment of their own palaces, until their delinquency was discovered; then they were made prisoners like the others, Mohammed and Sobdar being sent to the garden, the young Ameers remaining in the fortress. But all were allowed the enjoyment of their luxuries, and numerous attendants. This inconvenient division of prisoners increased the difficulty of guarding them; it was one of Major Outram's strokes of policy, his last act being to implore the General so to lodge them.

"It was now discovered that the Ameer Shahdad had caused the murder of Captain Ennis. This unfortunate officer was descending the Indus in a boat, on sick leave, when some Beloochees grappled the boat and dragged it to the right bank, where they stripped him naked. When the ruffians were tearing off his shirt, he shivered, and pleaded hard to save it,—'I am ill,' he said, 'the water is very cold, leave me my shirt.' The reply was a sword stroke, that sent his head flying into the water. When the Ameer Shahdad was taxed with the crime, he denied it strenuously; but the actual murderer was given up by the others, and at once acknowledged and gloried in the deed, saying, he acted from Shahdad's orders. 'I did it,' he exclaimed, 'and I would do it again: hang me.' It was the General's design to hang Shahdad on the highest tower of Hydrabad, in sight of Shere Mohammed's army for this, but Lord Ellenborough would not suffer him to do so. It was a misplaced lenity."*

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* I have inserted this paragraph, not as in the remotest degree bearing on the subject, but that the worst that the Historian had to say against the Ameers may be seen at once. That Ennis was murdered, there can be no doubt: how far his own conduct on the occasion of being made a prisoner, may have tended to exasperate the Beloochees, cannot be known. But assuming that that unfortunate gentleman was murdered in the most cold-blooded manner, be it remembered that it was at a time of *war*, when, goaded by our continued injustice and persecution, the nation was exasperated beyond endurance. Ennis was one of my own friends, and few deplored his untimely end more sincerely than myself; but I do not think that because when all hope of peace was past, and war to the death appeared unavoidable, orders may have been given by the Ameers to destroy the enemy in every way, and by every means; and because, in consequence, a British officer lost his life by cowardly murder, that the Ameer who gave the order can be justly "hung on the highest tower" of his own fortress. When an act of spoliation is to be committed, insults offered, injuries inflicted, or the laws of nations and the usages of war to be set aside, we console ourselves that "*only a barbarian*" suffers. *When* COMMON JUSTICE *demands that the uncivilized habits, demi-barbarous ideas, and rude culture, of an offender, be taken into consideration*, WE REJECT THE PRETEXT. I assume that the murderer of Captain Ennis rightly said he had Shahdad's order to kill every Englishman, but for this we have only the assertion of Sir Charles Napier, and the convenient and pliant moonshees of Mr. Brown—such as Moydeen! I would observe, that so constitutional and habitual is this addiction of General William Napier to distorting and exaggerating, that HE CANNOT ADHERE TO SOBER

P. 337.—"While the Ameers were thus gently used in confinement, their women remained in the zenanas. These were six strongly built palaces, forming so many separate forts within the great fortress of Hydrabad. They were, as has been already said, scrupulously respected, and no man of the British army entered the women's apartments; but it was soon discovered that the Ameers had, under the name of attendants, left 800 robust Belooche warriors, all of the Talpoor race, and therefore devoted to their interests, within these zenanas, which were full of arms complete for the 800, sword, shield, pistol, and matchlock. These men were constantly going back and forwards to the garden of the Ameers, to the city, and to the camp of Meer Mahommed. If one of them was stopped or questioned, a cry that the women would starve if their attendants were molested, was immediately raised. It was impossible, with any human feeling, to attempt to enter the zenanas to seize the arms, and reduce these fierce fellows to obedience, because they openly threatened, if one zenana was entered, to cut all the women's throats on the instant, and fight their way out. They were quite capable of both actions, and no great effort was necessary; for Shere Mahommed's army was within a few miles; the garrison of the fortress was but 400 strong, and it had to guard the outward ramparts of the fortress, which was of great extent, and to watch the six separate zenanas within. It could therefore have presented no strength at any particular point to the Belooche rush.

"In the garden, the Ameers had adopted a similar line of policy. Under the name of attendants they had gathered round them 500 stout Belooches, all armed with large knives, and many with sword and shield; and they were continually sending

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TRUTH IN REFERENCE EVEN TO THIS MELANCHOLY EVENT. Thus at page 332, he writes:—"In consequence of the orders issued by the Ameers to slay all the people belonging to the British Government who could be found unprotected * * * SEVERAL officers and their servants WERE KILLED." This is simply UNTRUE. Poor Ennis was the only officer who fell a victim. Captain Godfrey was seized, kept some days in durance, and roughly dealt with, but was subsequently released!

some of these men to the British camp to spy out the disposition and numbers of the troops, and then to Shere Mahommed to give him intelligence of what they discovered. They arranged a plan also for a concerted attack by his army on the fortress and camp from without, while their Beloochees should fall upon the garrison from within. Their intercourse with his army was incessant, almost every hour; and so confidently did they anticipate success, that they scarcely tried to conceal their treacherous proceedings."

The Romancist then proceeds to give an almost equally high-coloured account of the difficulties Sir Charles Napier had to contend with,—"Shere Mahommed," "the enemy," &c.,—a great portion of which is as nearly allied to truth (and not one iota more so) as the tale of Goody Two-shoes.* He then proceeds as follows:—

* *Exempli Gratia.*—" His field force, now reduced by the battle and sickness to less than two thousand, had to guard not only the intrenched camp with the hospitals and the magazines, and the station of the steamers, but the garden in which the Ameers were confined, the enclosing wall of which was more than a mile in circuit. Here then were 2000 men separated, not willingly but of necessity, into three bodies, the fortress being four miles, and the garden half a mile, from the intrenched camp which contained the magazine and hospitals." *The garden where the Ameers were confined was a portion of the intrenched camp, its outer wall forming the eastern defence of the said camp!* One other example will suffice. " The reinforcements expected from the North were engaged on a march very hazardous, having to fear the enemy and the climate; the stations to the South were attacked, plundered, broken up, or invested; the hill tribes were gathering in arms for a descent on the plains, &c." The reinforcements from the North saw not an enemy till they met in action with Shere Mahommed's force; and that Ameer, as we have seen, was acting on the defensive, not knowing where to turn or what to do. As for the stations to the South being " attacked," " plundered," " broken up," or " invested," it is a *sheer fiction* of the Historian. I subjoin an extract from the letter of one who is better conversant with Eastern matters in general, and Scinde affairs in particular, than most men—one, too, whose authority, did I give his name, it were rash

"Their attendants were disarmed. Sir Charles Napier, accompanied by his staff, entered their garden to remonstrate against the number of Belooches they had gathered about them, his license for having a full attendance being restricted to Hindoos and household slaves. Arrived at their pavilion, which was immense, being formed by hanging canvas from the surrounding trees, he found the whole space within crowded with Belooches, whose robust bodies, fierce air, and peculiar features, could not be mistaken; outside stood two hundred more; all were armed, and they pressed around him and his officers so rudely, that the latter, expecting violence, closed together for defence. Yet with this menacing proof of the fact, the Ameers expressed the utmost surprise at the remonstrance, and exclaimed with one voice,—'What people! What Belooches! We have nobody here but a few Hindoo servants! No Belooche ever enters this garden!' Then it was he caused these people to be disarmed, and the Ameers complained of it as an outrage! His consideration for the women's lives alone prevented him from doing the same in the fortress.

"Long this treachery and insolence was borne with exemplary patience; but when the danger became imminent, it would have been weakness to hesitate between duty to the troops and a desire to treat the captives with respect and politeness. Long, I say, the General forbore to apply the remedy which this state of things called for, lest he should be supposed to act revengefully on account of the dire cruelty they had designed to inflict on him,

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in either Sir Charles Napier or his brother to controvert. He writes:—"*In no country, and at no period of its history, could there possibly have been less of private robbery and murder than in Scinde during the war!* This was remarked by every one. The 'butchery' (of which the Fabulist talks) consisted, so far as I can learn, of the murder of two persons—Captain Ennis and a Parsee. *It was only during the time we were actually at open war that there was any plundering, murder, or commotion; both immediately before and after, every thing was profoundly tranquil.*" My correspondent alludes to the time that the *Belooches* were at war: for fifty-seven days after we had commenced war, not an individual was injured, nor a particle of property injured or destroyed. At Vikkur, a conductor and his wife were killed, but in a fair fight, or rather in a surprise, after war on the part of the Belooches had commenced.

if they had been victorious.* At last, considering only the safety of his army, he wrote thus to the Ameers in answer to one of their usual insolent and false complaints."

This long extract may be readily disposed of. The "large and pleasant garden of their own" in which the Ameers were placed, was a portion of Sir Charles Napier's intrenched camp: the "pavilions" in which they were lodged consisted of clouts hung between the trees. The "luxuries"† with which they were indulged may be represented by the negative algebraic sign; the respect paid to the ladies of the zenana has been already seen.‡

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* Allusion is here made to the extravagantly ridiculous hoax played on Sir Charles Napier's credulity, viz., that *if caught*, it was the intention of the Ameers "*to put a ring in his nose, and chain him to the walls of Hydrabad.*" One of the Ameers, we are told, proposed GOLD as the metal wherewith the nasal organ of the hero was to be *ringed*, but, so the fable runs, Shahdad declared that IRON was a more appropriate material. That such atrocious nonsense should have been listened to by an English General, only testifies to the singular credulity of Sir Charles Napier, when aught against the Ameers was narrated: that it should be put forth in a work professing to be a *history*, would be almost incredible were the book addressed to any nation under heaven save the English. But after the scene exhibited by a House of Commons listening with patience to Mr. Roebuck's story of the "*brass whip*," it were difficult to imagine anything too absurd to be credited in England, *provided the scene be laid in the East!* The "*fee-fo-fum, I smell the blood of an Englishman*," with which our infancy was wont to be horrified, is out-Heroded in the experiences of the "Giant-killer" of Scinde. On a par is the fiction that "a hostile party at Bombay" exulted over the probable massacre of Sir Charles Napier and his army,—an army which contained the friends and relatives of all who could possibly be supposed to form the "faction!"

† Let the officers who were placed on guard over these fallen princes be questioned as to the "*luxuries*" permitted to them, and as to the nature of the *Pavilions* (!) in which they were confined! Every thing was in the hands of the prize agents.

‡ Sir Charles Napier complained to Lord Ellenborough that the ladies declared they had not the means of subsistence, at the same time throwing discredit on the declaration. *What steps were taken to examine into the report?*

That Sir Charles Napier left 800 "robust Belooche warriors" in the zenanas, his brother perhaps believes: *no one who was in Scinde at the time does.* Had *he* done so, and had *they* threatened to cut the throats of the ladies rather than suffer them to be gazed upon by infidels, they would have done no more than Asiatic ideas of honour dictated. It would have been a dreadful deed, but the greater guilt would have attached to the Christian General whose conduct drove them to it. I am very certain that Sir Charles Napier cannot produce six gentlemen commanding regiments, or otherwise in a position to know what did occur, who even heard of these warriors or their threats. I speak advisedly and after examination. There were, of course, numerous slaves, principally Seedies and half Seedies.*

What measures were taken to supply them? Even assuming that they had been permitted to take all their jewels, &c. with them,—and that they did not, it is in my power to *prove*,—was it fitting that royal ladies, accustomed to the splendour and luxuries of an Eastern Harem, should be obliged to sell their trinkets to fill their stomachs?

* Extract from observations on the Second Scinde Blue Book, No. 181. Sir Charles says—"I had an immense treasure to guard. I was obliged to respect the zenanas in the fortress at the hazard of the regiment in the fortress, (which regiment had suffered greatly in the battle, and could not muster 400 men,) for in these zenanas were about 800 powerful Belooches well-armed, and the zenanas full of arms. I well knew the treachery of the Ameers, or I should not have been so unjust as to use the terms I applied to them in my despatch after the battle of Meeanee." It is said that "*there were about* 800 *powerful and well-armed Belooches*" *in the fortress after we took possession of it*, and while the 12th Regiment remained in possession of it. Meer Sobdar Khan in his petition, No. 103, says,—"The General sent a message to the effect that all the Belooche sepoys, both in the fort of Hydrabad and the suburbs, were to be sent away; I sent them away accordingly. * * Next morning, Colonel Pattle, &c., (with the troops) came into the fort." From which period the fortress continued to be garrisoned by the

The "five hundred stout Belooches" in the garden are creatures of the Historian's imagination. I unhesitatingly affirm, and I appeal for confirmation of my assertion to every one who has served under Sir Charles Napier, that that officer is so utterly ignorant of eastern aspect, character, language, and manner, as not to be able to distinguish a Hindoo from a Mussulman, or one class of Mussulmans from another. I can honestly say, that, besides Hindoos and slaves, there was no one with the Ameers in the garden. The impression sought to be conveyed is, that when Shere Mahommed was menacing the General, the Ameer's attendants were armed. *It is the reverse of truth. To my certain knowledge, every knife and other weapon that they had, was ordered to be taken from them on the 20th of February, when I accompanied Sir Charles Napier on his visit to the Captives.* That the Ameers may have protested against the indignity offered them by disarming their followers of the weapon it was customary for them to wear, is extremely probable: that the Ameers did insult, or would have dreamed of insulting the

12th Regiment. In Sir Charles Napier's elaborate reply to Meer Sobdar's petition, dated 12th June, (No. 134,) the Ameer's assertion that he had expelled the Belooche garrison the day before he admitted that of the British, is not denied; and is it likely, that, *alive as the General was to the treachery* of the Ameers, he would have permitted "800 *powerful and well-armed Belooches*" to remain within a fortress held by a regiment of sepoys only 400 strong, (for whom he afterwards substituted raw recruits when he moved against Shere Mahommed,) which had so lately suffered severely in a contest with these Belooches, and that he would have exposed, moreover, the vast wealth which had been collected for the army within the fortress, to such a body of Belooches!

General, whose prisoners they were, and whose harshness they had experienced, by pointing out as *Hindoos* men who were *Belooches*, is surely too gross a violation of probability to be believed even by the Historian's over-credulous countrymen. The thing is in the last degree preposterous. No Belooches were in the "*pavilion*" when *I* visited the Ameers in company with Sir Charles Napier; and the story about the pressing round us—the dread of violence on our part—the "severe looks" of the miserable wretches who surrounded us—and our "closing together for defence," are *sheer* inventions of the Historian. *I know* that the guard had strict orders to *search every one who entered the garden, and allow no arms to be carried in.* So much for the danger to which the army was exposed! That the Ameers intrigued with Shere Mahommed, is likewise most arrant nonsense; at all events, impartial men will require stronger proof, ere they believe it, than the assertions of Sir Charles Napier and his Commissioner, or the depositions of Moydeens and Budrodeens! Shere Mahommed required no information at their hands; the people of the country were in his favour, and conveyed him all the intelligence he required.* These reports of plots and intrigues, and possibly pretended intercepted documents, may be traced to Ali Morad's minister, who still stuck close to Sir Charles Napier, to watch the course of events,

* And not only so, but concealed all his plans and movements from us. I appeal to the officers sent to look after him, if this is not the case!

and look after his master's interests. Ali Morad was not secure of his ill-gotten gains till his kinsmen were finally disposed of; and the more he and his minister could exasperate the General against them, the better would be his own prospects.

If there be the most remote approach to truth in the picture above given of Sir Charles Napier's difficulties, how truly preposterous is it to tell us, that *immediately* after the battle he proposed marching against Shere Mahommed! But these difficulties never existed. Never breathed there a man more nervously alive to "*treachery*," "*Cabool disasters*," *&c.*, than Sir Charles Napier: HE was little likely to have tolerated their continuance. For that he was not scrupulously careful of the feelings of others, witness the following letter which he addressed to the unhappy Ameers, when annoyed at their too just complaints, and his credulity operated on by interested parties, he threatened to *place them in irons!*

"I have received your letter this day. You must recollect that your intrigues with Meer Shere Mahommed give me a great deal to do. I am also much surprised by the falsehoods which you tell. I will no longer bear this conduct; and if you give me any more trouble, by stating gross falsehoods, as you have done in your two letters, I will cast you in prison as you deserve. You are prisoners, and though I will not kill you, as you advised your people to do to the English, I will put you in irons on board a ship. You must learn, Princes, that if prisoners conspire against those who have conquered them, they will find themselves in danger. Be quiet, or you will suffer the consequences of your folly. Your friend, Meer Shere Mahommed, has prevented the letter from the Governor-General as to your fate from reaching me; his soldiers intercept the dawks. He is

a very weak man, and will soon cause himself to be destroyed; and so will you, unless you submit more quietly to the fate which your own rash folly has brought upon you. I will answer no more of your letters, which are only repetitions of gross falsehoods that I will not submit to."

And because this letter was condemned in Parliament as "an unheard of example of ferocity towards captives," the condemners are scoffed at as "romantic waiting women," the condemnation as "*frothy sentiment*"!—I leave my reader to judge between those British senators who, jealous of their nation's honour, denounced this epistle, and the *Historian* who upholds it.

SECTION XII.

THE CHARGES AGAINST THE AMEERS.—THEIR CHARACTERS AS MEN AND SOVEREIGNS.

Were I uninfluenced by other considerations, the peculiar relation in which I stand to one of the Ameers would compel me to rebut the unfounded accusations by which the bitterness of their captivity has been enhanced. But I am not so uninfluenced. The justification of the Princes of Scinde against the atrocious libels cast upon them, is essential to the vindication of my own character from the calumnies with which it has been aspersed.

My reader requires not to be told that, from the moment of his entry into the country, the Conqueror of Scinde was prejudiced—deeply and violently prejudiced—against its Princes. His every act, and speech, and letter, and proclamation, prove the depth and virulence of that prejudice. Yet with a seeming forgetfulness of his past thoughts, and deeds, and words,—a forgetfulness of which I have already given many striking illustrations,—he thus addressed the Governor-General on the 13th of March 1843:—

"I had no prejudice against the Ameers; *I certainly held their Government, as rulers, to be insufferable by any strong Government, but as individuals I felt pity for them as weak Princes whom folly had brought into difficulties. It was thi*

feeling which made me restore them their swords. * * * *SINCE THEN I have seen their real characters developed, and I do not think such thorough villains I ever met in my life.*"

I need scarcely tell the reader that this is not only incorrect in fact, but, as regards its implications, nonsense. Nothing had happened between the 18th February, when he returned their swords to the Ameers who surrendered, and the 24th, when those who were not in the battle were arrested, save the exposure of their wealth, to change Sir Charles Napier's sentiments, or materially influence his conduct. The General, who had for months been denouncing the Ameers as "regularly drunk with bhang every day after twelve o'clock," as lying and debauched profligates, whose "hostility and cunning were on a par," and who had listened to, and believed, all the tales of their unprincipled relative and maligner, Ali Morad, *assures the Governor-General that he had no prejudice against them!* The statement is as worthy of credit as many of his other affirmations, whose utter antagonism to *fact* I have had occasion to demonstrate. He who had no prejudice against the Ameers on the 18th February, thus wrote of them on the 25th of January preceding:—

"*Now I do not agree with you in thinking the Ameers are fools.** *They are cunning rascals to a man.* * * * *These tyrannical, drunken, debauched, cheating, intriguing, contemptible, Ameers. They are fortunate robbers one and all, and though*

* Yet, on the 13th of March he writes, that up to the 18th of February he regarded them as WEAK Princes whom FOLLY had brought into difficulties.

*I do most decidedly condemn the way we entered their country * * * I would equally condemn any policy that allowed these rascals to go on plundering the country to supply their debaucheries. * * * And on a crew more deserving to bear it* (the hardships to follow) *I think it could hardly alight. It falls heaviest on Roostum, an old worn-out drunken debauchee, a man drunk every day of his life, breaking his own religion and all its ordinances."*

To affirm that as men the Meers were immaculate, or, as rulers, a pattern worthy of general imitation, would, of course, be absurd. Scinde was a demi-barbarous government,—its rulers necessarily but partially advanced in civilization. In such a country, certain errors of government were unavoidable: and its Sovereigns partook, to a certain extent, of the vices of their subjects. Many of the institutions of the country, I readily admit, were such as Christianity would frown upon. As I have already said, there was much room for philanthropic exertion: but, as I have likewise maintained, there was nothing that called for revolutionary interference, even had we possessed a moral right to interfere, which we had not. The Ameers of Scinde were, as men, singularly free from the vices which prevail in Mahommedan communities; more intellectual than their compeers in other eastern countries,—temperate, and strongly averse to bloodshed,—affectionate, kind, and gentle almost to effeminacy. As sovereigns they were mild and little oppressive in their sway, and ruled with an unity of design (and it is therefore but fair to assume with a singleness of pur-

pose.) that greatly astonished the earlier visiters to their Court, who, hearing of the strange constitution of the Scinde Government, expected to find perpetual confusion and quarrels.

The laws and institutions of Scinde were such as suited the genius of the people, and the progress they had made in civilization. They were, in fact, as I have already said, as much the expression of the natural mind of Scinde, as our own constitution is of that of England. To seek to subvert, or radically to change them, because they comported not with our own ideas of justice, liberty, or political decorum, had been an application of *Procrustean* philosophy equally mischievous and absurd. Yet much was to be done by the quiet bu powerful influence of *example* ; much *had* been done, and, but for the revolution so unnecessarily effected, *very much* would have continued to be done, by the same moral agency, to introduce the mild influence of civilization among the rude Belooches, and to temper the asperities of Islam with the benevolent doctrines of Christianity.

The views which I now entertain, and ever have entertained regarding the Government of Scinde, and the character of the Ameers, have been fully developed in the preceding pages. It has, however, suited the interests and inclinations of certain parties to misrepresent them ; and I think it well to subjoin a letter addressed by me* to Sir

* These opinions were not officiously intruded by me on Sir Charles Napier, but given in reply to his request of the previous day, quoted at p. 23, section 1, Part I.

Charles Napier, on the 26th of January 1843, as embodying them. *I venture to affirm, that my sentiments will receive the concurrence of every British officer who, from a knowledge of the subject, is competent to tender an opinion.* The letter is alluded to by the Historian ; it would not have suited his interests to insert it :—

Extract from Letter addressed to Sir Charles Napier, by Major Outram, on the 26th January 1843.

"In compliance with the concluding paragraph of your letter of yesterday, I frankly give you my opinion on the points discussed therein. I am sorry to confess that I am unable entirely to coincide in your views, either as respects the policy or justice of—at least so suddenly—overturning the patriarchal Government to which alone Scinde has been accustomed, so far back as we can trace, either under Talpoor or Kullora rulers, I believe ; at any rate, while we are unprepared to give them a better. I say *patriarchal ;* for, however we may despise the Ameers as inferior to ourselves either in morality or expansion of intellect, each chief certainly lives *with*, and *for* his portion of the people ; and I question whether any class of the people of Scinde, except the Hindoo traders, (in this *Mahommedan* country,) would prefer a change to the best Government we could give them.

"The population consists of four classes.

"1st, The present Belooche *Talpoor* rulers, and the numerous chiefs and followers of the same class.

"2d, The previous Belooche *Kullora* rulers, and ditto. These two are now so blended, that their interests are much the same, although, doubtless, ambitious individuals of the latter would have no objections to rise over the former once more—from purely selfish considerations, however ; a change from which no benefit would accrue to the country.

"3d, The aboriginal Scindians, who are now the serfs of the land, accustomed to nothing better, are as happy as the similar classes in all countries, and are as yet prepared for nothing better.

"4th, The Hindoo traders, who have met with such toleration among these Mahommedans, that they do not choose to emigrate to the neighbouring Hindoo provinces of Rajpootana, Guzerat, and Cutch, as they undoubtedly would have done had they been much oppressed. This class would, doubtless, prefer our rule; but why? Not for the benefit of our laws, which they would rather dispense with, but because they have greater facility of 'turning of a penny,' and can more freely indulge in the abominations of their idolatry (as Mr. Poynder would express it) under our Government. I have always been alive to the disadvantages which the third and fourth classes are under, and hoped that time, and certain measures, would remove them, without the necessity for any such sweeping alternative as I am sorry to see you deem justifiable.

"The specific I advocated was, affording protection to the trading classes (who should seek to locate there) in the bazaars of our cantonments, and refuge to the serfs, as cultivators, in the proposed Shikarpoor farm, (obtained on fair terms of purchase.) I was sanguine that the mere force of example, which the prosperity of our bazaars, and flourishing state of our farms, would have afforded to the neighbouring chiefs, must have caused them, from motives of self-interest, similarly to promote trade, consequently cherish the Hindoo; and foster agriculture, consequently improve the state of the serf. The facility of obtaining protection under British laws in the heart of Scinde, must have compelled the rulers of Scinde so to govern their people as to prevent their seeking our protection: thus our object would have been gained without either the appearance or reality of injustice. * * *

"Until we entered Scinde, I verily believe all classes in the country were as happy as those under any Government in Asia. The amity with which four rulers of Hydrabad, and four at Khyrpoor, acted together, was dwelt upon by all who visited those countries, with wonder and admiration. Although every chief ruled his own people, each brotherhood had one Head, or 'Rais,' for the conduct of the foreign relations of the State, and whose power interposed in internal quarrels. I do not justify our location in Scinde under the terms of the former treaty, (my objections to which, stated to Colonel Pottinger at the time, who asked my

opinion, I submitted to you,) and undoubtedly our coming here has been the cause of much misrule. For instance, we destroyed the ruling head of Lower Scinde, where now six chiefs have equal powers; and we undermined the power of the 'Rais' of Upper Scinde, to his ultimate destruction.* I am, therefore, very sensible that it is our duty to remedy the evils which we have ourselves caused; and my idea as to the mode in which we might have done so, I have stated above.

"I will now endeavour to show wherefore I fear that the course you propose may fail; and why, therefore, I should object to it, even if my conscience could be reconciled to the measure as not unjustifiable.

"You seek to effect good government by establishing one ruler, (Ali Morad,) and *overturning* the oligarchy of seventeen rulers, if rulers you can call the head of each petty chieftainship into which Upper Scinde has been subdivided from the previous four chieftainships. By this measure, you sever the chief you elevate† from all his kindred, and turn all but his own offspring against him; he will dispossess his brethren, and a large portion of the Belooche feudatories, to make way for foreign mercenaries, by whom he will surround himself. The remaining seventeen chiefs, and their thirty sons and families,‡ and the greater portion of the military landholders, will consequently be thrown out of their possessions, or so reduced in circumstances, that they must ever be disaffected; each will, consequently, pursue his own course of rapine, either as open robbers defying the laws, or secretly aiding and sharing with those who are so. Will Ali Morad's, or any native Government, maintain the expensive and vigilant police that would be necessary to put them down? I fear not. Consequently the population, whose interests you wish to promote, will suffer; and the line of the Indus, which Lord

* Then pending.

† This had reference to the engagement which Sir Charles Napier had just entered into with Ali Morad, whereby the remaining chiefs of Upper Scinde were to be despoiled of one-fourth of their possessions, to support that Prince in his usurped position of Rais.

‡ A detailed list of whom was given in a previous letter, dated 24th January.

Ellenborough wishes to secure, will be rendered liable to constant interruption, from robbers lying in wait in the jungles on its banks, affording facilities throughout its course for their approach and escape. So much for the consequences in the *interior*. Then we must look to being disturbed by ravages of plunderers from *beyond the frontier* of Scinde, led on by the more enterprising of the disaffected, who will prefer exile and revenge to the pittance and degradation they are now condemned to. Unfortunately, the manner in which we have treated the Khan of Kelat, and let loose the Northern hill tribes, whom we latterly so effectually controlled, will afford to such adventurers a secure refuge in the mountains, (of Beloochistan, where we cannot pursue them,) and bands of marauders always ready to attend their call. Will Ali Morad's Government protect his territory from these aggressions? Certainly not. But *we* are bound by treaty to do so; and even if we were not so bound, we must repel them, or see the country of Scinde devastated by fire and sword, and our commerce on the Indus, and even communication by that river, stopped! The military precautions we shall then be compelled to adopt will cause an outlay, the mere interest of which will far exceed the annual lakh and a half of rupees, [£15,000] by which I showed that Beloochistan could be sealed against our enemies; the Northern tribes controlled by the Khan; and the commerce of Central Asia secured to us.

"You will say, how could the previous divided Government (or rather subdivision of power among so many Chiefs) have been better? I reply, because the former system secured the hearty co-operation of *all*, together with that of their Belooche followers, the only soldiery in the country, *against foreign aggression*, each being equally interested in preserving his own possessions, for, however they may squabble among themselves, it has never been known, and 'tis unnatural that it should be otherwise, that they ever failed to unite in the common cause against such assailants, although they might succumb to determined invasion. So long as the chiefs enjoy their possessions by birthright, they would never desert them to turn houseless freebooters, and to prey on their own land; but being deprived of their just rights, not only will they have the *will*, but vast *power*, to do mischief, in

their knowledge of the country, aided by the sympathy of the people. * * *

"The only alternative that I can perceive, other than *continuing the Government of Scinde on its old footing*, is to usurp the Government ourselves, dispossess the Ameers, kick out the Belooches, and set them *all* at *defiance* by scattering British troops over the country in sufficient strength to protect the remaining population from the predatory raids of those we have expelled. I question whether we should by that means either pay our expenses, benefit the people, or preserve tranquillity,* leaving alone the *unwarrantable outrage against justice and good faith* we should thus commit." * * *

These views found no favour in the General's eyes, and he treated them as he was ever wont to treat objections that he could not answer—he passed them over in silence. My sentiments were communicated to those in England who had a right to demand them, and from the date of their communication, the unhappy Ameers, whom I thus vindicated, have been made the objects of the most relentless calumniation by both Sir Charles Napier and his brother the Historian. In the Scinde fables of the latter, the atrocity of the charges brought against the victims of his brother's ignorance and headstrong self-reliance, can only be equalled by their extreme absurdity. I subjoin a specimen of the dignified strain in which the Historian discusses the character of the unhappy ex-Ameers of Scinde :—

* It does not follow that Scinde, tranquil at present under the weight of so large an army, will long continue so. We possess neither the security of the attachment of the people, nor of our neighbours, who neither fear nor esteem us. All Affghanistan was at one time similarly tranquil under our sway; and what is more, with fewer disaffected chiefs at large.

P. 344.—"But they were 'fallen princes'—'illustrious victims'—'friends of all the political agents who preceded Sir Charles Napier.' 'Oppressed weeping sufferers.' 'Dignified in misfortune, domestic, and deeply attached to their relations.' In such gentle pity-seeking accents was their fate bewailed by men whose only sympathy springs from discontent at being debarred by Lord Ellenborough from plundering the Scinde revenues under the names of collectors, secretaries, political agents, and other forms of the Directors' nepotism. Such, in substance, has been the constant cry of the daily press in India, and a portion of that in England; such has been the declamation in the House of Commons, and at the India House, and in the pages of the Directors' scribbling sycophants. But now shall the real characters of the Ameers be made known, that a fair judgment may be passed on them. Public opinion will decide whether Sir Charles Napier's treatment of these princes was a betrayal of English generosity and honour."

The Ameers were, and are, "fallen princes,"—the "illustrious victims" of a most unrighteous policy. "Oppressed" and "weeping," they suffer an unmerited exile; and those who have the best means of judging, testify to the "dignified" demeanour with which they bear their misfortunes. That they were eminently domestic in their habits, is a fact notorious to all; and that they were, and continue to be, "deeply attached to their relations," is a proposition as incontrovertible as that they were the "friends of all the political agents who preceded Sir Charles Napier."* That "the

* Not satisfied with misrepresenting the Ameers as private gentlemen and as sovereigns, General William Napier endeavours to prove *that they were devoid of natural affection!* At page 348 he thus expresses himself:—"It has been shown that they advanced, as ground of war, the alleged ill-treatment of Roostum, the most aged chief of the numerous families; how

daily press in India, and a portion of that in England," have strenuously urged these facts on the

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strenuously they protested to Major Outram, that pity and respect for that patriarch of the Talpoors was the cause, and the only cause, of their resistance to the demands of the Indian Government, and how Outram with admirable simplicity believed them. It might, therefore, be expected that they would have some compassion for his age and misery, when fortune had deprived him of all he possessed. They went forth from the palaces of Hydrabad carrying with them nought but their arms. He came there from afar, after a long flight and sojourn in the desert; he came with all his treasure and household goods carried on camels. In the battle he lost all. The victors seized the Ameer's camp, and when a false alarm that the Belooches were returning to fight, disturbed them in the evening, the General, desirous to clear the plain for a new action, ordered the captured camp to be fired; thus Roostum was left without resource. He was sent with the other Princes to the garden on the Indus. There he stood, eighty-five years of age, his white beard streaming in the air, his head bared in the sun of Scinde, without food, without attendance, without cover, without a carpet to lie down on, without a change of clothes, and he was sick also. There he stood, I say, a supplicant at the door of the other Ameers' gorgeous pavilion, which was filled with every convenience and luxury their near palaces could supply; yet no man asked him in, none would let him enter. When he prayed for shelter, none proffered him help, none gave him clothes, or money, or food; they would not even lend him utensils to cook with, a carpet to kneel on for his prayers. *He was on the point of perishing, when the General and his staff furnished him with a tent, and carpet, and clothes, cooking utensils, and food, and money,* TAKEN FROM THE PRIZE FUNDS. *Here then was ample proof that not for Roostum's sake had they gone to war.*" This farrago of nonsense and deception is readily disposed of. First, I would observe, that deeply as the Ameers of Hydrabad pitied and respected the venerable Roostum, they never pleaded our infamous treatment of the poor old man as the cause of *their resistance to our demands.* THOSE DEMANDS WERE NOT RESISTED, THEY WERE ACCEDED TO. The Ameers simply solicited that "Meer Roostum should be restored to his rights, the refusal of which they declared was the only obstacle to their signing the treaty and complying with all that is required of them." (Conference, 8th February 1843.) The Ameers endeavoured to induce Major Outram to declare that *in the event of Meer Roostum proving every thing he had advanced, his chiefship, and what had been made over from the Upper Scinde Ameers to Ali Morad, should be restored.*" (Conference, 12th February.) And on the 13th, the Ameers announced that *the Belooches* had sworn to stand or fall with Roostum, SINCE THEIR (the Ameers') SUBMISSION TO ALL OUR DEMANDS HAD FAILED TO OBTAIN JUSTICE FOR THE PERSECUTED OLD PRINCE. "*At least,*" they said, "*give us some pledge*

public attention, is a gratifying piece of intelligence, for which I am indebted to the Historian.

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that justice shall be done, to allay the excitement of the people." (Conference, 13th February.) Not a word here of pity; SIMPLE JUSTICE was the prayer of their petition, and it referred to a matter affecting not only Meer Roostum, but the whole Beloochee population of the country. When General Napier states that Meer Roostum came to battle with all his treasury and household goods, he states that which my reader knows to be a *pure fiction.* The poor old man came to Hydrabad with but a few followers, leaving the few things saved from the wreck of his property (*wrecked by the explosion of Sir Charles Napier's bombshell at Khyrpoor*) at Koouhera. HE WAS WITHOUT RESOURCE; HE WAS DESPOILED OF EVERY THING AND IN EXTREMITY, THROUGH THE "ADROIT AND FIRM POLICY" OF SIR CHARLES NAPIER. That he ever stood at the door of the other Ameers' "*gorgeous pavilion,*" imploring charity and finding none, *is a figment of the Historian.* The gorgeous pavilion, in the first place, *never existed;* and in the second, the old Ameer was never spurned from, nor did he seek charity at, the tent of his better-housed relatives. *The captive Ameers had barely the necessaries of life; they had not what, in the estimation of men of their rank, is deemed its decencies.* If on the 19th of February, the day of Roostum's surrender, they had access to their private property and "the luxuries of their near palaces," which I do not believe, they certainly were debarred it on the 21st, when the prize agents took possession of all. It cannot fail to strike the reader, as a new idea *in the economy of plunder,* that captives *closely imprisoned,* should "ask in," "proffer shelter," "bestow help," or "clothes," or "money," or "food," or furnish "cooking utensils," or "carpets," to fellow captives. Meer Roostum had been *thrust* upon the hospitality of the Ameers of Hydrabad; *the duties of that hospitality they had discharged to their own destruction, while they had the power.* Their power, their position, their means, were usurped by Sir Charles Napier; on him therefore devolved those duties, *even had he not been responsible for the respectful and befitting treatment of his Royal captives!*

Truly great was the *generosity* (!) of the General who, *with the aid of his staff, and supported by the prize property,* afforded a wretched *soldier's tent* to the venerable Octogenarian whom he had hounded to destruction! I speak advisedly, and upon the best authority, when I say that the Hydrabad Ameers refused nothing which they had it in their power to bestow on Meer Roostum or the wounded Belooches, though who could have blamed them had their own misfortunes dried up the fountain of their sympathies for others! But, poor men, they were themselves helpless captives! And the Historian tells us an absurd tale of the want of commiseration displayed by the Ameers *in grudging more than three halfpence to the man whom Sir Charles Napier* ORDERED *them to send to the British hospital to wait on a wounded Beloochee!* I appeal to every one whose eye this meets, whether, in the

But I fear that the Historian is in error. Unfavourably as his brother's character is reflected in the pages of the Second Scinde Blue Book, neither the "declaimers" against his conduct in the House of Commons, nor those in the India House, nor even "the Directors' scribbling sycophants," know sufficiently the demerits of that policy, whose "illustrious victims" now pine in

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course of reading, he has met with another instance of the victor of a mighty battle demanding that a vanquished and royal foe should provide the hospital attendants for the wounded ! Sir Charles Napier is, I am very certain, the first instance of an English General, who taking, or pretending to take a special interest in the welfare of a wounded enemy, and deeming the attendance of a fellow-countryman absolutely indispensable for the sick man, allowed that attendant to abandon his charge, rather than from his own pocket increase his paltry pittance of three halfpence a day ! for this, though not enough for the man, was all that the dethroned and despoiled Princes, whose subject he no longer was, could afford from their penury. *Apropos* to this subject, lest I should hereafter neglect it, I would observe, that the Historian attempts to *prove* that the Ameers neither deserved nor obtained the sympathy of their subjects, and his proof is this—" Nor has the Lion himself, the best of their fallen Princes, been able (since the conquest of Scinde) to drag even a hundred men into the field, since he lost his treasure, though, while that lastéd, he arrayed 30,000 for battle with great ease."—(P. 351.) To this it is only necessary to reply, that *so long as Shere Mahommed could keep the field at all, his subjects, to a man, assisted him.* Before the battle of Shahdadpoor, 300 men left Meerpoor—then occupied by the British—to join him ; and all over the country, the people (*Scindians as well as Beloochees*) supplied him with money and grain of their own free will, without allowing the British authorities to know any thing about it. About 5000 men, with four guns, proceeded early in June 1843, to meet the Meer at Sukkurrund, *at a time when he had no prospect of paying them!* On the 14th of June, Shere Mahommed marched with 10,000 men to surprise Captain Jacob's detachment. It is true they deserted him, but they were themselves taken by surprise. Yet this is the Prince whom, in the preceding march, the Historian gravely tells us, at page 370, his brother "*had rendered more hateful to the Scindian people.*" There is not a man in Scinde—Belooche, Scindian, or Hindoo—save those employed by the British Government, or deriving their subsistence in our camps, who does not long for the return of the Ameers!

captivity and exile, to urge, as they are represented to have urged, the cause of the Ameers. Had such, indeed, been the case, their captivity had now been at an end. Sufficient light, however, has been thrown upon Sir Charles Napier's policy to satisfy the public that much injustice has been perpetrated; and his unchivalrous treatment of his royal captives has shocked the feelings of all who have been made cognizant of it, by the manner in which their downfall and ruin was accomplished. Solemn treaties, though forced upon them, were treated as waste paper; past acts of friendship and kindness towards us in the hour of extremity were disregarded; false charges were heaped upon them; they were goaded into resistance; and the ruthless and unrelenting sword of a faithless and merciless ally completed their destruction. We have kindled a beacon which will hereafter shed a baleful light throughout India: for who henceforward will place their trust in the British nation, the word of the humblest of whose representatives was, in bygone days, sufficient to satisfy the doubts alike of the sovereign prince, and of the uncivilized and naked Bheel chief! The people of England may rest assured, the lesson we have read will not be lost during the struggle which is now being made on the banks of the Sutledge for the possession of no less a prize than the empire of the East. Few in England are aware how near the brink of a precipice we have been placed; but in India it is well known that we have only been preserved from a disaster which would

have shaken our power from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya, by the exertions of one man: by his cool and determined courage, and heroic example at that moment when, during our late terrible conflict with the Seiks, all seemed lost; and when (while fear of the result oppressed the boldest) he nobly exclaimed—"Eightieth, do your duty," and gained the victory.* Conscious that still more painful revelations might be made, and dreading that they would, the Historian has endeavoured, by his reiterated calumnies against the fallen Princes of Scinde, to deprive them of the sympathy of Englishmen; as he has attempted, by the most sweeping accusations of moral and intellectual unfitness, to destroy the credibility of those whom he feared might be called on to testify against his brother.

Before proceeding to refute *seriatim*, the groundless charges made against the Ameers, I would strive to divest the subject of the garb of fallacy with which it has been invested.

I will for the moment assume—though the assumption is an injustice—that the Ameers were guilty of all the vices charged against them, and, if it be possible, of even greater. I will suppose, that as men they were monsters more loathsome than history can tell us of, or than imagination can paint; and that, as sovereigns, the records of

* I, of course, here allude to Sir Henry Hardinge, the present Governor-General of India, on whose prudence, judgment, and discretion, the future fate of British India at this moment, under Divine Providence, mainly depends.

the Roman empire afford no parallel to their misdeeds. And I yet maintain that, however humanity might have gained by their fall, our national honour was tarnished, justice violated, and religion shocked. To States, as to individuals, it is forbidden to do evil that good may come; to both the maxim commends itself—

"Fiat Justitia, ruat cælum."

The manslayer is not the less a murderer because his victim has done deeds of violence: the community may benefit by the removal of the latter, but his blood is on the head of him who sheds it. And high though England's mission be—to conquer, and to civilize—and to conquer that she may civilize—her conquests are only justifiable when unavoidable; for providential purposes, providential means, and agencies, and opportunities, are at the fitting time provided. To anticipate that time is sinful; to plead, in extenuation of that sin, that it is overruled for good, is blasphemy. I have yet to learn that England enjoys any punitive jurisdiction over the nations of the earth; that she has been commissioned to wander forth the High Constable of the Universe—to invade, despoil, and slay, that she may punish the oppressor, and grant deliverance to the oppressed. Yet such is the fallacy sought to be palmed on the public. The question at issue between the conqueror of Scinde and those who denounce its conquest is, not whether the Ameers were virtuous or wicked, —patriarchal princes, or tyrannous rulers,—but whether the policy which led to their dethronement

was in harmony with the principles of honour, justice, and mercy? If "English generosity and honour" *were* violated,—if justice was disregarded, and truth paltered with,—if *might* superseded *right*, and our victims were goaded on to their own destruction,—let the character of the latter be blacker than even the pencil of calumny has shaded it, as "fallen Princes," "oppressed and weeping sufferers," they claim our commiseration, and have an *absolute* right to redress. How far our measures were in harmony with the precepts of our religion, and the character which we arrogate for our nation, the reader of the preceding pages needs not be told. And when it shall be seen that the charges adduced against the Ameers are base and groundless calumnies, that public indignation which General Napier has sought to excite against his brother's victims may, perhaps, expend itself on their oppressor, and the apologist of their oppression.

P. 348.—"First, as to their merits as Sovereigns. The Ameers governed by the sword, and by no other law. The Belooches were their troops; the Scindians and Hindoos their subjects, their victims; up to the battle of Meeanee, any Belooche might kill a Scindian or Hindoo with impunity, for pleasure or profit: this license was widely exercised, especially where women were concerned.

"The Ameers dealed largely in the slave trade, and so did all their feudal chiefs, both as importers and exporters.

"They had, to form shikargahs or hunting grounds, laid waste, in less than sixty years, more than a fourth of the most fertile land in Scinde, a country nearly 500 miles in length, and from 100 to 300 in breadth. And to form one of these hunting wildernesses for a child of eight years old, they would depopulate

whole villages with less hesitation and feeling than an English farmer smokes a hive of bees. They extorted money from Hindoo and other merchants by torture and mutilations. They forced labouring men and mechanics to work for them by the same means, at about twopence daily wages, when their services were worth ten times as much; and, more often than not, they cheated them even of that pittance: this oppression they carried to such an extent, that when Sir Charles Napier took possession of Scinde, scarcely could a mason, or carpenter, or other handicraft man be found; all had fled with their skill to distant countries. The Ameers also restricted commerce, and oppressed merchants and traders, because they disliked the presence of strangers, who might draw comparisons between their rule and that of other Princes. They dreaded lest their subjects should be told the inflictions they endured were unknown save in Scinde, the most fertile and most miserable country of all Asia. Finally, they stopped one of the great water-courses derived from the Indus, purposely to dêstroy the fertility of the neighbouring kingdom of Cutch, which had been irrigated from it."

This is a long extract, but I have thought it well to give at once all that the malice and ingenuity of their calumniator could urge against the Ameers as rulers. I now proceed to analyze the charges, and expose the ignorance of their accuser.

The Ameers governed by the same means and the same law as every other Mahommedan power in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe. It is the law written in the Koran, as expounded by the Mahommedan doctors; and it is as perfectly understood, and as rigidly observed in every Mahommedan country, and among every Mahommedan people, as is the law of England in our own country and its colonies. When General Napier wrote that, "*up to the battle of Meeanee any Belooche might kill a Scindian or a Hindoo with impunity, for*

pleasure or profit," he wrote that which was totally opposed to truth. Whence the Historian (or rather Sir Charles Napier, for he first penned the absurd tale) drew his information, I know not, but I envy not the feelings of the man who could take so cruel an advantage of another's credulity as to palm on either so monstrous a fiction. In Mahommedan countries, great privileges are accorded to the (so called) *true believers*, over *infidels ;* but this does not extend to the shedding of blood with impunity. In Scinde, the Mahommedan doubtless domineered over the Hindoo, as in Turkey to the present day the Turk lords it over the Greek. But would Europe accept the abolition of exclusive privileges as a palliation for the deed, were Russia to annex the Ottoman empire to her dominions, hurl the Sultan from the throne of Stamboul, and banish him to Siberia a dishonoured pensioner on her niggardly bounty? The expedient plea of humanity would be disregarded, and the alleged sufferings of a distressed people would weigh but little in the estimation of the other powers. Let our exuberant philanthropy expend itself where the greatest evils exist, and where, the task being difficult, the glory would be great. There were fewer privileges enjoyed in Scinde by Moslem over Hindoo, and by Belooches over Scindians, than those which mark the supremacy of the white citizens of the Southern States of America over their degraded brethren of colour. A transatlantic crusade were an insane project; but it were free of the stigma which attaches to the conquest of Scinde,—*mean cowardice!*

The slanders of General Napier have reached the ears, and embittered the sufferings, of the exiled Ameers; and one of them has appealed to the public through the press. The youthful Hoossein Ali thus wrote a few weeks since to the editor of one of the Calcutta papers :—

"Sir Charles Napier has written,* and you have published in your newspaper, that the Ameers ruled their country by the sword, and not by any other law; and that a Belooche could kill a Hindoo or a Scindee with impunity. *In reply,—it is true that the Ameers held their country by the sword, but it is unfounded that a Belooche could kill a man without being punished. It is common in every kingdom, and in every place, for those who do not fear God, to exercise many sorts of oppressions on the helpless; but those persons are chastised according to the laws of the Government; and in Scinde, criminals are punished by the laws and rules of Mohammedanism.*"

To urge more in refutation of this charge against the Ameers as rulers, is unnecessary. It is wholly groundless. But had it been true, it would have afforded no excuse for, still less a justification of, our recent proceedings in Scinde. I have said, and I repeat it, that the Ameers' Government had many defects, as a demi-barbarous government necessarily must have. But what have we substituted for it? Have we attended to the provision of Sections I. and III. of Acts 3 and 4 Gulielmi IV., cap. 85, that in enacting new laws due regard shall be had to the *rights, feelings, and peculiar usages*

* The mistake was natural enough.—Of Sir Charles Napier's aptitude for charging them with atrocious and unfounded accusations, the Ameers had seen too many examples; and when the libels contained in the "Conquest of Scinde" were reprinted and commented on in the Calcutta papers, they not unnaturally concluded that their persecutor and captor, was now their calumniator.

of the people? This act, of course, refers to British India generally; but with how much greater tenderness ought not a people just conquered to be dealt? With regard to Scinde, what is the fact? A purely military Government has been established,* and justice is administered, both civil and criminal, by military courts and commissions, composed of European officers. I am in possession of very much information on the mode in which justice is administered in Scinde; and I could divulge many illustrations of the method, alike lamentable and ludicrous. I, however, forbear,—*for the present.*

The second charge brought against the Ameers as sovereigns is, that they "dealed largely in the slave trade, and so did all their feudal chiefs, both as importers and exporters." The virulence of the accuser vitiates the accusation. As the charge now stands, it is incorrect. Neither the Ameers nor their feudal chiefs "dealed largely in the slave trade" as exporters. As importers, they did, though to a very limited extent. From the earliest ages, domestic or household slavery has existed in the East. In Scinde it prevailed, and, I believe, exists to the present day; but a trade in slaves was unknown. Slaves were, and, as I have said, are maintained in families; and if an exact illustration of the system be sought, it will be found in the pages of the Bible. Far be it

* Vide Sir Charles Napier's late letter to the Governor-General regarding the Indian navy serving on the Indus, as published in the *Bombay Times* of the 23d July 1845.

from me to underrate the evils of slavery, or of the slave trade generally, or in any shape or form; but I may be permitted to observe, that it is admitted by all authorities that that prevailing in the East is of the mildest character. Slaves in India are for the most part well-fed, well-clad, and well-housed, and frequent instances occur of their rising to offices of great trust and distinction, and acquiring immense wealth. The mild and benignant character of Scinde slavery in particular has been well illustrated by Captain Hart.* I will further only observe, that most of the free cultivators of the soil would, under the Ameers' rule, right gladly have changed places with the slaves.

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* (*From the United Service Magazine for January*, 1844.)

"SLAVERY IN SCINDE.

"*By Capt. Hart, Bombay Army.*"

Extracts.—" Public attention has lately been directed to an edict issued by the Governor-General of India, abolishing slavery throughout the newly-acquired territory of Scinde; an act so consonant to the feelings of the British nation, that it has gone far towards eradicating the evil impression caused by that high functionary's much-censured Somnath proclamation. The last accounts from that quarter, however, inform us that Sir Charles Napier, the Governor of the conquered province, had found it necessary to defer promulgating the order, as most serious difficulties presented themselves to its being carried into execution. That the wisdom and foresight of this gallant officer, in at once deciding on withholding the boon of freedom from a numerous class of the people under his rule, may be duly appreciated, a few remarks explanatory of the state and condition of the slaves in Scinde, and the relation in which they stand to their masters, will, it is hoped, not be deemed uncalled for or unnecessary. The circumstance of more stringent clauses having been added to the Act for the suppression of the slave trade on the Western Coast of Africa, during the late session of Parliament, gives peculiar interest to the inquiry at the present moment. * * *

"To avoid entering into minute details, our remarks will here be confined to a notice of the four classes into which the slave population of Scinde may be divided, namely, those imported from Africa forming one; the Georgians

If the tolerance of slavery by a Government be sufficient justification for its subversion, let us first

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and Abyssinians a second; a race called Guda, being the descendants of Scindian fathers and negro mothers, the third; and the last and most numerous, those born in bondage in the country. * * *

"For his own credit and reputation, the master takes care that his slave shall be well-dressed and fed. The trifling duties required are soon learnt, and the boy, associated with others of his own race, speaking only their master's language, and looking up to him as the source of the comforts they enjoy, soon falls into the same train of feelings, forgets his sorrows, and, ere long, has no other thought than that of devotion to his owner's family, which he now looks on as his own: all recollection of his natural parents fades from his memory, and even if he does think of the days of his childhood, the remembrance is but associated with nakedness and starvation. As he increases in years, he is taught the use of arms and to ride, that he may be able to accompany his master on his journeys; and although he never rises beyond the rank of a domestic, he is satisfied with his situation in life, and he is always certain of having his wants provided for. That he should be faithful and attached to his master, and have no greater dread than of offending him by misconduct, is the necessary consequence of the manner in which he is brought up. To him freedom will be no boon. * * *

"The number of negro boys annually imported into Scinde may be estimated at two hundred individuals, the greater portion of whom are disposed of at Kurrachee; those not sold are taken to Hydrabad and the interior.

"The negro girls brought into the country are more numerous than the slaves of the male sex, the demand for them being much greater. * * *

"From the above statement it is evident that the general condition of the negro slaves in Scinde is far superior to the bondage in which those of their own race are held in the sugar and tobacco plantations of the West.

"The circumstance of being taken from home at so early a period of life, in a short time completely obliterates from their minds every recollection of their native land, and knowing no language but Scindee, they consider Scinde as their country. * * *

"Of the general character of the negroes, both Mahommedans and Hindoos speak well; good treatment usually inducing them to consider the house in which they are brought up as their home, where food and raiment are provided, and they are certain of receiving small presents in money on occasions of unusual festivity. * * *

"It is not unusual for masters on their deathbeds to set at liberty several of their bondsmen, either as a reward for long and faithful services, or in honour of the Prophet. But slaves of good character, even when given their freedom, are unwilling to quit the family in which they have domesticated; because to leave it would probably be to starve. * * *

expend our virtuous indignation on the nation most guilty, and that is best able to resist us. I

"It has not been stated what individuals have voluntarily accompanied the exiled Princes of Scinde to India, but the probability is that the greater number of their attendants are of this class and negro slaves, whose feelings of attachment and gratitude will not allow them to forsake their masters in adversity. * * *

"The most numerous class of bondsmen are a large portion of the lower class of the population, who have been in a state of slavery from time immemorial, and whose numbers are constantly on the increase. * * *

"In a long course of years, their numbers have, by intermarriage, and in some cases alliances with their masters, increased to a great amount. Few Mahommedan families, with the slightest pretensions to respectability, are to be found without such persons belonging to them, who are looked on as a portion of the family, whom, it would not, under ordinary circumstances, be considered reputable to sell. But some instances did occur during the late disturbances, when so many families were reduced to beggary, of their being offered for disposal,—though the sacrifice was evidently as distressing to the master as the slave, who, while admitting the right of possession, denied that of ability to transfer his services. In the households of the chiefs, these men form the greater proportion of their personal military retainers, are fed and clothed, and act as a body-guard, knowing no law but their commands, nor acknowledging any other superior. With the husbandman they sometimes share the labours of the field, and benefit or suffer by his prosperity or misfortune. Born and bred under their master's roof, the idea of purchasing their liberty never enters their minds. * * *

"On this last named class the proclamation of the Governor-General would have fallen with great severity, if an attempt had been made to carry it at once into execution. Brigades must have been marched from village to village, from town to town, to enforce the decree; and even after the wandering dwellers in the mountains, to forcibly separate slaves from their masters, for voluntarily they most probably would not have quitted them. The peaceable portion of the community would, in such a case, have risen in arms, and joined the Belooche chieftains, at so summary a dispersion of their establishments; nor would it have been a difficult matter for the masters to prove to the slaves, that if forced from their service they must starve, which in truth would have been the case, as they hold no land or property in their own right. The policy or justice of thus suddenly changing the relations in which in Eastern countries one class of the community has, both by law and custom, always stood to another, may well be questioned. Such an edict at once deprives the noble of his personal attendants, wives of their waiting women, the peasant of his fellow-labourer, and the Hindoo of his groom. The ordinary labours of life would be suspended; and if those in

do not believe a tithe of the wild tales narrated of the horrors of prædial slavery in the Southern

servitude took advantage of the new law, and forsook their masters, multitudes of hungry paupers would be thrown upon society for subsistence. To obtain food, they must have united in gangs, and the whole country been plundered to supply them. The very fact of Kurrachee having been made a British port, had, as a matter of course, put a stop to the importation of negroes. A simple regulation, prohibiting any future sales, might have been issued at that town, and by degrees enforced in the interior. The Mahommedan Governor always had the power of manumission in case of proved ill-treatment, which authority, exercised by the British officer who succeeded to his post, would have answered every purpose. The sale of children by their parents, in times of scarcity, cannot be prevented. Even in British India it occurs in numerous instances. However distressing to the refined feeling of the West, an Eastern mother, not having the same ideas of freedom, urged by her own necessities, and unwilling to see her child perish from want, disposes of it to those who are able to be at the cost of its maintenance, with the prospect of repayment from its future services."

I regret that I have not a file of newspapers to refer to, that I might extract and submit to my reader the very sensible despatch of Lord Ponsonby, as given in the newspapers of the day, in reply to instructions received from England to treat for the abolition of domestic slavery in Turkey. To such of my readers as have any doubts regarding the mild nature of Eastern slavery, I would earnestly recommend its perusal. How little right our nation has to condemn our neighbours for tolerating slavery, let history tell. Little more than a decade has elapsed since the lash reverberated through our own sugar fields, and the clanking of chains was heard. Nor have many decades elapsed since the *slave trade* ceased among us. If a Mahommedan and demi-barbarous Government deserves to be subverted in 1845, for permitting the importation of *household* slaves, what terms shall adequately describe the punishment which should have fallen on Christian and civilized England little more than a century ago! I subjoin an extract from Macintosh's History of England, in Lardner's Cyclopædia:—

Vol. 9, page 300, year 1713.—"By this treaty with England he (Philip of Spain) renewed or recognised the treaty of commerce and navigation of 1667, between England and Spain, granted to England the odious monopoly of supplying the Spanish West Indies with African slaves under the name of the assiento.

"The assiento, or contract, stipulated that from the first day of May 1713, the English should transport into the West Indies 144,000 negroes, at the rate of 4800 negroes the year, and pay for each negro 33½ of right in full for all royal duties.—It is a sad proof of the slow progress of moral truth, that even in a country where discussion was free, a century should elapse before the light of reason and the breath of religion vindicated the humanity of the nation."

States of America,—but there it undoubtedly exists in a revolting form; by commencing our operations in that quarter we shall at all events escape the odium which must necessarily attach to our late transactions in Scinde,—*that of being* BULLIES. I have before quoted the words of Meer Hoossein Ali: I again recur to his letter:—

"It is also stated by Sir Charles Napier, that the Ameers used to deal in slaves. Dealing in slaves is allowed by the religion of Moslems, and therefore it was the practice in Scinde. The Ameers did not introduce this custom into Scinde, but it is now 1261 years since the practice was introduced into Islamism, and it is still carried on in the Persian and Arabian territories. Previous to the establishment of the British Government in India, such a custom was current through the whole of Hindostan, and up to this time the custom is not totally abolished, for we have seen the Nazim of Moorshedabad has in his service many negroes and eunuchs of Abyssinia; and the merchants of this place (Calcutta,) such as Meerza Mahommed Kurbellai, and several other Moossoolmans, also entertain them."

Here I would have closed my remarks on this subject, but since the above was written, I have seen the *Kurrachee Advertiser* of the 10th September, a paper supposed to be the immediate organ of the Scinde Government. Whether this supposition be correct or not, there can be no doubt that it could not exist a day without Sir Charles Napier's sanction, for Scinde is the only possession we have in the East to which the freedom of the press does not extend. It is, moreover, published at a press belonging to one of the collectors of Young Egypt, appointed by Sir Charles Napier. It was generally supposed that Sir Charles Napier

had had the good sense to abstain from carrying into effect the proclamation of the supreme Government of India by which slavery in Scinde was declared to be at an end. In the *United Service Magazine* for January 1844, a journal supposed to possess the confidence, and to echo the sentiments, of General W. Napier, I find the wisdom of the Governor of Scinde loudly extolled for *not* having carried out that proclamation; and yet the *Kurrachee Advertiser** indignantly denies that any delay occurred in bringing into operation Lord Ellenborough's order for the immediate abolition of slavery. To which of these respectable testimonies most credit is due, I know not, but if there be a particle of truth in the statement of the Kurrachee newspaper, that "there has not been for the last two years a slave in Scinde," it is clear that Sir Charles Napier is as reckless in his measures as his brother is in his assertions. What the British Government in India has been unable entirely to eradicate in a lengthened series of years, the Governor of Scinde has, we are informed, rooted out in six months!

But, assuming that slavery had existed in Scinde in its most revolting form, the conquest of the country was not essential to its abolition. Mild as is oriental slavery in general, peculiarly mild as was that of Scinde, the name is as offen-

* A dingy lithograph, executed, I believe, at the Kurrachee Government press, certain writings in which are avowedly to supply the Governor of Guernsey with the requisite materials for defending the Governor of Scinde.

sive to an Englishman as the thing is intrinsically evil. In sketching the draft of the new treaty, the abolition of slavery had not been lost sight of by me; from the moment that I assumed political authority in Scinde, this had commended itself to my attention, as will be seen by a reference to my despatch of the 5th March 1840; and by making Kurrachee a British port, as I recommended, our object would have been in a great measure obtained.

Let us proceed to the third count in the indictment against the Ameers. I requote :—

> "They had, to form shikargahs or hunting grounds, laid waste in less than sixty years more than a fourth of the most fertile land of Scinde, a country nearly five hundred miles in length, and from one to three hundred in breadth. And to form one of these hunting wildernesses for a child of eight years old, they would depopulate whole villages with less hesitation and feeling than an English farmer smokes a hive of bees."

This grandiloquent paragraph would imply that the Ameers formed the shikargahs over lands previously cultivated and populated, whereby the inhabitants were driven out to make room for the wild beasts which ministered to the selfish pleasure of their rulers. This is not the fact. The shikargahs occupied more ground than was compatible with the welfare of a fully populated country; nay, further, they might, ere long, have proved an obstacle to the extension of cultivation, and the consequent increase of population. As it was, however, they were innocuous. These preserves did not usurp the place of cultivation, nor

with some few exceptions, had the space they occupied ever been under tillage. Scinde had for ages produced more grain than was sufficient for its people ; under the Ameers it was an exporting country, and to it migrated, in years of scarcity, numbers of the poorer classes from the neighbouring principalities of Cutch and Rajwarra. Already has a great, a lamentable, change taken place. It is asserted in the public journals, and the assertion is confirmed by letters which I have seen from parties the best informed, that great distress prevails in Scinde.

Under our benign sway and admirable administration, the price of the necessaries of life has been more than doubled ; new taxes have been imposed in augmentation of the distress ; and the only party likely to benefit is the Government, who will be able to show an increase of revenue, by being enabled to dispose of the grain collected as revenue, at nearly famine prices. Such are the blessings we have conferred in the third year of the Conquest of Scinde !

When the Historian describes the Ameers as depopulating villages to extend their hunting preserves, he neglects to add that these villages consisted of temporary huts of mud and reeds, liable to be swept away at each inundation ; built in a few days ; taken down, transported, and rebuilt, in an equally short period. Nor has he cared to inform his reader, that in the exercise of this harsh but undoubted right, it was usual for the Ameers to grant an equivalent of ground elsewhere. Can

the same always be said of the frequent ejectments which occur in more civilized countries? An Englishman who justifies the invasion of a country on the score of the severity of its game laws, must needs be more of a cosmopolite than a patriot.

We are next told that the Ameers "extracted money from Hindoo and other merchants, by torture and mutilations." That isolated instances, of such treatment may have occurred in Scinde, is possible: as a system, nothing of the kind was practised. The Hindoo bankers of Scinde, particularly those of Shikarpoor, were a powerful body, able to protect themselves by their monied influence; and *lacs* of rupees were almost monthly remitted through Scinde by these alleged victims of the Ameers' rapacity. Could this have been the case had the Scinde Government been guilty of practices similar to those charged upon it? Mutilation of the person is a mode of punishment sanctioned by the Koran, and universally obtaining in Mussulman countries. In the British Courts of Law in India it is awarded by British judges, though not now carried into effect, being commuted into fine or imprisonment. In Scinde, the penal code was milder than in most Mussulman countries, and during the whole period of our connexion with that province, mutilation was seldom if ever inflicted, save for offences which, according to our own code, would have been punished with death. So far as my own memory serves me, I can call but one instance to mind in which a hand was cut off: the criminal was a mur-

derer. When extortions were practised on the Hindoo merchants, I feel very certain that the underlings of the Government, and not the Ameers, were to blame. I could furnish the Historian with very harrowing instances of oppression practised by the inferior servants of the British Government in India, yet he will scarcely maintain that the latter is tyrannical. Under the "purely military Government" of his brother, I know a case in which the draught-bullock of an aged cultivator of the soil was forcibly taken from him, and eight shillings tendered to him as the equivalent! The old man followed his despoiler with tears in his eyes, and the money in his hand, imploring the restoration of the animal on which he was dependent for the irrigation of his ground; but was spurned. Aye, did I choose, I could multiply such examples; but it is needless. No one holds the Governor of Scinde responsible for misdeeds committed by others, of which he is ignorant and which he loathes; and wherefore should the Ameers be denounced as systematic oppressors, because a few isolated cases of extortion *may* have occurred? It is only necessary to observe, that, had the Hindoos been greatly oppressed, or had instances of oppression not been rare indeed, they would, as a matter of course, have migrated into the neighbouring Hindoo countries of Cutch, Guzerat, and Jeysulmere. In the next accusation charged against the Ameers by General William Napier, it were difficult to say whether *ignorance*, *disingenuousness*, or *malice*, is pre-eminent.

Prior to our occupation of Scinde, and the ruinously high prices we introduced,* *twopence* daily was not only good wages for a labourer, but enabled him to live more comfortably, in proportion to his wants and ideas, than a shilling would one of the same class in England. That artizans were paid at the same rate, is a pure fiction. "More often than not," proceeds the Historian, "the Ameers cheated them even of that pittance." This I unhesitatingly assert to be a calumny as false as it is malevolent. The unhappy Ameers are now, in a great measure, at the mercy of any reckless libeller; but God is just. Even in this world their wrongs may be avenged: in that which is to come, justice will assuredly be rendered to them. On the subject of this accusation, Meer Hoossein Ali thus expresses himself:—

"Again, it is stated that the Ameers used to force the workmen—such as carpenters, bricklayers, &c.—to work at the coolie's rate of six pice (twopence) a day, and that this tyranny had reached to such a degree, that when Sir Charles Napier conquered Scinde, there could scarcely be found a bricklayer or carpenter, because they had all fled away to distant countries through tyranny. In reply. The cause of the workmen fleeing away, was not the Ameers' tyranny, but the tyranny of the General himself. The workmen reflected, that when the Ameers, who were the rulers of the country, suffered such excessive oppression at the hands of Sir Charles Napier, what would be their own fate had they (who were subjects, and helpless) remained

* Wherever a British force is stationed, there prices immediately rise, and ere long range one and two hundred per cent. above the former averages. This holds as well with regard to the price of food, as to the wages of workmen. Yet even in India now, threepence is, I believe, the regular day-labourer's hire.

there; and consequently they all, both old and young, fled away from Hydrabad, and there remained none except a few Hindoos, who were the poorest of all."

Still more ridiculous is the charge adduced against the Ameers, that they "restricted commerce, and oppressed merchants, because they disliked the presence of strangers, who might draw comparisons between their rule and that of other Princes!"

Simple men! They were, it is true, little skilled in the modern science of political economy. But far from restricting commerce, or shutting their country against foreigners, they threw open their river to all comers, and decreased their tolls; not that they sought thereby to benefit themselves, or saw how they were likely to be benefited, but simply to please us, humble suppliants for measures which we had no right to enforce,—and because *we* told them it was for the gain of commerce. After they had admitted us into their country, they remitted *all river tolls*, to the exemption even of their own subjects; tolls which are collected to this day by their neighbours the Seikhs, if not by our own and favoured ally, Bhawul Khan! The gross ignorance of the Historian is well illustrated in this accusation. The Ameers' city of Shikarpoor was the grand *entrepôt* of eastern commerce. There might be seen the wares and produce of every part of the world; its bankers were ready to supply letters of credit on Russia, Arabia, Persia, Affghanistan, Thibet, India, and Burmah.

The last and crowning charge against the Ameers as rulers is, that their *predecessors* "stopped one of the great water-courses derived from the Indus, purposely to destroy the fertility" of the western portions of the neighbouring and *hostile* kingdom of Cutch! In *bygone years*, it seems the earlier rulers of Scinde cut off the supplies of an enemy, by withholding from him the means of irrigation; and it was, therefore, a righteous deed to persecute their children—to dethrone, despoil, and drive them into exile!

Here I would willingly conclude; for I have now exhausted the list of charges brought against the Ameers, as rulers, by the Historian. But, as illustrative of the tone of their maligner, it is my duty—painful, though imperative—to call attention to the almost blasphemous presumption which would invest our iniquitous spoliation of Scinde with the sanctity of a Divine visitation.

P. 346.—"But God did not form the teeming land of Scinde, with all the germs of fecundity, nor spread the waters of the Indus, to bring them forth with plenteousness, merely to support the brutal Ameers in luxury. They thought so; but His avenging hand was laid upon them at Meeanee."

The indignation of his countrymen, when made aware of the events which developed the carnage of Meeanee, will, I sincerely trust, be accepted as sufficient punishment for this daring impiety. True is it that the hand of God was laid upon the Ameers on that dreadful day; but who shall say that he chastened them in anger? Let us not delude ourselves to our ruin with the fearful fallacy,

that, because agents of his providential designs, we are guiltless or acceptable in his sight.

Let those who presume to read the thoughts of the Eternal, in the events of his providence, point out, in our recent history, a single passage which would justify the assumption that God's blessing rests upon the appropriators of "the teeming land of Scinde." Within the last two years, more of our gallant soldiers have been laid low by pestilence than fell in the battles whose successful issue made us masters of the country! The land which we thought so fair to look upon, has already proved a charnel-house.* We thought, by its appropriation, to become rich; and every hour we retain it but diminishes the distance between

* The "drink charge" brought against the gallant 78th Highlanders, that the principal cause of "their suffering was their own intemperance," is familiar to most of my readers. They may not, however, be aware, that a similar attempt is reported to have been made to explain the frightful mortality which occurred in a wild-goose chase after Shere Mahommed, in the hot season of 1843. The European troops consisted of H. M. 28th Regiment, and Bombay Foot and Horse Artillery; and I am credibly informed that the fatal results of the exposure of these gallant fellows, was attributed to their *excessive use of spirits!* H.M.'s 28th Regiment heard of the charge, and were, as might be expected, excessively indignant; but as the charge did not come before the public, as in the case of the Highlanders, they were unable to appeal to the Governor-General against the slander. I subjoin an extract from the letter of a friend, who was with the force:—"We were only out a week, from the 11th to the 18th, and the sickness commenced on the 13th. No one, at the time, laid the cause of the sickness to any thing save the excessive heat; especially as the men were much knocked up by marching all night, and the impossibility of sleeping by day from the plague of flies. As for its having been caused by the use of spirits, as far as the —— are concerned, I can safely affirm it was not the case." An officer of the 28th, in writing regarding the alleged charge, observes:—"Truly it is a cruel and a wicked one; not a drop of spirits could be obtained for love or money."

us and bankruptcy.* The apples of Sodom have already turned to ashes in our mouths, and ere our unhallowed repast be finished, a heavier judgment may fall upon us.

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* Not the least revolting trait in the "Conquest of Scinde," is the manifest attempt made to enlist the sympathies of the British public in behalf of our spoliation—by an appeal to their avarice! Had its surplus revenue been as many millions per annum, as its drain on the Indian treasury amounts to thousands, the morality of the seizure of Scinde would remain unaffected. As it is, however, to retain the country is as foolish in a financial point of view, as its conquest in a moral. I demonstrated, in a letter addressed to General William Napier, on the 3d July, the disingenuous nature of the pretended budget with which he endeavoured to delude his countrymen into the idea that Scinde *was not a heavy drain on the Indian finances.* A friend, who has long known the country, and is familiar with its history, people, and resources, gives a frightful picture of the state of Scinde now, contrasted with what it was under the Ameers, and thus concludes:—"The proprietors of India stock ought to sell out, if Sir Charles Napier's accounts are not to be placed before them for another year or two." I would now only observe, that every measure taken with a view to the reduction of our expenses in that province, but tends to increase them. Many years must elapse ere less than 10,000 men will suffice to hold the country. At this moment, (September 1845,) 16,000 are employed there. To reduce the apparent strength, a regiment of cavalry have been ordered to return to India; and while this is done, a second regiment of Irregular Cavalry, for service in Scinde, is about to be raised, and *a baggage corps is being organized!* Such a scheme as the latter never would have been entertained, save by one profoundly ignorant of the art of moving armies in the East, and despising all Indian experience. The cost of the camel-men alone will equal the whole expense of the carriage of baggage on the old plan, and the attempt to *make soldiers of the camel-men* will end in developing men fit neither to fight nor drive. Sir Charles Napier appears still to be impressed with the ridiculous idea which he entertained three years ago, that the mass of followers and baggage attending an Indian army consists principally of the private servants and *kit* of the officers and men. WERE THESE ITEMS ANNIHILATED, THE WHOLE TRAIN (*assuming that only one month's supply of food accompanied the army*) WOULD ONLY BE REDUCED BY ONE-TWENTIETH PART! The Governor of Scinde seems to believe, that, in whatever respects Indian practices differ from his European experience, those practices are *wrong*, although based on profound knowledge and the experience of ages. In short, as Sir T. Munro said of a similar person, "*he wants to make* ANGLO-SAXONS *of the* HINDOOS!" As a substitute for a regiment of regular infantry, and supposed to combine the advantages of a foot with those of a mounted

Of all the charges which have been preferred against the ex-Ameers of Scinde as men, none has been more frequently or more confidently advanced than that they were addicted to every species of debauchery,—and more especially the vice of drunkenness, so strongly denounced in the Koran. The charge is made no less than nine times in the first, and is repeated six times in the second volume of the "Conquest of Scinde."* Like the other

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regiment, a new *camel corps* has been established. Its cost cannot be less than *quintuple* that of an infantry battalion. The high price of grain in Scinde, and the sickness that prevails, have induced the Governor-General to give increased allowances to the troops and followers serving in that province. The boon was, indeed, an acceptable one, and well deserved, and will, with the other substantial benefits conferred on the Indian army, endear to it Sir Henry Hardinge *as the soldier's friend*.

* P. 131.—"He (Sir Charles Napier) knew the Ameers to be debauched men, habitually intoxicated with bhang."

P. 132.—" * * Together with the horrible debauchery, and sensuality, and ignorance of the Princes themselves."

P. 136.—"Roostum was old, and nearly imbecile from debauchery."

P. 144.—"But nervous and cowardly from sheer debauchery, many of them being constantly drunk with opium and bhang."

P. 150.—"The imbecile Ameer Roostum, excited by false reports, and constantly intoxicated with bhang."

P. 154.—"And their constant intoxication rendered the intelligence probable."

P. 155.—"The nervous timidity attaching to debauchery."

P. 156.—"Infirmity of purpose and debauchery were to him apparent."

P. 157.—"Roostum, the Rais or Chief Ameer, an old debauched wretch."

P. 198.—"Being influenced by fear, anger, hope, and drunkenness alternately."

P. 206.—" * * * On their vacillating nervous habits, the result of constant inebriety. He spoke at once to their fears and to their prudence, when the intoxication of bhang left them the power of thought."

P. 211.—"And when the wavering imbecile Roostum," &c. &c.

P. 227.—"To intimidate these inebriate luxurious Princes."

P. 253.—"As drunken sensual men might be expected to do in such a crisis."

P. 243.—"The continual inebriety, the unsettled policy and clashing interest of these broods of Ameers."

groundless accusations brought against the Ameers, the object of this calumny (and such I shall beyond dispute prove it to be) is to deprive these fallen and deeply injured Princes of the commiseration which, when their misfortunes are fully known, cannot fail to be excited in the mind of the British public.

Sir Charles Napier is, as the reader will readily imagine, the Historian's authority for the character assigned to the Ameers. It is unnecessary to requote all the virulent abuse heaped on them during the progress of his policy. In March 1843, shortly after the battle of Meeanee, he wrote :*—"The Ameers are the greatest ruffians I ever met with, without any exception." In December 1843 :†—"The King (Roostum) being an imbecile old fool, full of useless cunning."‡ "The old idiot."§ "He (Roostum) with his usual vacillating imbecility, an imbecility I believe to have been produced by his long habits of drunkenness, for he is said to have been never sober after midday."‖ "The old idiot." ¶ "The imbecility of old Roostum."** "I think that such thorough villains I never met with in my life."

It will be observed, that Majors-General William and Sir Charles Napier endeavour to establish this false charge by the simple process of reiteration. As far as it affects the octogenarian Meer Roostum,

* "Conquest of Scinde," p. 178. † Ibid, p. 181. ‡ Ibid, p. 182.
§ Ibid, p. 192. ‖ Ibid, p. 194. ¶ Ibid, p. 195.
** Second Scinde B. Book, No. 85, p. 48.

—and it cannot fail to be remarked that it is more frequently levelled at him, on the principle, I imagine, that as he is the most deeply injured of all the Princes of Scinde, it was more especially incumbent to prevent sympathy for *his* misfortunes, by misrepresenting his character,—the fact of his having attained the patriarchal age of eighty-five, and of his being at the present moment, notwithstanding the afflictions he has undergone, in the full and perfect possession of his faculties in his exile at Poona, is almost a sufficient answer. For these facts are inconsistent with Sir Charles Napier's assertion that "he (Roostum) is said to be never sober after midday."!!

The refutation of the charge, however, shall be given on the most positive testimony of almost every English gentleman* intimately acquainted with the objects of the slander prior to their downfall, and those who have had charge of them since, whose testimony embraces a long series of years. In the first place, I myself am able emphatically to deny the truth of the accusation. There is no more foundation for the charge than for the calumny uttered against H. M.'s 78th Highlanders, that the *unprecedented* sickness and mortality in that fine regiment, during 1844-45, was produced by drinking,—that "*the great disease with officers and men was drink*." My testimony on the point at issue ought to be regarded as at least of equal

* And I doubt not that Sir Henry Pottinger, and all others who knew the Ameers when in power, would testify to the same effect if referred to. What I have given are the sentiments of ALL in India.

weight with that of Sir Charles Napier, for I had constant intercourse with the Ameers, (of Lower Scinde,) was in the habit of visiting them at all hours of the day, and accompanied them frequently on hunting excursions, when concealment of the degrading vice imputed to them was impossible; whereas Sir Charles Napier scarcely ever met them, and certainly never saw Meer Roostum until after the battle of Meeanee, when, though he might have gone whither he pleased, he surrendered.

In the following testimonials, there are points touched on to which I shall hereafter refer; I deem it the better plan to give the communications entire.

From Major Woodhouse, Commanding the 6th Regiment, N.I.

"Sattarah, 16th *September* 1845.

"With reference to the conversation I had with you a short time ago respecting the Ameers of Scinde, I have no hesitation in confirming what I then said as to the impression I had received of them during my sojourn in Scinde in 1820-1821. In the latter end of 1820, Captain Sadlier, of H. M.'s Service, was sent by the Bombay Government as an Envoy to the Court of the Ameers of Hydrabad. The other members of the mission were W. Simson, Esq., and Dr. Hall, and I had the command of the escort. The mission disembarked at Kurrachee, and from thence went to Hydrabad, where it remained about two months, and then returned to Bombay by the way of Luckput Bunder. During that time I did not hear anything which indicated any want of humanity on the part of the Ameers, or called in question their characters as rulers for justness and moderation. Had anything existed to militate against a favourable impression of their characters in these respects, it would in all probability have be-

come known to the mission; and I think I do not err in saying that every member of it left Scinde with a good opinion of the Ameers as men and rulers; and during the late field service in Scinde, no facts came to my knowledge to lead me to assign to them a lower standard of character than I was formerly ready to accede to them.

(Signed) "F. R. Woodhouse."

From Dr. Hawthorn, Surgeon, 3d Regiment, Light Cavalry.

"17th *August* 1845.

"Sir,—I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st ultimo, and have much satisfaction in bearing testimony to the gentlemanly demeanour, and strictly sober habits of the Ameers of Hydrabad when they were in power in 1835-1836.

"I resided at Hydrabad for a period of seven months, during which I was in professional attendance on His Highness the late Meer Noor Mahommed Khan. I had almost daily an opportunity of seeing the other Ameers, either in durbar or in their private dwellings, and frequently accompanied them on their hunting excursions. I never had any reason to suppose they were in the slightest degree addicted to intemperance: on the contrary, they had the greatest horror of any intoxicating liquor or drug, and would never take medicine without an assurance from me that it did not contain opium. Your letter was long in reaching me, as it had been sent to Asseerghur.

(Signed) "H. P. Hawthorn."

From Captain Leckie, late Assistant Political Agent in Lower Scinde.

"Sattarah, 2d *October* 1845.

"My first introduction to the durbars of Upper and Lower Scinde was in the year 1830, when I accompanied the late Sir Alexander Burnes on a mission to Lahore. Subsequently I went to Hydrabad in October 1838, and remained there until September 1842, as assistant to Sir Henry Pottinger and yourself. During this time, I was frequently with the Ameers, both in

open durbar and at private interviews, on business and in a friendly way. With one solitary exception, I never knew them deviate from their style and bearing, which was always frank and gentlemanly.

"In their habits they were temperate, and I never saw them in any way excited. As parents they were kind, and took a pride in the education of their sons. They were beloved by their chiefs and dependents who were at Hydrabad, and in constant attendance on them.

(Signed) "J. D. Leckie."

From Captain Hart, 2d Grenadier Regiment.

"CAPTAIN HART'S* OPINION OF THE AMEERS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT.

"A residence of three years in Scinde (1839-40-41) led me to the conclusion that the Government of its Ameers had been judged by too high a standard. Compared with the rule of despotic states in Europe during the past century, their sway was mild; and although unrestrained in the exercise of absolute power, their people were not subjected to harsher measures than are common to native Governments in India. The aversion of the Ameers to shed blood was notorious. Property was generally secure, notwithstanding the absence of any regular police. Even the jealousy evinced for the preservation of their shikargahs never carried them the lengths of the extreme punishments once authorized by the forest laws of Britain.

"The acknowledged fact, that crimes of any magnitude were rarely committed, spoke of itself for the condition of the lower classes; of food they had sufficient in quantity, and of clothing in quality, to satisfy their wants. Limited in Scinde as in other eastern countries, to securing a bare subsistence, the cultivators endured no hardships to which their Indian brethren are not liable; while the simplicity of the form of assessment freed them from numerous petty extortions of subordinates to which the

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* Author of the Article on Slavery in Scinde in the *United Service Magazine* for January 1844.

latter are often exposed. The almost exclusive monopoly by the Hindoo population of the management of the revenue, proved that they did not consider the bigotry of their rulers as an intolerable burden. That trade was not, in all instances, depressed or obstructed, was shown by the transit of opium through Scinde to the Coast in preference to the route of the British provinces, as well as by the encouragement afforded to merchants by the remission of customs duties in proportion to the extent of their traffic.

"Of the private characters of their rulers, the Scindians spoke favourably. They were said neither to indulge in spirituous liquors or to smoke; and violating the sanctity of a subject's dwelling in search of wealth, or tenants for their harems, were acts unheard of, &c. &c.

(Signed) "S. Hart."

From Captain Whitelock, late Assistant Political Agent, Lower Scinde.

"Seroor, *10th September* 1845.

"Your letter of the second instant has, most unaccountably, only just reached me. I shall have much pleasure in giving you my opinions respecting the private characters of the Ameers of Hydrabad (collectively.) It would perhaps be desirable that I should first specify the many opportunities I had of becoming intimately acquainted with their Highnesses during my residence in Scinde. I accompanied the Mission to Hydrabad in 1838, and was present at all the interviews between Colonel Pottinger and the Ameers prior to the arrival of the troops under command of Sir John Keane. Subsequently I was for a year stationed at Tattah, where I frequently received friendly messages from them: and upon my return to Hydrabad in the end of 1839, I was instructed to give every encouragement to the advances the Ameers were then making towards a friendly and sociable intercourse with the political officers, and which, it was conceived, would be best promoted by our partaking of their sports and amusements; and I need scarcely remind you that you also considered the advantages likely to accrue from cultivating their Highnesses' friendship to be of primary importance, as you would thereby attain access to them at all times, and communicate *viva voce*, or through your

assistants, every question of importance, instead of through the usual channel of corrupt Agents and Moonshees. During the year 1840, I frequently shared in the sports of the Ameers; visited in their private dwellings, upon occasions of sickness, or for the purpose of condolence upon family bereavements, &c.; and I was favoured with their correspondence (private) until I left the country.

"It would be absurd to draw any line of comparison between any of the princes of Asia and the enlightened and accomplished rulers of the more civilized parts of Europe. Among Eastern ones, however, the Ameers deservedly ranked high in the estimation of all the Europeans who had been on terms of intimacy with them. The Ameers, in common with all mankind, had faults and weaknesses, but in many respects their conduct was most exemplary. They religiously abstained from drinking wine, or intoxicating liquors of every description; nor did they use tobacco, with the solitary exception of taking snuff; and, moreover, they were not addicted to that almost universal practice among Mahommedans, of smoking tobacco. Their manners were mild and gentlemanly, their dispositions humane; and, as far as I could judge, their deportment towards their children, relations, and dependents, was invariably kind and affectionate.

"I have felt great surprise at the reports that have been circulated of the Ameers' ill-treatment of their wives and females, and I can conscientiously aver, that, during my residence in Scinde, I never heard such a thing hinted at, although it is well known that there was an influential clique among the Hindoos who were ever too ready to prejudice the European officers against the rulers of Scinde. I feel, however, thoroughly convinced that the Ameers were incapable of acting in so cowardly and despicable a manner. It is true that, with regard to women, there were amongst them one or two sensualists, and they of all persons were not likely to have acted towards them with harshness; yet one of these, the late Meer Nusseer Khan, has been more particularly accused of treating them with great cruelty.

"The Ameers have been also charged with the most savage and atrocious crimes relative to their mode (alleged) of destroying their offspring. From all the enquiries that I have made, I believe that, by the law of their country, they were compelled to

send away the children of their concubines, but that it was not usual to destroy them; and the only case that has come to my knowledge of *suspected infanticide* since 1838, occurred at the close of 1839, when our native agents reported to me that one of the Ameers had refused to allow his illegitimate child to be removed from the Fort, and that, in consequence, some of the Belooche chiefs had remonstrated with him in very uncourteous language. A few days afterwards, the child died. His Highness felt his loss most severely, and, for several weeks, so intense was his grief, that his health suffered considerably. I believe that the child's death was caused by poison, b . I feel certain that H. H. not only did not connive at the murder, (if it was one,) but I do not think that a suspicion has ever entered his mind that his loss was effected through any unnatural agency.—Believe me, &c.

(Signed) "C. R. Whitelock.
"Captain, late Assistant Political Agent, Lower Scinde."

From Captain Postans, 15th Regiment, N. I., late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Scinde.

"CAPTAIN POSTAN'S 'PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ON SCINDE.'

"*To the Editor of the Bombay Times.*

"Sir,—Observing in a note to your correspondent *D.*, in your issue of the 23d instant, that my authority is quoted as having stated that the Ameers of Scinde destroyed their illegitimate female children rather than expose them to infamy or degradation, I beg to be allowed to observe, that my remarks on this subject are, it will be seen, not positive, but given as conveyed to me on general report, and are so to be understood. Considerable experience, from personal communication with nearly all the ex-princes of Scinde, has induced in my mind the strongest conviction, that though they were not free from the errors common to human nature, and under peculiar circumstances of religion, education, &c., they were on the whole amiable, merciful, and generally free from those dissipating and brutalizing effects of absolute power, too frequently observed in Mahommedan rulers; and though, as a faithful historian, (in intention at least,) I should, I

conceive, have been wrong to have passed over this or any other circumstance, in elucidation of the characters of the Scinde Ameers as they appeared to me, I most distinctly beg to disavow the slightest wish to assist, by any testimony derived from me, in the fearful attacks lately published on the private characters of these fallen princes. On the contrary, I regard such with the feelings of repugnance common, I am sure, to my countrymen in India.

"T. P."

"AHMEDNUGGUR, *25th July* 1845."

In reference to the above letter, which appeared in the *Bombay Times*, Captain Postans thus addressed me :—

"You are right in attributing the letter in the *Times* to me. * *

"I had the strongest personal regard for all the late Ameers of Scinde. In my personal intercourse with them, they always left the most favourable impressions from their urbanity, amiability, and desire to please. As rulers, though I could point out many faults in their mode of Government, these were the consequences of their confined views as to civil polity, but, on the whole, the bulk of their subjects were probably as happy and contented under their rule as could be desired. Their great failing was profusion, on the one hand, and avarice on the other, but they were merciful to a *fault*, and *just* where they judged for themselves. As men, I consider them exemplary characters, (taking into the case their education, and prejudices of birth and religion ;) and the devotion and respect evinced towards them, by their children and all about them, was a conclusive proof of the domestic harmony which reigned in their singularly constituted families. I really doubt if it were possible to find in our own country so many families, each and every member of which had his own interests to support, living together so peaceably and affectionately.

"They have, I hear, borne their reverses like *men*, patient under many misfortunes ; and this is an additional proof that their minds were well regulated in prosperity.

"There is not, I am sure, one of us who knew the Ameers of Scinde, as princes surrounded with power and prosperity, who does not feel an added respect for them in their altered fortunes.

(Signed) "T. Postans,

"Late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Scinde."

Extract from a Letter from Captain French, Political Agent, Nimaur, late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Scinde.

"It is very deplorable that General William Napier should have published to the world such charges against the ex-Ameers of Scinde. As far as my observations will enable me to speak they are totally unfounded. I was in Scinde and Cutchee from the 6th September 1840, to the 7th December 1842, when I left for Ferozepoor, and during that period, or in fact until the appearance of the 'Conquest of Scinde,' on my word I never, as far as my memory will enable me to speak, heard of such doings by the Meers. Had such horrible atrocities ever been perpetrated, I think you will allow I must have heard of them; first, because, as you know, I amused myself by gathering some notes on Scinde; and, secondly, because the Ameers and their Rule was a daily subject of conversation for many months of the above period, while I was at Sukkur, in every house there. Many officers had Scinde Moonshees; I had one, and some of the others, like myself, employed them probably more with a view of acquiring local knowledge than aught else. I have but to repeat, that until the appearance of 'the Conquest of Scinde,' I do not recollect ever having heard of these abominations; I don't believe a word of them, but they will be all believed at home.

"The Rule of the Meers, I think, has been severely dealt with by General Napier in his book, but of this I cannot speak so confidently; yet I never saw a country so quiet as that from Roree to Subzulkote, when I marched through it in December 1842. Recollect the *time!* Scarcely a village had a sign of walls round it, a fact, with some others of the same kind, I recollect writing to our friend S. from Subzulkote. That there was in the Scinde and all Eastern Governments, as well as in every Government of Europe, very much to condemn, no one can deny.

In my opinion there is much to admire in Native Governments, but then we must know their working, and the people, to be able to appreciate that worthy of admiration. This is opposed to the 'Sub junta' school, but let any man make a dozen or two marches through our own country in India, and then say if he thinks the people better clad, or more happy, the country more highly cultivated or prosperous, than that of the Guicowar, or Rajah of Sattarah, before he upholds our own rule and sweepingly condemns those of other countries—those which are thousands of years old, though the dynasty may be new. Of the oppressive rule of the Meers, as set forth by General Napier, I never heard, that is, to the same extent; but who will point out the rule not open to objections? I know of none. Let us look at home before we abuse our neighbours. Let us look at the perhaps most benevolent Government in the world, that of the Court of Directors, and point out five Districts in India that have risen in prosperity to a degree worth noticing in the past twenty-five years of profound peace. The Meers erected no gibbets, nor confined a man for debt, to the ruin perhaps of his family. Did you ever hear of a cultivator in Scinde being ejected, as we know of daily at home? Did an Ameer give a village in Jagheer, he gave, and could only give, the *Sirkar's* rights* on that village; and did he adopt the clearance system of home?—gave he not other land in lieu, and likewise compensation? It is not because the Meers were not Josephs that they were a tithe of the sinners General William Napier would make them out to be.

"Personally, I saw little of the Meers; I pitied, and yet pity them. Once I called on them with Kennedy and Eastwick; and in December 1842, I took over the draft of the new treaty to Khyrpoor; on no other occasion did I see them. On the latter, poor old Roostum Khan and Nusseer Khan were present. Young Napier, Chamberlain, and Richardson, were with me. The Meers protested against the charges in the preamble to the treaty, defied proof, and said they would send a Wuckeel to wait on Sir Charles Napier. All this I reported to the General,

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* The Government share of the produce of the soil, and the rights and immunities belonging to the Government.

and he said, of course their denial, &c., should be laid before the Governor-General. My duty was done, so I hastened out of the country *en route* to Rajpootana.

(Signed) "P. T. French."

From Dr. Winchester, Civil-Surgeon, Rutnagherry, late Residency Surgeon at Hydrabad.

"Bombay, *27th September* 1845.

"During the two years I passed at the Residency in Lower Scinde, I had, as you are aware, daily intercourse with the different Ameers of Hydrabad. Previous to my nomination to Scinde I had been much associated with officers who had personal knowledge of their Highnesses, from their official situation, and I was never prepared, from their conversation, to expect any thing unfavourable to the Ameers. Nor do I think from the latter end of 1834, when I first went to the province of Cutch, that I ever heard attributed to them, with one rumoured exception, and that regarding only one prince, any of those vices which have since been made so notorious. I most assuredly never heard any act of cruelty mentioned; on the contrary, I always thought the Ameers were lenient as rulers, and dispensers of criminal justice; and however oppressive their system of taxation might have been, it never was inforced by cruelty. The condition of the villages and inhabitants did not mark that the population of Scinde was worse treated than the generality of Eastern countries. I have passed repeatedly, alone, unarmed, through great portions of Lower Scinde in 1839-40 and 41, and never met with insult, but, on the contrary, with civility and kindness.

"Shortly after I joined you in March 1840, the Ameers, especially the late Meer Noor Mahommed, requested my services, and they invariably treated me, up to my departure in December 1841, with all absence of state, receiving me in their private apartments, where, surrounded by their relations and friends, I had an opportunity of hearing their private and familiar conversation. Besides, I frequently attended the Ameers in their hunting excursions, and on several occasions to little pic-nic parties at their gardens on the banks of the river, and on no occasion did I ever witness any thing which could be deemed incorrect. In their

habits, the Ameers were exceedingly simple, and in manners unaffected. Their food was plain; their drink was water, and except in the use of snuff, I never heard, or saw, any of them using tobacco or ardent spirits. They were free from the prejudices Mussulmans generally have towards Christians, and I never heard them affect to despise any other religion than the Hindoo, of which they had every contempt, on account of its idolatry.

"No one ever hinted to me that the Ameers ill-treated their women. I repeatedly asked natives the manner in which women are obtained for their zenanas. I never heard of force being used; but that the women were very reconciled to their lot, being enriched by valuable presents of jewels, and insured a competence for life. When I have been within the precincts of the harem, I never beheld any thing that could lead to the supposition of tyranny. H. H. Meer Nusseer Khan often solicited medicine for his females, as did the other Ameers, evincing, in the detail of their complaints, anxiety for their welfare; and I on one occasion was much struck with the conduct of Nusseer Khan towards a lady of his harem who was dangerously ill.

"At another time I was sent for by Meer Shahdad Khan, owing to his son being very sick. Scarcely had I reached the palace when the child was reported worse, and without any ceremony I was taken into the apartments of his wife; and as the child was suffering from convulsions, of which it subsequently died, I was there—by express desire, that I might see one of the fits—some time; and I was certainly on this, as on other occasions, curious enough to observe what was going on around me, and I remember being struck with the orderly and homely manner in which matters were conducted.

"The above were two occasions on which the Ameers evinced good feeling; and, were it necessary, I could detail others where they showed the same benevolence, not only to those immediately related to them, but to their chiefs and retainers.

"Asiatic character cannot be judged by European standards; but judging of the Ameers from what I have seen and known of natives, I certainly esteemed them favourably. The conduct of Meers Nusseer and Sobdar Khans towards their sons, young boys, marked them to be good fathers; and I know the late Noor Mahommed was much grieved that his eldest son, Shahdad Khan,

was indifferent to his associates and appearances. In their religious observances they were very strict, and I have often remarked the constancy with which they perused the Koran, and the respect they paid to this book, which was never opened or shut, unless with veneration; and if any of Nusseer Khan's sons happened to be present, they invariably knelt, and their father, placing the Koran on their heads, blessed them.

"The Ameers of Scinde have been accused of murdering their illegitimate offspring; but I am quite satisfied, from minute inquiries which I instituted, that they never took the life of a child which had actually seen the light. In the case of slave women proving *enceinte*, doubtless the practice of procuring abortion was resorted to, as is, I believe, common in all Oriental seraglios; and I have even had a person pointed out to me, who was stated to be instrumental in effecting this. I had the mode of doing so explained; but I am bound to add, I never heard of any injury being produced to the female by the process employed.

(Signed) "JAMES W. WINCHESTER,
"Civil Surgeon, Rutnagherry."

From DR. LEITH, Assistant Presidency Civil Surgeon, late Surgeon to the Political Agency in Lower Scinde.

"In reply to your letter, which I received yesterday, I am very glad to communicate to you the opinion I formed of the deposed Ameers of Scinde.

"From December 1841, to November of the following year, I resided at Hydrabad in medical charge of the Lower Scinde Political Agency; and it being the chief part of my duty to give medical attendance to the Ameers, or to any member of their families that might require it, I had, during that time, almost daily opportunities of seeing them either in Durbar or in private. And being again appointed medical attendant to the Ameers, in April 1843, when they were brought in captivity to Bombay, and from thence sent to Sassoor, I saw them during nearly two months under very greatly altered circumstances.

"During my acquaintance with the Ameers, I remarked their great freedom from the vices usually prominent among Indian Mussulmans, and I was pleased with their affable and gentle

manners and domestic habits, and also with the mild exercise of their power as rulers. The people generally seemed to love them; and from what I saw during my stay at Hydrabad, I could have expected the devotion they displayed a few months afterwards, in supporting their chiefs when fighting for their honour, their independence, and their territory. I never saw any thing to give me the least suspicion that any of the Ameers used any intoxicating thing; nor did I ever, while in Scinde, hear even a rumour that they did so, and I think I must have known it if they had. The use of intoxicating substances I have heard several of them openly condemn: most of them used snuff, but none of them ever smoked tobacco, or any thing else. During the many opportunities of observation that my visits to the sick afforded me, I never saw or heard of any conduct towards the members of their households but what was marked with kindness. During my residence at Hydrabad, I heard of but one severe punishment being inflicted; the criminal was a murderer, and the usual penalty of having his hands cut off by the executioner was inflicted; and in this case the Ameers showed great anxiety for the safety of the man's life after the amputation. English gentlemen were invariably received with kindness and courtesy at the Hydrabad court by all the Ameers, and especially by Meers Nusseer Mahommed and Shahdad Khans. The Ameers I became acquainted with at Hydrabad, were Meer Nusseer Mahommed Khan, his two sons, and two brothers, Meer Mahommed Khan, Meer Shahdad Khan, Meer Hoossein Ali Khan, and Meer Sobdar Khan and two sons. On their arrival in captivity in Bombay, old Meer Roostum Khan (about eighty years of age,) with his son and nephew from Khyrpoor, accompanied them, and I then became acquainted with these also. I formed a favourable opinion of the characters of Meer Roostum and his son. They differed from their Hydrabad relatives in being somewhat less polished in manners; and Meer Roostum was less strict than they in his observances of Mussulman abstinence, in so far as he did not object to take wine as a medicine, which his feeble state appeared to render necessary. I never saw the least approach to intoxication in him or in his son: of his nephew I cannot speak so surely.

(Signed) "A. H. Leith."

"Bombay, *20th Sept.* 1845."

From Dr. Peart, Civil Surgeon, Poonah, and in charge of the ex-Ameers of Khyrpoor.

"Poonah, 17*th July* 1845.

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th inst., and have much pleasure in replying to your queries. Ex-Ameer Roostum Khan of Khyrpoor, with his youngest son, Ali Buksh, and his nephew, ex-Ameer Nusseer Khan, have been under my care since March 1844, and I feel the greatest satisfaction in being able to bear testimony to their noble bearing under their misfortunes; and I can safely say, that since I have had the pleasure of knowing them, I have never observed anything whereby even the slightest shadow of a suspicion of intemperance or debauchery could be attributed to them; and I have had ample opportunities of judging, visiting them at all times. Ex-Ameer Meer Roostum Khan, now upwards of eighty years of age, is in full possession of his faculties—his memory is good, and he is most strict in his religious observances; his mode of living is abstemious, eating meat only once a day, and his sole beverage water or milk.

"Respecting the memorials which have been forwarded to England since the ex-Ameers have been under my care, I can assure you most positively that they have never had the most trifling assistance in framing them, neither were they seen by, or their contents known to, any European, until after they had been placed in my hands for transmission to Government. In reply to the last part of your letter, from frequent conversations I have had with the ex-Ameers upon the subject, I am enabled to state, that their disinclination to have their families sent to them from Scinde is quite insurmountable, and when I have proposed it to them, their reply has always been, 'as long as we are prisoners, this is no place for our wives and children, to make them prisoners also.'

"I trust you will excuse my refraining from informing the ex-Ameers of the allegations that have been made against them, as I am sure by so doing I should be adding fresh causes of sorrow.

(Signed) "J. H. Peart.

From Captain Gordon, in charge of the ex-Ameers of Hydrabad.

"Dum-Dum, 27th July 1845.

"My Dear Sir,—I have to acknowledge your letter of the 14th instant, requesting my sentiments on certain charges preferred against the Ameers of Scinde, in the second volume of a work recently published, entitled the "Conquest of Scinde." I shall reply to your queries in the order in which they occur in your letter to my address, premising, that from my almost constant daily intercourse with the Ameers since they arrived in India, in April 1843, I have had the best opportunities of judging of their character and habits.

"I observe, therefore, in reply to your first query, that the Ameers are the most temperate of men, rigidly abstaining from wine, and every kind of liquor; while to smoking also they have a strong aversion, and cannot even endure the smell of tobacco, and it will not be supposed that their present habits of 'total abstinence' in these respects are newly acquired, or different from those they have hitherto been accustomed to. In regard, therefore, to '*smoking*' and '*drinking*' the Ameers are examples to most of us who boast a higher civilization, and a more self-denying morality.

"With regard to your second query, I am unable to conjecture on what grounds it has been asserted that the Ameers' memorials were written for them by persons at Bombay and not by the Ameers themselves. In my opinion, the memorials referred to are in no respect superior to the usual correspondence of the Ameers, who are quite as capable of representing their own case, and proposing and answering objections, as are educated men among ourselves; and this fact will not be disputed by any person who has had opportunities of observing their good sense and shrewd and pertinent remarks on men and things. I am aware that an opinion is abroad that the Ameers are a set of "illiterate barbarians;" but this is not the case, for with one or two exceptions they are well acquainted with, and appreciate, the best Persian authors, (in prose and verse,) and the knowledge thus acquired from books, improved by their own sagacity and experience, has made them no mean judges of the motives which ordi-

narily govern men in their actions. After these observations, I need not obtrude my opinion that the Ameers were fully equal to write the petitions alluded to,—that they did write them, is my most firm conviction, and on this point I can scarcely be mistaken.

"The Ameers solemnly deny the allegations referred to in your third query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas; and in justice to them I cannot withhold my testimony, that while I was employed in Scinde and the neighbouring countries, I never once heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers, and had it prevailed it is scarcely possible that it could have been concealed from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers.

"It was, I believe, the wish of the ex-Ameers that their ladies should not accompany them from Scinde; and since their arrival in India, they have always expressed the utmost repugnance to their removal, in the hope, no doubt, that they themselves would eventually be restored to their own country. This hope they still cherish, and while it lasts (although far less intensely than before) they will never sanction a proceeding which, as we are well aware, is so offensive to their ideas of female honour and decorum. The Ameers have always spoken to me of the removal of their ladies as a step to be resorted to only in the event of their "vakeels" returning unsuccessful from England, and they now perceive that their worst fears in this regard are likely to be realised.

(Signed) "FORBES M. GORDON."

From CAPTAIN MYLNE, 6th Regiment, N.I., late Political Agent, Hydrabad.

"BOMBAY, 18*th January* 1846.

"I hasten to reply as briefly as possible to your question regarding the private character of the ex-Ameers of Lower Scinde, and most truly can I say that, as far as my own observation went, and as far as I could learn from others, very few indeed of the native Princes of India could so well stand the test of inquiry into their domestic life.

"I had, as you know, many opportunities of seeing them:

they had, in general, very short notice of my intention of waiting upon them, and my visits not being confined to mere formal interviews at the Durbar, I had the better means of remarking the total absence of all marks of debauchery and symptoms of excess. I cannot recall to my recollection having ever heard, during the seven months of my being in charge of the agency, any accusation against them as being addicted to the common Mussulman vice of intemperance; and, kept informed as I was, through several sources, of their every day life, it could hardly have failed of coming to my ears had there been anything approaching want of kindness or affection displayed by them to their families. But the manner in which they invariably alluded to their households, and the grief expressed when any member of their families was in distress, convinced me that much attachment existed between them.

"Need I say, that if there are any other points on which my opinion of the unhappy Ameers can be of any service, it will afford me much pleasure to give it?

"CHAS. D. MYLNE."

To these convincing testimonies, I would add that of an officer long resident in Scinde, and intimately acquainted with its people. "My own knowledge," he writes, "that is from personal intercourse, is nothing, but the unanimous testimony of all the natives who were in a position to know, shows that, with the sole exception, I believe, of Ali Morad, the Meers of Scinde were sober and temperate to an extraordinary degree,—not only not drinking or using intoxicating liquors or drugs, but not even smoking a hookah."

On Sir Henry Pottinger I call to confirm the testimony thus rendered in their favour by every British officer who has had an opportunity of intimately knowing the Ameers. *He* can inform his

countrymen that the documents now submitted to the reader, are sober and literal statements of undeniable facts. Both his authority, and that of my lamented friend Sir Alexander Burnes, have been quoted by General William Napier, as bearing out his assertion that the Government of the Ameers was tyrannous and oppressive. I have failed to discover the passages whence the alleged extracts are made, and I feel very certain that neither the one nor the other of these distinguished diplomatists ever expressed himself as they are both alleged to have done, after a lengthened intercourse with the rules of Scinde, or without some very powerful qualifications. Sir Henry Pottinger's official despatches I have already had occasion to quote, as illustrating the sentiments of one not more remarkable for his political sagacity than for his intimate acquaintance with oriental character generally, and with that of the Belooches in particular. To his measures and recommendations I have from time to time referred as being in direct opposition to those of Sir Charles Napier—contrasting the deep views and mature deliberations of the accomplished politician, with the crude opinions and unscrupulous conduct of the General. Sir Alexander Burnes's eulogies of Meer Roostum, "the good old man," I have already placed before the reader.* And if, as I confidently

* I deeply regret that I have it not in my power to refer to Captain Del'Hoste's Journal, written in 1832, which, though buried in the records of Government, I believe contains sketches of the characters of the Ameers. The following passage, extracted from Dr. James Burnes's book will show

expect, I have satisfied my reader of the utter groundlessness of this charge of debauchery and drunkenness against the Ameers generally, and

how innocent were the preceding generation of Ameers of the foul charges brought against their sons:—

"The Ameers of Scinde are less sunk in sensuality and indulgence than Mahommedan Princes in general. Meer Moorad Ali Khan asked me on one occasion whether I had any objection to his taking daroo, a word which I understood in its usual acceptation of ardent spirits; and I was proceeding to explain that it would be better to avoid all stimulants, and particularly wine, for the present, when he abruptly interrupted me by begging that I would not use the name of the forbidden juice of the grape in the presence of a true believer. I found afterwards that his Highness only meant a pomegranate; and although this anecdote may give an impression of display before a large assembly, still I believe it is well ascertained that the Ameers never indulge in intoxicating drugs or liquors. They have been known to dismiss persons with disgrace from their presence, who have appeared before them redolent of wine; and Bahadoor Khan Cokur, a Beloochee chief of high birth, in the service of Meer Moorad Ali Khan, was suspended from his employments for a considerable time, from having been once seen in a state of intoxication. The Ameers universally objected to take medicine in the shape of tinctures, from the spirits they contained. There is not a hookah to be seen at their Court, nor do any of the family ever eat opium. It were to be hoped that this temperance on the part of the rulers had had a proportionate effect on their subjects; but experience obliges me to declare, that most of the soldiery, and many of the courtiers, are addicted to every species of indulgence that can either enervate the mind, or debilitate the body. The eating of opium is as common in Scinde as in Cutch; and I found no present more acceptable than a few bottles of brandy, and no annoyance more intolerable than incessant indirect applications to repair the ravages of unlawful disease, or to renew the powers wasted in luxury and debauch. The Ameers commence business about two hours before daybreak, when each holds a private levee to listen to complaints, and adjust the affairs relative to his peculiar province. It is on this occasion only that they wear turbans. About sunrise, they repair to their apartments to dress, and appear shortly afterwards in durbar, where the whole family regularly assemble, and where all State proceedings are transacted. The letters which have arrived during the night or preceding day, are then thrown before them in a heap, and the time is passed in reading or giving orders regarding them, and in conversation till ten or eleven o'clock, when they withdraw to their morning repast. At two o'clock they again show themselves abroad, and remain together till dark, when they separate for the night to their respective places of abode."

against the venerable Meer Roostum in particular, I may safely leave it to his judgment to determine what degree of credit is due to the monstrous and incredible stories narrated on the same authority as that which I have just proved to be so worthless. The Ameers have been accused of committing deeds exceeding in iniquity those ever invented in the most fabulous romance of ancient or modern days; such as, *chopping their own "offspring to pieces with their own hands, immediately after birth; but more frequently placing them under cushions, smoking, drinking, and jesting with each other about their hellish work while the children were being suffocated beneath them;" chastising their wives with "whips of twisted brass wires," for "what they deemed the poor women's offences, such, perhaps, as weeping over their slaughtered children;" "hellish deeds, which rendered them objects for horror rather than sympathy."** * Such

* "Conquest of Scinde," page 348:—"Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad, depicted the most noble and generous of the Ameers, the most humane of the pernicious brood, had in his zenana a whip expressly to correct the women; the last is composed of two lengths of twisted brass wires! It is no fable! the usage is certain, &c." That the roma cist who palmed off on his too credulous countrymen the arrant nonsense (out-Heroding the famed Munchausen) of Fitzgerald of the "tempestuous hand," should write such trash, excites but little wonder. But it is surprising, and derogates not a little from the respect due to the collective wisdom of the nation, that the absurd fable should have been listened to in Parliament.

It must have astonished all English gentlemen in India conversant with the mild ways of Mahommedan gentlemen towards the inmates of their harems—(subjected to no other hardships than that of voluntary seclusion, which they themselves consider as disgraceful to infringe as would an English female regard a reflection cast on her chastity)—to see so wantonly libellous and utterly absurd an accusation gravely uttered by a British Senator in the presence of the Parliament of England. The report of the

are the statements put forth as *History*, and as worthy of the belief of the most civilized portion of the globe! They can only be accounted for,

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debate given by Hansard, states, that *sensation* was caused by this climax to all the misrepresentation and mystification palmed on the house on that occasion, but the nature of that sensation is not described: for the honour of my countrymen I trust that it was the sensation of *indignation* at the unblushing assurance of Mr. Roebuck in presuming to attempt to impose such trash on the representatives of our nation.—Of all the Ameers, Nusseer —the courteous, refined, and even chivalrous Nusseer—was the last on whom the romancist should have attempted to cast this stigma. Nusseer! who would as soon have given pain to a woman as would Mr. Roebuck or General Napier dream of inflicting the same barbarous cruelty on their own daughters. Poor Nusseer is now no more. It has pleased God to summon him whither the malice of his persecutors can no longer pursue him; where the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest. He was mercifully removed ere the atrocious calumnies of General William Napier could add another drop of bitterness to the overflowing cup of his misfortunes. *Requiescat in pace.* His nephew, Meer Hoossein Ali, indignantly replied as follows to the charges, as preposterous as they are malignant, of the historian:—"*Whatever stories the General has written concerning our ladies, we could reply to them by as bad and worse words about him; but it is not our custom to write evil about any one, or call him bad names, agreeably to the saying, the man of wisdom will not call him a respectable man who uses the names of respectable men with disdain.* (Persian proverb.) *Sir Charles Napier has described the killing of children by the Ameers; but in reply we say, thousands of woes to him who wrote such a thing, for we are neither guilty of that, nor know any thing about it. This is only an unfounded charge and a false calumny. Let it be asked, how can a man be so inhuman as to cut to pieces a young child, and in consequence expose himself to the fire of hell and the curse of God! Regarding the brass whip which the General has written about, it is all a lie, like the rest of his accusations; because a whip is for horses and not for women. There is no matter if the General has got it* (the whip with which it was alleged Meer Nusseer chastised his women) *in his possession to show to the people, for we also can produce not only a brass whip but hundreds of iron whips.*" And thus the young Ameer concludes his humble attempt to defend the memory of his father, and to uphold the character of his brethren, all that remained to them:—"Sir Charles Napier calumniates the Ameers, because he knows that he has injured them very sadly; and by calling the Ameers monsters, he hopes to draw off the sympathy of people from their sorrowful misfortunes; but he will fail in his design even in this world; and on the day of judgment, when the Belooches who were innocently murdered by the General in the battles of Meeanee and Douba, shall rise

by some heartless wag having practised on the credulity and too ready ear of Sir Charles Napier, (to hear any thing to the disadvantage of his vic-

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against him,—on such a day where will he find refuge from their accusations and complaints of those whose characters he has blackened by his calumnies!"

A brass whip, by no means a great rarity in the East—is found in the women's apartments, and the logical inference is, that *it was designed for their backs!* By a parity of reasoning, the valuable firearms, swords, jewels, and treasures, found in the zenanas, may be concluded to have been collected by the ladies, who, addicted like their lords to intrigue, were meditating a "revolt of the *Harem!*" Alas, poor England! If your senators are at the mercy of Mr. Roebuck, and your rising generation are dependent for Eastern *facts* on the imagination of General William Napier! England of all nations is most interested in obtaining correct information regarding India; Englishmen are of all Europeans the most ignorant, and the most easily imposed on, in all that concerns it!

To prove how cruelly the Ameers treated their ladies, the historian tells us, that "*when the Ameers fell, not one woman, old or young, mother, wife, or concubine, would follow them to Bombay, so much were they detested;*" and we are told that they "sought and obtained leave to return to the homes of their childhood." The reader of the foregoing pages will not be surprised when I tell him that THIS IS A PURE UNMITIGATED FICTION; though he will probably be amused at the hardihood of the fabrication. The ladies did not accompany their lords, because to have done so would have been an acknowledgment that all hope of the return of the Ameers was abandoned. The treatment of the captive Ameers, the indignities to which they were exposed, the undefined horror entertained by all Asiatics of transportation across the "black water" (sea), and the incertitude as to the final disposal of the captive princes when in the country of those who had evinced such a recklessness of justice, truth, and mercy,—were enough to deter even affectionate wives from voluntarily accompanying their husbands at first. But it was not their husbands' wish that their wives should accompany them. UP TO MY LAST ACCOUNTS—JULY 1845—THE AMEERS' LADIES, SO FAR FROM HAVING "RETURNED TO THE HOMES OF THEIR CHILDHOOD," WERE STILL LIVING IN A TANDA (A WALLED VILLAGE) ABOUT THREE MILES FROM HYDRABAD! What say Dr. Peart, in charge of the Khyrpoor Ameers, and Captain Gordon, in charge of those of Lower Scinde, on this subject? The former writes:—

"In reply to the last part of your letter, from frequent conversations I have had with the ex-Ameers upon the subject, I am enabled to state that their disinclination to have their families sent to them from Scinde is quite insurmountable, and when I have proposed it to them, their reply has al-

tims) who forthwith transmitted what may have been intended as a bad joke and fiction, to him who was to become the annalist of the Conquest of Scinde.

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ways been, '*As long as we are prisoners, this is no place for our wives and children, to make them prisoners also.*' I trust you will excuse my refraining from informing the ex-Ameers of the allegations that have been made against them, as I am sure, by so doing, I should be adding fresh causes of sorrow."

The latter, thus :—"The Ameers solemnly deny the allegation referred to in your second query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas, and in justice I cannot withhold my testimony, that while I was employed in Scinde and the neighbouring countries, I never heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers, and *had it prevailed, it is scarcely possible that it could have been concealed* from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers. IT WAS, I BELIEVE, THE WISH OF THE EX-AMEERS, THAT THEIR LADIES SHOULD NOT ACCOMPANY THEM FROM SCINDE, AND SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL IN INDIA, THEY HAVE ALWAYS EXPRESSED THE GREATEST REPUGNANCE TO THEIR REMOVAL, IN THE HOPE, NO DOUBT, THAT THEY THEMSELVES WOULD EVENTUALLY BE RESTORED TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THIS HOPE THEY STILL CHERISH, AND WHILE IT LASTS (ALTHOUGH FAR LESS INTENSELY THAN BEFORE) THEY WILL NEVER SANCTION A PROCEEDING WHICH, AS WE ARE WELL AWARE, IS SO OFFENSIVE TO THEIR IDEAS OF FEMALE HONOUR AND DECORUM. THE AMEERS HAVE ALWAYS SPOKEN TO ME OF THE REMOVAL OF THEIR LADIES, AS A STEP TO BE RESOLVED ONLY IN THE EVENT OF THEIR VAKEELS RETURNING UNSUCCESSFUL FROM ENGLAND, AND THEY WILL NOW PERCEIVE THAT THEIR WORST FEARS IN THIS REGARD ARE LIKELY TO BE REALIZED." This, be it remembered, is the testimony of two high-minded English gentlemen, writing simultaneously from the eastern and western extremities of India, daily associating with the Ameers, and acquainted with all their thoughts. They cannot be supposed to be discontented "at being by Lord Ellenborough debarred from plundering the Scinde revenues, under the names of collectors," &c. They are gentlemen whose words have never been doubted, nor their honour called in question ; with no interest in the matter save that of Englishmen jealous for the honour of their country. And what is opposed to them ? The assertions of one whom I have proved to be as reckless of *truth* as he is ignorant of what he pretends to discuss—the champion of a brother whose policy is unjustifiable, and only to be extenuated by proving its victims monsters more horrible than it hath hitherto entered into the mind of man to conceive !

CONCLUSION.

Before concluding, it may be convenient to place before the reader, in a brief summary, the leading propositions which it has been my unpleasant task to establish, in the preceding pages, in reference to Sir Charles Napier.

Sir Charles Napier arrived in Scinde, and assumed political control of the province, on the 9th September 1842, when all prospect of war was ended by the peaceable return from Affghanistan of General England's army, effected, in a great measure, through the aid of the Ameers' Government. He himself admits, with reference to the *crisis* having passed, that he ought to have been there two months previous, (Conquest, page 20.) By the middle of October, the whole of the British troops were assembled in Scinde, from whence Lord Ellenborough had directed that the Bengal troops should return to their own provinces, his Lordship deeming that there "was no necessity for holding a considerable force at Sukkur."

The first proposition which I urge, and one which I have fully substantiated, is, that there was no political necessity for the warlike demeanour which Sir Charles Napier assumed from his first arrival in Scinde, the crisis during which only hostility on the part of the Ameers was to be ap-

prehended having been passed through in safety, and with *éclat*, before he entered the country; that by his menacing attitude, harsh conduct, and extensive military preparations, he gave consistency to the prevailing rumours of intended aggressions on our part which then agitated the Ameers, thereby causing the distrust in their minds which it was his duty, and the express command of Lord Ellenborough, that he should prevent, and impelling them to adopt the measures of self-defence, which were afterwards assumed as ground for aggression against them. That, in a word, his hostile preparations were uncalled for, opposed to his instructions, and calculated to produce the evil which he professed a desire to avert.

Secondly, I have shown that Sir Charles Napier, in giving effect to his policy, pursued the very opposite course to that which he had promised: that, so far from doing *any thing* "to induce the Ameers to accept quietly the treaty"—"sparing no pains to convince them that neither injury nor injustice are meditated," he withheld every assurance he was empowered to give, that was calculated to remove their fears, suspicions, or objections.

A third proposition which I have been compelled to establish, is, that Sir Charles Napier neglected to inform the Governor-General that the additional terms imposed by the new treaty were far more stringent than His Lordship supposed, and that no means existed for affording the indemnity which his Lordship had directed: and that,

at the same time, he kept both the Ameers and myself in perfect ignorance of Lord Ellenborough's benevolent views, thereby deceiving the three parties most interested in the matter,-and the parties whom it was most important to put in possession of the real merits of the case.

Fourthly, I have shown that Sir Charles Napier *at once* pronounced judgment of conspiracy against the Ameers, on evidence entirely defective.

A fifth proposition, bearing directly on the question of the Scinde policy, and one which I have established, is, that on the 8th December 1842, Sir Charles Napier proclaimed a large portion of the Ameers' territory as ceded to the British Government "by treaty concluded with the Ameers," and prohibited their subjects from paying the revenue thereof to their Highnesses, before any such treaty had been negotiated.

Again, I have shown that, on the plea of the Ameers having assembled armed bands, Sir Charles Napier invaded their territory, and, on the 20th December 1842, marched in hostile array against the capital of Upper Scinde, without previously adopting the obvious and simple means in his power to ascertain whether any such hostile bands existed, which was denied by the Ameers.

I have clearly proved that Sir Charles Napier induced Meer Roostum, the existing Chief of Upper Scinde, to place himself in the power of his younger brother, Ali Morad, when the latter usurped the Turban of Sovereignty, and that this transaction the General confirmed, although himself suspicious

of foul play; and further than this, that he suppressed Meer Roostum's protest against this proceeding, and refused all inquiry into the transaction, although assured that war must be the consequence of withholding it.

An eighth proposition, which, notwithstanding Sir Charles Napier's assertions to the contrary, I have established, is, that Sir Charles Napier countenanced certain exactions by Ali Morad, which seriously affected all the Chiefs of Upper Scinde, and supported him in those exactions, (which he had previously been warned would force the Belooches to war,) although proof was offered that he had been misled into the measure; that he withheld all information on this subject from the Government of India, until after it had committed itself to a decision on the Scinde question, and afterwards, when called upon for the required information, supplied it only partially and in a disingenuous manner.

The ninth proposition is one which has not been attempted to be denied, though mysticism has been practised with a view to divert attention from its real merits. It is that Sir Charles Napier, on the 5th January 1843, marched against Emaumghur, the castle of Meer Mahommed Khan of Khyrpoor, without any previous declaration of war, although that Chief had committed no offence against the British Government; and destroyed the said castle, and plundered what it contained, although no resistance was attempted, and although he had assured the Ameers that he "would neither plun-

der nor slay them, if they did not make any resistance."

I have further proved that Sir Charles Napier obliged the Ameers of Lower Scinde to give refuge to the fugitives from Upper Scinde, thus involving them in the quarrel; though conscious that the former had acceded to every thing required of them, and that I had requested to be permitted to proceed to Hydrabad, for the express purpose of preventing the admission of the fugitives to that capital—a request avowedly preferred with a view to prevent the Ameers of Lower Scinde from being drawn in (committed) to the cause of their cousins of Khyrpoor, from which they otherwise would have stood aloof.

It is with reluctance, and only because I have been driven to it by himself and his brother, that I have been compelled to show how Sir Charles Napier withheld from the Governor-General the "Notes" of the "Conferences" held with the Ameers, on the 8th and 12th February 1843, and with their deputies on the 13th, on the only opportunities which they had of defending themselves; that he also failed to transmit to his Lordship all that I had urged in their favour, and several letters and protests which had been addressed to him by the Ameers—thus securing a decision against them on *ex parte* evidence. Not only do I complain that these documents were suppressed by Sir Charles Napier for months, until demanded from him, from time to time, by the Governor-General, in consequence of references from England; but

that even then they were not *all* supplied, and those transmitted were forwarded neither honestly at once, nor in their chronological order. And finally, I maintain that Sir Charles Napier assigned most contradictory reasons for having withheld the "Notes of Conferences."

A twelfth proposition, which, had I not been compelled to do so, I should not have brought forward, but which I have also fully substantiated, is, that Sir Charles Napier charged the Ameers with treachery in their attack on me, when he ought to have known the charge to be untrue. That he distorted dates to support the charge, and withheld the documents in his possession which would have disproved it.

Further, I complain, and have clearly proved, that the Ameers who surrendered after the battle of Meeanee, were induced to do so by the assurance that no harm should befall their brethren who were not personally in the battle; and that the latter were induced by those assurances, and the understanding that pardon had been extended to Meer Hoossein Ali, to dismiss their garrison, and make over the fortress at a time when the British General had no means of attacking it. That three days after thus obtaining possession of the fortress, those Ameers were also seized and imprisoned, and shortly afterwards transported to India, together with Meer Hoossein Ali, and all their sons and male relatives who were residing in the fortress; and that every thing belonging to

them, private as well as public property, was taken possession of by the prize agents.

Again, I have shown that the Princesses and families of the Ameers were treated with unexampled harshness and indignity, and were obliged to leave the fort without any adequate provision or arrangement made for their shelter, protection, and subsistence, after having been deprived of all their household goods and property.

I trust I have satisfactorily demonstrated that the treatment which the Hydrabad Ameers met with, compelled Meer Shere Mahommed of Meerpoor to adopt defensive measures, and that this Prince's overtures for terms then rejected, if reasonably met, would have put an end to the war.

Another proposition, neither to be gainsaid nor more leniently enunciated is, that Sir Charles Napier has most cruelly and unjustly traduced the private and public characters of the fallen Ameers, on no shadow of evidence whatever, (so far as yet produced,) while my testimony in their favour, given in writing to Sir Charles Napier on the 26th January 1843, was withheld.

That Sir Charles Napier so despised the Belooches, while all his measures were calculated to drive them to desperation, that he risked the honour of his country's arms by marching on the capital of Lower Scinde with an inferior force, although warned by me that all the Belooches of the nation would by his advance be compelled to unite to oppose him ; and that he rejected the aid

of her Majesty's 41st Regiment, and this *only four days before the battle*, after I had assured him that hostilities were inevitable.

Here are seventeen distinct propositions: I leave their consideration to my countrymen. In this summary I have not included the misrepresentations regarding myself, which are a secondary consideration, but their value and object will be appreciated by the reader in tracing the successive acts of injustice, violence, and political dishonesty which I have thus briefly enumerated.

I now submit the work to the candid judgment of the public. My defence has been written under many and great disadvantages. It has been weakened, moreover, by my having scrupulously endeavoured to avoid violating those rules to which all official men are subjected, however much they have been set at naught by my opponents. I have in fact abstained from making use of official documents in my possession, though of importance to my vindication. Would that I could have forborne revealing so much of the dishonouring page of our history which the Scinde transactions exhibit, but my defence has been wrung from me by the acrimonious assaults on my character and reputation, published by Majors-General William and Sir Charles Napier. I am satisfied that, notwithstanding the rank, power, and influence of my opponents, the celebrity which the one has acquired in the path of literature, and the false glory (by which I mean glory acquired in the prosecution of an unjust war of aggression) which surrounds the

other, I shall be held to have, in these pages, successfully refuted all their serious accusations, and to have proved that no portion of the culpability which attaches to the conquest of Scinde, ought henceforth to be imputed to me.

Whilst these passages are passing through the press, war with all its horrors has been rekindled on our frontier, and victories, though dearly bought with a loss of officers and men unprecedented in the annals of British India, have been won by the devoted gallantry of our troops, stimulated by the noble example and personal conduct of the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of India. Let the military reader cast his eye over the map, and he will at once observe that by the annexation of Scinde, and the subversion of a friendly native Government, we have secured no accession of strength to our north-west frontier. On the contrary, it has become weakened and exposed. I have shown that it was mainly to the assistance which I derived from the deposed Princes of Scinde, that the safety of Major-General England's column in retiring from Candahar is to be attributed. The resources of Scinde and the neighbouring territories were then placed at our command to a far greater extent than is likely, now that the country is our own, for the hearts of the people are *not* with us, but against us. How otherwise are we to account for the loud complaints that exist, that our troops are crippled for want of carriage? There cannot at this moment (January 1846) be less than 20,000 men of all arms in Scinde,

and reinforcements are still being poured in with the accustomed energy of the Bombay Government. It remains to be seen what portion of this large army will be able to move in comparative ease with the army of the Sutledge; and I shall be much surprised if more than half can be spared for this object, even under an emergency like the present. The remainder will be required for the protection of the country itself from foes, external and internal, though in 1841, less than 3000 sufficed for that purpose. No contrast could be greater than between our present weakness and our former strength in Scinde,—that is, for all legitimate purposes.

To those who accustom themselves to trace cause and effect, it will not be difficult to assign the conquest of Scinde as one of the principal causes of the destructive war now raging on the banks of the Sutledge. To the superficial observer it may seem that the Seikhs, by their invasion of our territory, are without excuse; and certainly by the deeds of violence and bloodshed which the Seikh army has lately committed against their own Government, they have placed themselves beyond the sympathy of the whole civilized world; but who can fail to detect *this* excuse, that, warned by the fate of a neighbouring nation, they may have been impelled by the instinct which pervades the human breast in every nation and in every clime, to take the initiative, as the only chance left of securing themselves from a similar fate.

It is true, and as consoling as it is true, that the

sin of aggression cannot be imputed to us in the present conflict; but it would be bold to deny that the present war with the Seikhs is not the fruit of former acts of aggression and spoliation on our part. Reverentially I say it, from my first entrance into public life, I have thought that the British nation ruled India by the faith reposed in its honour and integrity. Our empire, originally founded by the sword, has been maintained by opinion. In other words, the nations of the East felt and believed that we invariably held treaties and engagements inviolate; nay, that an Englishman's word was as sacred as the strictest bond engrossed on parchment. Exceptions, no doubt, have occurred; but scrupulous adherence to faith once pledged was the prevailing impression and belief, and this was one of the main constituents of our strength. Unhappily this charm has, within the last few years, almost entirely passed away. Physical has been substituted for moral force—the stern, unbending soldier for the calm and patiently-enduring political officer; functions incompatible—except in a few and rare cases—have been united; and who can say for how long a space—under such a radical change of system, such a departure from all which the Princes and People of India have been accustomed, and most highly value and cherish—the *few* will be able to govern the *millions*?

In further illustration of my meaning, I may remark, that on the 1st October 1842, a proclamation was issued by the Viceroy of this vast empire to the Princes and Chiefs of India, declaring that,

content with the limits which nature has assigned, peace was our only object—the extension of our rule beyond those limits uncoveted; and, as if to give weight to the declaration, our brave soldiers were decorated with medals bearing the inscription—*Pax Restituta Asiæ*. In a few short months afterwards, however, the din of arms again resounds, and the Princes and Chiefs of India observe the deputy of the same Governor-General goad the rulers of Scinde into resistance and despair—two destructive battles fought—those rulers dethroned and transported as exiles to India—their nation, according to their conception, enslaved—and their country annexed, by another proclamation, to the British empire.

How can this be reconciled? And on what nation can such events have produced a more lasting impression than on the Seikhs, whose country adjoins that of Scinde? It is unfortunate, in these cases, that the public cannot avoid identifying the Governor-General with the acts of the agents he employs. They thus regard the transactions in Scinde as having emanated from his authority. These pages have shown how fallacious this impression is, and that the Governor-General was, from some cause unexplained, kept in ignorance of facts essentially necessary for the right comprehension of the measures adopted by his agent. The impression, nevertheless, exists; and our repeated violations of faith are charged—not on the deputy who committed them, but upon the repre-

sentative of Majesty, under whose orders he is supposed to have acted.

The moral effect of a single breach of faith is not readily effaced. "I would,"—wrote the Duke of Wellington, on the 15th of March 1804,—"I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every position in India, ten times over, to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and the advantages and honour we gained by the late war and peace; and we must not fritter them away in arguments drawn from overstrained principles of the laws of nations, which are not understood in this country. *What brought me through so many difficulties in the war, and the negotiations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else.*"

It is another great misfortune, that acts like those I am deploring, prevent those who are really imbued with pacific views and intentions, from acting upon and carrying them out. The present Governor-General, to his honour be it said, has endeavoured to carry out his wise and pacific intentions to the utmost verge of prudence and forbearance. Who shall, however, venture to say that his measures, which we know to have been purely defensive, have not, under the warning of Scinde, been regarded by the Seikhs as indicative of meditated aggression on the first favourable opportunity; or that the bold step they adopted of invading our borders, is not to be attributed to the distrust and suspicion excited in their minds by the subjugation of the Princes and People of Scinde?

If, in the performance of the necessary duty of self-vindication, I have read a warning to those in power to retrace their policy before it is too late, may it not be neglected; for nations require occasionally to be reminded that "the love of conquest is national ruin, and that there is a power which avenges the innocent blood." Our interests in the East require consolidation, and not extension of our dominion.

If, in the performance of the secondary duty of self-vindication, I have read a warning to those in power to retrace their steps, before it is too late, may I not be neglected; for national righteousness [illegible] finally to be reminded that "the love of conquest [illegible] individual sin, and that there is a power which avenges the innocent blood." Our interests in the East require consolidation, and not extension of our dominions [illegible] passed by the late war and [illegible] our Indian fame, array of arguments drawn from words and principles of the laws of nations, which are not understood in this country. *What brought on us so many difficulties in the war, and the [illegible]? The British good faith,* [illegible] anything else."

It is another great misfortune, that acts like those I am deploring, prevent those who are really imbued with pacific views and intentions, from acting upon and carrying them out. The present Governor-General, to his honour be it said, has endeavoured to carry out his wise and pacific intentions to the utmost verge of prudence and forbearance. Who shall, however, venture to say that the measures which we know to have been [illegible] under the warning of [illegible] as instances of [illegible] attributed to the [illegible] people of Britain.

APPENDIX.

LETTER TO SIR CHARLES NAPIER IN REPLY TO THAT READ BY MR ROEBUCK IN PARLIAMENT.

LONDON, 40, LOWER BROOK STREET,
26th October 1843.

MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—Owing to the Bombay Mail having put back, I only received your letter of the 22d July the day before yesterday, which, in justice to you, and because I am sure you would wish me to do so, I have sent to Lord Ripon, as containing your explanation regarding the "Notes of Conference," &c., which otherwise would not reach Government before the arrival of the next mail, being too late for the Governor-General's despatches which left Bombay on the 26th August, and he could not have been informed of the after opportunity on the 7th September.

If Lord Ripon will allow me, I shall also forward this to his Lordship, that he may have the explanations on both sides, which, together with the despatches from Lord Ellenborough by this and the next mail, would, I trust, suffice to enable Government to form their own judgment as to the disposal of the Ameers, without the necessity, I should hope, of involving us in personal, and especially public, discussions, from which no good could accrue to the public interests, and certainly I should look for none to my own, (to which you allude,) which latter, however, have in no ways been involved in the question, because, for the sake of the Ameers (whose case I considered of more importance, and my bounden duty fairly to represent to the constituted authorities when by them called upon to do so) I have purposely ab-

hold in the desert should be destroyed, and it was well to show that we could *reach* such places, but I neither know, nor question, nor justify, the grounds on which that measure was resolved, on the eve of the execution of which I joined you; but I wish to show what effect it may reasonably have had on the minds of the Ameers, who neither knew the *grounds*, nor that the Emaumghur chief had *ever been accused* even of acting against us in any way.] Well, after all this, they find your army in full march on Hydrabad; whether conscious of evil or not, they dread being *similarly accused* and *punished in the same breath*, without previous opportunity to prove their innocence (if innocent;) moreover, they are doubtless informed that you had written to Ali Morad thus—that you are "*well aware that all the Ameers* of *Khyrpoor and Hydrabad*, with the exception of yourself [Ali Morad] and Meer Sobdar, are united to oppose the British Government"—[vide your letter to Ali Morad, dated 23d December 1842;] they thus had reason to consider themselves *pre-judged* and *pre-condemned*. Is it to be wondered at, under these circumstances, that they should have had recourse to the only chance of preservation which they thought remained to them, [if you force them to bay, by advancing your army to Hydrabad,] by preparation for resistance in the event of attack, should they find that accepting the treaty formerly tendered is not sufficient to ward off the approach of your army; with, as *they only can then understand*, no other object than utterly to destroy them? They *have* accepted the *treaty, and* so *have the Upper Scinde Ameers*, and they hoped so doing would have relieved them from all additional claims, and from the visitation of your army at Hydrabad; but to their disappointment they find no hopes held out that the very severe additional imposts* on the Khyrpoor Ameers [which affect the interests of all the nation more or less] would be removed, nor could they obtain from me any pledge that your army will not come on here, although I assure them that I do not *think* you would do so on their accepting the treaty; still, as I cannot say so *positively*, they consider that I am deceiving them. I dare say they never did really issue the orders

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* *Over and above the Treaty.*

stained from bringing forward at all, which I am glad of, as I now find, from your letter, that I erroneously attributed to the wilful neglect of Lord Ellenborough, what I had complained of.

Independent of my private feelings, which would suffer severely by appearing before the public in any way opposed to one from whom I have experienced so much personal kindness as yourself, and for whom I have the highest admiration and esteem, I have not the presumption to suppose that my opinions would be received by the public for a moment against those of one so justly celebrated as "Sir Charles Napier;" neither could I expect, or wish the Government *openly* to condemn what has been done in Scinde, however the matter may be viewed by the Cabinet; all I hope for, and all I advocate, is, that the Ameers should be pardoned and restored, as a gracious act of clemency on the part of Her Majesty, if not to their Sovereignty at least to their estates; and when my opinions have been asked by the legitimate authorities, THAT I have advised; in *justice*, the Ameers being, I consider, sufficiently punished for all they have done; and in policy to prevent future embarrassments, which I foresee must arise from their expulsion, not to be averted by the temporary submission of the other chiefs, to which I should attach no consequence whatever, nor should rely on *at all* beyond so long as we maintain an overwhelming army in Scinde, at a cost infinitely exceeding any revenue we shall ever derive therefrom, with a certainty, besides, of sooner or later being embroiled with the Brahoes, Affghans, &c., &c. Foreseeing, as I do, these difficulties, I should have been unworthy the confidence of my Government, which I have so long enjoyed, and should have been untrue to my employers, had I not endeavoured to prevent them.

But although we differed in our views as to the policy to be pursued in Scinde, after the surrender of the Ameers—and although we differed in our judgment of the events which led to the battle of Meeanee, I see not why unworthy motives should (or possibly *could* to *you*) be attributed to either of us; to *you* for acting on your own judgment, or to *me* for forming a different opinion and endeavouring to impart it to you; therefore I beg you to dismiss from your mind the anxiety on my behalf which you so kindly express at the conclusion of your letter, for however I may be condemned by the public, in the event of your

appealing to its decision, still, as my own judgment acquits me, *and* my own heart approves of the course I have pursued, I shall bear my fate with resignation, I trust, although I shall deeply regret the occasion, especially if it should cause any coolness on your part towards me personally, for however *I* may think hostilities might have been prevented had you pursued a different course, I have never uttered, or thought, that *you* acted in any way otherwise than what YOU considered best on public grounds alone, and I well knew that, from dictates of humanity, you abstained from hostilities so long as YOU thought you could do so without risking your army and compromising your duty.

You justly remark on my comparative inexperience in military matters, but I trust that I never presumed to obtrude any opinion opposed to your own having reference thereto [the proposition regarding Meerpoor, to which you refer, having principally political objects in view, so far as I recollect, but which could only have been submitted for your *consideration*, not intruded against any *previously expressed* views of your own.] At the same time, I cannot divest myself of the conviction, formed on many years' experience in political employment in India, and particularly from four years' intimate knowledge of the Ameers and people with whom we had to deal—which it is surely no reflection on you that you could not have acquired intuitively—*that our objects could have been attained without war*, and that, had you personally heard what the Ameers had to say for themselves,* (not having authorized me to enter at all into the case in dispute, *i. e.*, regarding Meer Roostum, &c.,) you would have given such assurances as were just, without derogating from your dignity, which would have sufficed to cause the dispersion of the Belooches, and an amicable settlement; this was the object of my suggesting to you to drop down the river to the agency at Hydrabad, (in a steamer,) where the Ameers would have met you without an idea of treachery, (how could THEY *in* SCINDE possibly hope to escape the consequence of such treachery after they had seen us successfully invade and RE-invade *Affghanistan?*) *or*

* Not on the subject of the Treaty, they having executed it, but regarding the engagement to Ali Morad.

having an opportunity to attempt it ; such indeed never COULD have been thought of by *them*, the proposition being *entirely my own ;* neither could your absence from your army for three or four days, while it remained in position some fifty miles from that of the Ameers, have risked it in the interim.* You thought otherwise, however, and certainly if we were to judge the natives of India strictly according to European notions and customs, the Ameers' petty prevarications and assembling their Belooches, (although really only with a view to self-defence, lest they should be unable to avert your advance on their capital, or in the foolish hope, that by an imposing appearance they might obtain a mitigation of the arrangements relating to Meer Roostum,) *you* might, not unnaturally, form the judgment you did ; but I will venture to say, that were we to deal equally rigidly with all the native powers in India, not one would exist in a year to come.

* (15th June 1844.) At the time the above was written, I had no copy of my letter to Sir Charles Napier alluding to this subject, but I now find it published in the 2nd Blue Book, (No. 53,) and that my proposition to the General to go to Hydrabad—"*was only in the event of the draft treaties being executed by both Ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde,*" when there could be no plea for hostilities. Moreover, I there find, that the proposition to march the troops to Meerpoor was merely contingent on *the event of an amicable settlement with the Ameers of Upper* and *Lower Scinde*, inducing Sir Charles to send back the surplus troops to India [as had always been intended in such case] by *that route*, as most convenient in every respect ; such demonstration, at the same time, insuring the submission of the Meerpoor Chief, should *he alone* have remained aloof. Sir Charles Napier thus states—"Your wanting me to go to Hydrabad without my army, added another proof to my conviction that they had deceived you ; and finally, your proposing to me to march the troops to Meerpoor completed the proofs." The following were my propositions :—"If you do not intend the troops to come any further, *in the event of the draft treaties being executed by both Ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde*, I hope you purpose coming here yourself, where your presence would facilitate every thing that remains to be settled ; of course I do not mean with reference to myself, for I could join your camp as easily as stay here, but to avoid delays in referring to the Ameers, &c." Again :—"The Meerpoor Chief has not sent his vakeel, but I expect him to-morrow ; should he not come, perhaps you may deem it advisable to march the troops to Meerpoor, *which* would be all in the way of such portion of your force returning to *India*, going by Bhooj, or to Guzerat, *should you wish to send them that way* as quicker than *via* Carrachie, where, moreover, there is greater difficulty in providing boats than at Mandavie in Cutch." —(Dated 10th February, 1843, No. 52 of 2d Blue Book.)

Under such impressions, which in the latitude you allowed to me, I freely communicated to you, [as I previously had done the impracticable nature (to effect *pacifically*) of the arrangements in Upper Scinde, in my letters from the time we parted at Emaum-ghur, and finally reverted to* when we met personally after the action,] I advised the restoration of the Ameers, but seeing little prospect that my individual opinion would weigh with you, I then gave you that of Mr. Robertson, (late Governor of Agra,) whom, in my wish to afford you the advice of so distinguished and long experienced an Indian Diplomatist, I had consulted, on meeting him at Sukkur. At the same time I asked your permission to show our correspondence to Sir George Arthur and my confidential friends; this was on the morning I took leave of you, to which you replied—"Certainly, Outram, I can have no objection; I am always a friend to discussion which elicits truth" —your exact words, I think, but at all events their purport, which I now quote, because, from the remarks in your letter regarding the "Notes of Conference," you appear to have forgotten the circumstance. Lest you still should not remember it, I will also quote from a letter I received from you dated 5th March, showing that you were fully prepared for my placing the case before Sir George Arthur and his colleagues, *i. e.*—"Now as you propose your (views) to the Bombay Government, it becomes essential to prevent his Lordship considering them to be the same. He will probably hear of yours and ask mine.—I say they are different, because, besides those we took before the battle, you since told me you thought the Governor-General should restore the Ameers." Until the receipt of that letter, I had supposed, that although out of kindness to me, you might not have given my *opposing view* to His Lordship *as* MINE, still I had relied that what I had represented on behalf of the Ameers, in *their* inability to speak for themselves, would have been conveyed, *in some shape or other*, to the Governor-General, for such consideration as His Lordship

* In allusion to the following passage in Sir Charles Napier's letter—"You wished to keep the peace because you thought the policy unjust, and as you said to me, 'every drop of blood shed you thought was murder.'" *I said* this to Sir Charles Napier *after* the slaughter at Meeanee—*I wrote* to him that it would be so *twenty-two days before* that battle.

might deem it worthy of, however little weight you yourself gave to it: but, even then, it never occurred to me that the "Notes of Conference" could otherwise than have been transmitted, being strictly of an official nature, and the only opportunity afforded to the Princes of Scinde for formally communicating their sentiments to the representative of the British Government, and through him to the Governor-General, on an occasion so important to their own interests as receiving a new treaty so seriously affecting them, which I had been delegated to require their acceptance of. When asked the question, therefore, by Lord Ripon, I had no hesitation in saying, that, as I had no doubt you must have received the "Notes," I could have none that they had been transmitted to Lord Ellenborough, our communications being uninterrupted up to that period. I must *confess* I readily took it for granted that the Governor-General, in his off-hand manner, had omitted to forward those documents, but never for a moment contemplated that he might not have received them.

This disposes of the first portion of your letter, as to placing the Ameers' case before Sir George Arthur, which could not have been *without* the "Notes of Conference" of course. By the bye, you allude to only *two* having been received, and infer that the *third* must have been intercepted; you are led to suppose, I presume, that there were *three* "conferences" with the Ameers, consequently that one is missing, but by the *third* is meant my conference, *not* with the Ameers themselves, but with their *Deputies* on the 13th, which I forwarded to you on the night of that day, and as, in acknowledging my letter of the 14th, you allude to the *pledges* solicited by those Deputies [thus—"Do not pledge yourself to any thing whatever. * * * They need send no proposals. The time has passed, and I will not receive their messengers. There must be no pledges made on my account."] I conclude you received it also.

My simplest mode of replying to the principal points adduced by you against the Ameers, is by transmitting the annexed copy of a letter addressed to you, which I was just on the point of finishing when interrupted by the attack on my residence on the morning of the 15th February, after which event its delivery was of no use, as I then joined you and pleaded to the same effect

verbally, so far as *then* might serve the Ameers and avert the future evils I apprehended, though not urging much that is therein noticed, because no longer applicable ; but a few remarks are called for on one or two of the subjects adverted to by you,—first, with respect to Meer Roostum's assertion that you had *made* (made is the term in *your* letter, but the Ameer's expression at the conference was—" by the General's own *direction* I sought refuge with Ali Morad") him give himself up to Ali Morad, it appears *virtually* correct, according to Oriental notions, although not *literally* so, for, situated as he then was at Khyrpoor, the mere intimation of your *wish*—thus " take your brother's (Ali Morad's) advice, go to him, and either stay with him, *or I will escort you to my Camp,"**—would be considered by him tantamount to a *command* to do the former, and I question whether he did not look upon the latter portion of your message as a *threat*. Besides, we do not know how far the message may have been coloured by the messenger, having too much reason to suppose that almost every native who came to you at that time was under the influence of Ali Morad's bribery.

Secondly, regarding my suggestion to move on " Meerpoor," I cannot find it mentioned in any of my letters of which I retain copies,† but I have some recollection that at one time I expected the Upper Scinde Ameers to retire in that direction rather than

* This is quoted from your letter to me of the 11th February, the portion *underscored* being so in the original. By the bye, I observe in that letter you mention your intention to send the " conferences" to Lord Ellenborough, thus—" I have no power to discuss former treaties, but I will " state to Lord Ellenborough what the Ameers say," (alluding to the conference of the 8th February,) " because it is fair to them. I will at once send Lord Ellenborough a copy of what passed ; for though I do not think he will alter one iota, he may incline to show them favour in the Roree district affair."

† 1st June 1844. I had no recollection of having made such a proposition, but from the positive manner in which Sir Charles Napier asserted it in his letter to which this is a reply, and as at one time I considered it likely that the Khyrpoor Ameers might fly in that direction, I thought it possible I might have tendered some such suggestion as herein mentioned ; now, however, that I have seen my letter in the Blue Book, (vide extracts in a previous note,) it is clear that I only contemplated the troops taking that way *on their return to India, after every thing had been settled both with the Hyderabad and Khyrpoor Ameers.*

involve their Hydrabad brethren, or that all might fly together with a view to seek refuge in the desert, and I may have suggested an advance on Meerpoor with a view to cut them off from that side, while our steamers would have deterred their flight across the river on the other, in the hope that seeing escape impossible, they might be induced to comply with our demands, for I well knew that so long as your army *did not come down on Hydrabad* itself, the Lower Scinde Ameers at least [and their Belooches,] not being compelled to risk a battle elsewhere than at the *capital*, (which, in my memorandum dated 1st November 1842, I told you I feared they might be in "*defence of their capitals*,") were not likely wilfully to seek it; and I myself have no doubt *that had you gone to Meerpoor* in the first instance, but ultimately been driven to hostilities, you would not have been molested there, or opposed *elsewhere than at Meeanee* when you approached Hydrabad, and at the time you did so; but I beg to remind you, that if, at any time, your army was placed in jeopardy, it was so against my advice—given so far back as on the 1st November, three and a-half months previous, (which is quoted in the annexed letter of the 15th February.) You, of course, were the only judge what force would be adequate for what you determined to undertake, and you were certainly not misled by me into undervaluing the enemy, (as was so much the fashion in your camp, and by you found fault with previous to the first collision.) You may recollect that, even after the successful resistance of my small escort against a host of Belooches, I told you (on the day before your first battle) that you would be *desperately* opposed, it being a very different case, I said, they acting on the *offensive* against my party, and on the *defensive* against your army,—having their families, honour, and capital at stake.

Thirdly, as to the Ameers' assertions that they would dismiss their Belooches, it is very likely that they may not really have attempted to do so, and it was hardly to be expected that they should, seeing that, *notwithstanding such promises*, [which, however, I doubt not they would have kept had I given the reasonable assurances they asked for,] no pledge whatever would I give that justice would be done to Meer Roostum "*should he prove his case*," or any positive assurance that your army should not

come on, which even at the eleventh hour would, I am confident, have caused the Belooches to disperse peaceably, as they did in 1839, when Sir Henry Pottinger pledged that Sir John Keane's army should not cross to the Hydrabad side of the Indus: had I given a similarly positive pledge that you would not approach beyond Hala, it would have been attended with the same result.* My opinions at the time on that subject, as well as re-

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* (1st June 1844.) In this reply to Sir Charles Napier's letter of the 22d July, I took no notice of his remark—" The Ameers' anxiety that I should halt, proved to me, past all hesitation or doubt, that they were only trying to gain a day or two that they might bring 50,000 men to Meeanee instead of 25,000" [consequently that my wanting him to halt proved that I was deceived by the Ameers]—because I then supposed that Sir Charles Napier merely alluded to my wishing him to halt when the Ameers had signed the treaty, which I willingly avow; but in the Blue Book I now find that Sir Charles states [in a letter to the Governor-General, No. 143, dated 3d July 1843, 20 *days before* that addressed to me,]—" He (Outram) joined me on the 16th at Matharee, and still wanted me to delay my attack for a day! yet six hours' delay would have added 24,000 men to the forces of the Ameers at Meeanee." Had I then conceived that this *after event* was referred to, I should have reminded Sir Charles Napier of the following facts, *i. e.* that the delay alluded to was only suggested in *preference* to what I considered a *greater evil*, and greater delay, which was at one time contemplated by the General, who, when I met him at Muttaree, had resolved to *leave his baggage there*, and advance on the 17th to clear the shikargahs—an undertaking which must have caused at least one day's harassing work to the troops in making their way through the forests, (even if unopposed,) and, perhaps, another day in *returning to the baggage*; consequently, it would have been at least the 18th, if not the 19th, before the General could have advanced to Meeanee. Not only would greater delay have been incurred by that measure, therefore, and greater exposure suffered by the troops, but the retrograde movement on the baggage—especially if after a skirmish—would have been regarded by the Belooches as a defeat on our part, and encouraged them accordingly: moreover, I had my misgivings as to the consequences of plunging into such dense jungles with such inferior numbers, where every man of the enemy could have come into play, and in their own mode of warfare, where the advantages of discipline would have been lost to us, it was therefore *only in preference to that measure* that I proposed to the General to take steps to burn the shikargahs previously [that night (16th) or next morning,] in order that *when the army did advance* it might do so *with its* baggage. Ultimately Sir Charles Napier resolved that burning the shikargahs from the river flank should be simultaneous with the advance of his army by the road on the opposite flank of the woods, *but taking the bag-*

specting the intercepted letters found on Hyat Khan, &c., are fairly stated at the time in my letter of the 15th February, previously alluded to; and those views were mainly confirmed by the intelligence which reached Bombay, *also at the time of the occurrence*—from the Rao of Cutch. If the materials for history, to which you allude, are grounded on information, or documents, brought forward *after the event* by Moonshees and hangers-on of camp, (always ready to cater to what they suppose, and so readily ascertain with their proverbial cunning, to be the great man's views, without the party thus informed having an idea of the imposition,) any person versed in Asiatic ways would regard it very doubtfully, and I am sure you must long ere now have been satisfied of the truth of what I represented to you during the march to Emaumghur, *i. e.*, that the information furnished by Major Clibborn's spies was dictated by Ali Morad (or his minister Ali Hoossein) in whose pay they were.*

You next refer to the reasons assigned to His Lordship for being silent on matters which I had brought to your notice; the kind motive for which, as regards myself, I very gratefully appreciate, while I regret it both on our own account, and on that of the Ameers, because causing this correspondence, so painful to me in every respect, and because it now appears probable, from Lord Ellenborough's letter of the 9th February [published in the Blue Book] that had His Lordship been sooner aware of the extent of the exactions from the Upper Scinde Ameers, *in excess of his own treaty*, [which he therein shows his readiness] to modify, my *inability to negotiate regarding which* was the *real cause of the war*, he would have authorized such modifications as would have enabled me to bring about a peaceable settlement.

The remainder of your letter is chiefly personal to myself, and hardly calls for reply, except perhaps the observations—"Of course, in despite of such feelings [against our proceedings in Scinde,] you exerted yourself as you were bound to do after accepting office, but I confess I see nothing which calls for public

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gage WITH *him*, which was the object I had in view! We having then thrown away the scabbard, I had no longer any wish to delay the conflict, which was then inevitable.

* Unknown to that gentleman of course.

thanks"—which possibly might be construed into a taunt, but I am sure is not intended as such; for God knows, and I think you must be sensible of it, my only object in returning to Scinde, beyond the principle of implicit obedience to orders, was to aid you in the endeavour to effect a peaceable settlement, by counteracting the arts of Ali Morad,—in gratitude for much personal kindness I had experienced from you, as well as, I hope, from even higher motives. Having failed in that object, ambitious as I am of military glory, to promote which no better field is ever again likely to offer, still, under my impressions of the *cause*, I would far rather have foregone all future chance of acquiring fame, than *sought*, of my own free will, to share in the glorious (as *military* events) contests which have ensued, although most readily would I have continued *after hostilities broke out*, could I have been necessary in simply a military and irresponsible capacity, or had I had any hope of alleviating the fate of the Ameers.

With reference to my complaint regarding the Governor-General's neglect of my earnest endeavours to effect *amicably* His Lordship's objects, as you did not report them, of course it falls to the ground: but in order that the nature of that complaint may be understood, should this correspondence be placed on record, I quote the following extracts from my letter referred to—dated 20th March last:—"Now as there has been no occasion in my life in which I can more conscientiously feel that I have more devotedly exerted myself to serve my country and Government, than during the distressing period of my last visit to Scinde, and as in no case have I ever been stronger in striving to execute my orders—although adverse to my own feelings—I do consider that I ought not to submit in silence to His Lordship's injustice in this instance, *for I am sure that you must have informed him* that I really *had* exerted myself arduously in the very difficult position in which I was placed,—with or without success, is not the question,—were the matter investigated, it would be seen that, under the circumstances, *success* was *impossible*: the point is, did I do the utmost that could have been done, situated as I was, to effect an amicable arrangement? I maintain that I did; and, more, that I spared no personal exertion or exposure to accomplish that object. If this is not admitted by His Lordship, I must challenge inquiry into the fact. I have taken, and intend to

take no public notice of His Lordship's treatment of me on former occasions, for however the manner [of my removal from Scinde] may be condemned, the changes were those of a system which he chose to introduce, and which it is not for me to call right or wrong, but in this case I cannot, in honour, permit the tacit condemnation alluded to."

You understand "*thanks*" according to the usages in England, but in India the practice is far different. Why so, I know not, unless probably with a view to foster a feeling of "*honour*" and "*pride of reputation*," which is the best check that could be established over the members of the services in India, to whom such immense powers and interests are necessarily intrusted, at such a distance from the mother country. Accordingly, in India thanks are bestowed on every occasion of the termination of service of the nature to which I lay claim, and the absence of any notice whatever is understood to denote disapprobation, especially under the circumstances described in my letter of the 20th March, *i. e.*—"Such is the effect of Lord Ellenborough taking no notice whatever of my exertions as Commissioner, either on your communicating to His Lordship your permission for me to retire, or on appointing Brown in my place. I will confess I am sensitive on this point, for in the same proportion that I am grateful to you for giving me a name as a soldier, I am irritated at Lord Ellenborough continuing to disgrace me as a political officer, which allowing me to depart without the slightest acknowledgment of my endeavours to effect an amicable settlement with the Ameers, and of my honest exertions to carry out the views of Government, however opposed to my own opinions, is tantamount to: as a political officer, I am disgraced without such acknowledgment in this particular instance, for your despatch represents me to have been *deceived*, and that, backed by my *retirement without any notice whatever*, must cause the supposition that I am cast over as a discomfited political [against whom all classes are so ready just now to carp] found wanting at the hour of trial."

On my arrival in England, I was sent for by Sir Robert Peel, at whose desire I, of course, stated my views regarding the Ameers and Policy in Scinde. Afterwards, when called on by Lord Ripon in his capacity of President of the Board of Control.

of course I did the same; also to the Chairs of the Court of Directors; to Mr. Arbuthnot also, who met me by appointment from the Duke of Wellington,—at the same time pleading the cause of the Ameers in every way in my power, and especially exonerating them from the erroneous charge of treachery in *their attack* on me, as in honour bound, and as impelled by my conscience to do—considering myself the more particularly called upon to do so, they themselves having been debarred from pleading their own cause by close imprisonment, and denied access to, or communication with, friends, European or native, as I had been given to understand. Moreover, I have, in my private communications, endeavoured to enlist the sympathy of ministers—which I consider due to the Ameers in their fallen state,—by contrasting the mode of their treatment with that of the family of Tippoo Sultan after the fall of Seringapatam; it having, in my humble opinion, been unnecessarily harsh, and quite inconsistent with the honourable treatment I assured them of on your behalf, when they surrendered; for which I do not impute blame to you, who cannot know what is customary towards Indian princes in such cases, but those Indian officers attached to you ought to have known, and might have told you. I have also privately called their attention to the fact of the pledges which I communicated to the Ameers not present in the battle, *i. e.*, Meers Sobdar and Mahommed Khan—that they would not be molested if they remained quietly in their houses, and to the pardon you granted to Hoossein Ali, all of whom have since been arrested and thrown into prison, I am informed, but for what reason I have been unable to ascertain. In so doing, however, although I cannot but reflect on your *Indian* inexperience, I never attributed to you, or *could* attribute, any motives in the slightest degree derogatory to your *honour*. You *conceived* that the Ameers purposed your destruction, and that by effecting theirs you secured benefit to the people of Scinde, and to our own interests, at the expense of a few *tyrannical aristocrats!* I was *convinced* that the Ameers had only defensive objects in view, and were ready to concede anything reasonable rather than brave our power, and that their overthrow would cost the lives of thousands without really securing advantage either to the Scindians or to ourselves; uncalled for, I conscientiously believed, either by necessity or expediency.

even if the principle could be upheld, that evil may be done for good to come thereof. I am sure Sir Charles, that under the impressions which I entertain respecting our proceedings in Scinde, and which I never concealed from you, you will not blame me for acting as I have done, and that you, under similar circumstances, would not have acted otherwise; should you feel disposed for a moment to entertain any feeling of irritation towards me, I wish for no other test than a reference to your own heart as to how you yourself would act in a like case.

So anxious have I been, nevertheless, to avoid committing my opinions in conversation, especially to members of the opposition, that (as I wrote you two months ago on forwarding the newspaper controversy with your brother William) I have almost wholly debarred myself from society during the time I have been in England. Relying on Government acquiring a thorough knowledge of the rights of the case, and under the obligation of my late official position, I have allowed to pass entirely without notice the numerous plausible newspaper and pamphlet advocacies of the annexation of Scinde which have appeared, grounded on misapprehensions of the real nature of the case against the Ameers consequently their stro gest points of defence and real cause ot the war [the exactions *beyond* Lord Ellenborough's treaty] were never even touched upon by the Ameers' advocates before the publication of the Blue Book, and have yet been but slightly noticed, as evidently misunderstood. To your rel tions, however, I candidly stated that we were diametrically opposed in our Scinde politics, while I gratefully acknowledged your forbearance towards me, in permitting me so freely to urge my views when opposed to your own; I fear they conclude that because we thus differ in opinions we must necessarily be e emies, which is very distressing to me, for my feelings towards you, my dear Sir Charles, ever have been, and always must be,* those of sincere esteem and grateful remembrance.—Believe me to be, my dear Sir Charles, very sincerely yours,

(Signed) J. OUTRAM.

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* I had not then seen the Second Scinde Blue Book, and could no have conceived what is there published.

LETTER REFERRED TO IN THE ABOVE.

Dated HYDRABAD, 15*th February* 1843.

MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I received during the night your letter of the 13th, and have sent the enclosure to Meer Mahommed Khan,* which, however, I am neither much surprised at, nor much condemn in my own mind, however strongly I express myself to him on the subject. You may recollect in the memorandum I submitted to you before going to Bombay, dated 1st November last, I stated that I thought we could obtain our objects by merely "sequestrating the districts and towns we demand from them, where our troops are already located, and the occupation of which they are in no condition to oppose, and are not likely to attempt to do so, although possibly were we to *advance against their capitals to dictate terms, a feeling of honour might drive them to resist, and thus cause much sacrifice of life and property*, more particularly of the more unoffending classes. I *did* apprehend that "marching on their Capital" might drive the Ameers to collect all the means they could for opposition, which otherwise they would not attempt. The Ameers have seen our army marched to Khyrpoor on account of the robbery of dâks,' &c., which *they knew* Meer Roostum's party—to whom it was attributed—*had not perpetrated;* and notwithstanding his previous acceptation of the treaty, they have seen Meer Roostum pursued and deposed, [pray recollect I am stating their case, not intruding my own views,] in consequence [they say] of either a forged, or enforced, abdication, when under restraint, and his consequent flight instigated by Ali Morad, who they suppose is playing into our hands [or we into his—much the same.] They have seen the Emaumghur chief pursued to his castle in the desert, and that castle utterly destroyed, although unaware of any fault towards us that he had committed, and although unopposed. [Here again I disclaim giving my own views; since we *did go there*, it was, I consider, for the general good that such a strong-

* Copy of the intercepted letter summoning his people.

hold in the desert should be destroyed, and it was well to show that we could *reach* such places, but I neither know, nor question, nor justify, the grounds on which that measure was resolved, on the eve of the execution of which I joined you; but I wish to show what effect it may reasonably have had on the minds of the Ameers, who neither knew the *grounds*, nor that the Emaumghur chief had *ever been accused* even of acting against us in any way.] Well, after all this, they find your army in full march on Hydrabad; whether conscious of evil or not, they dread being *similarly accused* and *punished in the same breath*, without previous opportunity to prove their innocence (if innocent;) moreover, they are doubtless informed that you had written to Ali Morad thus—that you are "*well aware that all the Ameers* of *Khyrpoor and Hydrabad*, with the exception of yourself [Ali Morad] and Meer Sobdar, are united to oppose the British Government"—[vide your letter to Ali Morad, dated 23d December 1842;] they thus had reason to consider themselves *pre-judged* and *pre-condemned*. Is it to be wondered at, under these circumstances, that they should have had recourse to the only chance of preservation which they thought remained to them, [if you force them to bay, by advancing your army to Hydrabad,] by preparation for resistance in the event of attack, should they find that accepting the treaty formerly tendered is not sufficient to ward off the approach of your army; with, as *they only can then understand*, no other object than utterly to destroy them? They *have* accepted the *treaty, and* so *have the Upper Scinde Ameers*, and they hoped so doing would have relieved them from all additional claims, and from the visitation of your army at Hydrabad; but to their disappointment they find no hopes held out that the very severe additional imposts* on the Khyrpoor Ameers [which affect the interests of all the nation more or less] would be removed, nor could they obtain from me any pledge that your army will not come on here, although I assure them that I do not *think* you would do so on their accepting the treaty; still, as I cannot say so *positively*, they consider that I am deceiving them. I dare say they never did really issue the orders

* *Over and above the Treaty.*

for the dispersion of their troops [which they declared they had done, in the hope of obtaining the required assurances from me;] seeing that even their *acceptance of the treaty* could not extract *any thing* satisfactory from me, it is natural enough that they should continue their preparations for their own protection, and having been told that the circumstance of their troops continuing in force *insures* your advancing and attacking them, of course they think that *nothing but war is left to them.* The Ameers have repeatedly warned me of the consequence, and have even urged me to leave this, "as they would be compelled to go with their Belooches whether they would or not"—but as possibly the object of such warnings was to frighten me into giving the assurance they want, and as it is my duty to induce them to submit peaceably to what I am ordered to carry out, [whatever my own opinion of the matter may be,] I, of course, must continue at my post, which may possibly induce them to comply. My remaining here will not produce hostilities, unless they are now determined on war at any rate [which indeed is, I fear, forced upon them *now*, whatever I may do;] whereas, so long as I do stay, the door is left open to them, and it shall continue so until the last moment.

I was interrupted in this by the announcement that the Belooches were approaching to attack, so I must hereafter report the result.—I remain, &c., &c., yours very sincerely,

(Signed) J. Outram.

THE END.

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